Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Tenggara. And later that month, he visited his political rival within NU, AbuHasan, who invited him on a trip to honour the graves of the NU’s founders inSurabaya and Jombang, and eased (momentarily) the greatest split that NU hadexperienced in decades. 61 By early 1997, Abdurrahman appeared to haveovercome Suharto-backed attempts during and after the NU’s 1994 congress tounseat him—attempts that had also involved Hartono, Habibie and Siti Rukmana.By the same token, he had kept Habibie off-side, and had made attempts tomanoeuvre himself and his NU constituency into a stronger bargaining positionwith Suharto’s circle whilst seeking to diminish the influence of the Musliminterests in ICMI.Before the Suharto-Abdurrahman rapprochement the NU chairman had mostlydefended NU’s independence from state encroachments involving Golkar andICMI. However, as Abdurrahman reconciled with Suharto, he correspondinglychanged his attitude to Golkar’s and ICMI’s forays into pesantren. He said thatThere is no resistance by the pesantren to government efforts to developthe pesantren. ICMI expects us to participate [in these efforts]—it need notcause a reaction from NU. Also, the local pesantren leaders should not beconfined to following the policy of PBNU [NU’s central board]. If theychoose to join Golkar and work with the government, that is their business. 62The NU chairman had obviously overstated things when he claimed that therewas no resistance by pesantren to government incursions. However, he wascareful to explain that NU was not a monolithic organisation and ‘there was nofixed pattern of relations between NU and the government’. 63Colleagues of Abdurrahman and NU’s membership responded to his apparentreconciliation with Suharto and support for Siti Rukmana’s Golkar campaignwith a mixture of concern, bewilderment and betrayal. There were sympathisersand supporters who defended his actions. For example, at a meeting of P3M (anNU-linked NGO), one speaker maintained that Abdurrahmanhas only got close to the government and Suharto to protect NU [from stateinterventions]. Besides, NU must have access to the centre of power. Youcannot achieve anything for your community if you do not have access tothe power brokers.However, the speaker also notedMANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 119NU already has its long established pockets of political culture and will notbe greatly affected by what Abdurrahman does or who he invites to NU, orwho he takes around the pesantren circuit. 65Not surprisingly, NU’s PPP supporters were outraged. The Secretary General ofMuslimat and PPP supporter, Susy Witiajar, claimed that Abdurrahman had lost
120 NAHDLATUL ULAMA: BETWEEN INCORPORATION AND INDEPENDENCEa lot of credibility at the grassroots. The Muslimat members [from PPP], inparticular, are highly critical of his accommodation with Siti Rukmana andGolkar. It is very clear that Abdurrahman moved close to Golkar in order toprotect his own leadership position.’ 66 The leader of P3M and liberal scholar,Masdar Mas’udi said, ‘the youthful supporters of Abdurrahman feel betrayed byhis accommodation with the state. They were brought up on his ideas ofdemocracy and democratic struggle, then they witness his actions that contradictthe kind of democratic behaviour that they were taught by Abdurrahman tobelieve in.’ 67In summary, in the context of intra-elite power struggles, the NU chairmanmanoeuvred himself and NU between a difficult position of opposition toSuharto, maintaining NU’s independence from state arrangements, and securingNU from heavy state interventions. He was faced with the problem of how torespond to threats and pressures from the state to support Suharto and Golkar,whilst trying to maintain the integrity of NU’s independence. However,Abdurrahman did not always act alone in negotiating a narrow gorge between theavailable choices. He also responded to pressures within NU. On the one hand,we considered how NU’s RMI leaders and Murdiono pressured Abdurrahmaninto conciliation with Suharto. For a period, Abdurrahman even seemed toembrace accommodation with Suharto by taking Golkar leaders on a politicaltour of the pesantren.On the other hand, there were counter-pressures in NU to remain independentfrom Suharto and to oppose Golkar’s and ICMI’s incursions into pesantren. NUwas such a large and heterogeneous organisation with different, sometimesopposing, political orientations. Under these conditions, it would have beendifficult for Abdurrahman to maintain a consistent standpoint and still representall of the concerns of the organisation. When he caved in to pressure to reconcilewith Suharto he faced the reprobation of pro-democracy elements in NU anddefenders of NU’s independence.CONCLUSIONThe conflicts in NU were partly a product of Suharto’s corporatist strategies,which affected the different issues and pressures in NU and influenced thestandpoints adopted by Abdurrahman. Suharto tried to bring as much as possibleof Muslim interests behind Golkar so that he could achieve unanimousendorsement at the presidential election. He attempted this through strategies ofcorporatist capture, using organisations like ICMI, MUI, and Golkar to penetratepesantren and garner support. Corporatist capture served to fragment interests, toreinforce pre-existing cleavages, and to create new ones, in NU. Suharto’sinitiatives to neutralise NU’s influence in PPP after 1984 had a similar outcomeof reinforcing and creating divisions between members in NU who backed PPPand those who supported Golkar. One purpose of the fragmentation strategy
Page 2 and 3:
Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
Page 5 and 6:
ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
Page 7 and 8:
viThe University Student Movement 1
Page 9 and 10:
viiiWhile many authors have used a
Page 11 and 12:
PrefaceThe book is the product of d
Page 13 and 14:
Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
Page 15 and 16:
xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
Page 17 and 18:
xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
Page 19 and 20:
xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
Page 21 and 22:
xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
Page 23 and 24:
2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90: 68 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
Page 96 and 97: Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
Page 98 and 99: MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 126 and 127: Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
Page 150 and 151: Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
Page 184 and 185: MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
Page 190 and 191:
MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
Page 198 and 199:
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203:
Page 204 and 205:
Page 206 and 207:
Page 208 and 209:
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
Page 214 and 215:
Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
Page 216 and 217:
THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Page 228 and 229:
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
Page 238 and 239:
MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
Page 256 and 257:
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
Page 258 and 259:
Page 260 and 261:
Page 262 and 263:
ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
Page 264 and 265:
REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
Page 266 and 267:
REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
Page 268 and 269:
REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
Page 270 and 271:
REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
Page 272 and 273:
REFERENCES 251National University,
Page 274 and 275:
REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
Page 276 and 277:
IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
Page 278 and 279:
INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
Page 280:
INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
show all

Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?