Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 145manage the rivalry in an apparent effort to defuse the potential for open conflictagainst Habibie and ICMI. He became the chief patron of ICMI and endorsed theappointment of the new vice-president, (ret.) Gen. Try Sutrisno, and two formervice-presidents to ICMI’s council of patrons, which took place in August 1993 atthe Presidential Palace. Try (a man long considered to be in Benny’s camp) hithertowas viewed as Habibie’s adversary and was known to be critical of ICMI. 66In a sign of rapprochement, after the August meeting, the press carriedpictures of a gathering of state officials, the military top brass, and sixty ICMImembers who witnessed Try warmly shaking hands with Habibie. In his publicaddress, reading from an official text of platitudes, Try outlined ICMI’s role inthe field of technological development, and as a promoter of nationalism andnational unity. He nonetheless indicated that he was not entirely satisfied withICMI by warning the organisation against becoming ‘trapped in narrowcommunalistic-sectarian behaviour’. 67 Highlighting his intended supervisory rolein ICMI, he warned its members to demonstrate vigilance (kewaspadaan) inorder that they did not ‘stray’ from agreed organisational channels and goals.Speaking off-the-cuff, he also hinted that much still had to be done to mendfences between ICMI and the military, as he cautioned ICMI against creating thepublic impression that ‘generational’ divisions existed within the armed forces. 68Try’s warning was a reference to the inclination of ICMI’s intelligentsia to viewthe armed forces as split between pro-Feisal/pro-Islamic officers and those anti-Islamic officers aligned against ICMI.The appointment of Try to ICMI can be considered as one of several attemptsby Suharto to maintain a shifting balance of competing interests within andoutside of ICMI (and Golkar) in order to preserve his own autonomy and power.On the surface, at least, relations between Habibie and ICMI on the one hand,and the armed forces’ leadership on the other seemed to have improved. Despitesurface appearances, there remained a strong undercurrent of dislike forHabibie’s leadership position as technology minister and Suharto’s closeconfidant.Defence PurchasesOne year later, in mid-1994, a controversy erupted over Habibie’s purchase ofwarships from the former East German navy, as antagonisms between thetechnology minister and his military adversaries became public. Mainstreammilitary officers resented Habibie for taking over lucrative state contracts, andmaking foreign deals over their heads, in military hardware purchases. Habibie,like Sudharmono before him, was unpopular for commandeering militaryhardware purchases from the defence department. Habibie not only underminedthe military’s budgetary control of defence purchases, but he also deprived themof non-budgetary kickbacks.For example, in 1993 he arranged the purchase of twenty-four Hawk fighterjets from Britain. In addition, to their chagrin, the armed forces leadership was
146 INTRA-ELITE RIVALRYforced to buy aircraft, which were considered inferior to planes availableoverseas, from Habibie’s IPTN plant. Creating the greatest controversy, however,was his purchase of thirty-nine dilapidated warships from the former EastGerman navy. Habibie bought the warships at bargain-basement prices but hisplans to refurbish them at an estimated cost of US$1.1 billion (about threequarters of the official defence budget) drew sharp criticism. He had made thelatest purchase, debiting it to the defence department’s budget. 69Consequently, in retaliation, military officers and the economic technocrats—who did not share Habibie’s vision for a high-tech, high-cost economic take off—forged an open alliance against Habibie’s purchase of the ships. The Minister ofFinance, Mar’ie Muhammad, and the Minister of Defence and Security, Gen. EdiSudrajat, publicly criticised Habibie’s purchase and severely slashed hisprojected refurbishment budget to US$320 million. 70 Suharto had appointedMar’ie Muhammad, an economic conservative, to the position of Minister ofFinance in 1993 partly to maintain a check on Habibie’s over-zealous projects.Comprehensive press coverage of the intra-elite dispute was one of the factorsthat prompted Suharto’s information minister to revoke the licenses in June 1994of two national magazines, the Tempo and the Editor, and of the popular tabloidDeTik. Habibie was thought to have been behind the decision to ban thepublications, as Habibie’s military antagonists were apparently behind the presscampaign to expose the ICMI chairman’s bad management of defence purchases. 71The ICMI intelligentsia closed ranks to defend their beleaguered chairman,insisting that he was not responsible for banning the publications. Instead, theyaccused Tempo of conspiring with ‘non-Muslims and the military to destroyHabibie’s reputation over the ship purchase. The issue was portrayed not interms of press or other democratic freedoms, but one of Muslims versus non-Muslims.’ 72 The partiality of ICMI against Tempo was not entirely unwarranted,as the news weekly regularly had adopted a critical and partisan editorial stanceagainst the Muslim association.The public exposure of intra-elite rivalry between Suharto’s civiliansupporters and ABRI had led Suharto to curtail the period of political opennesswith a clampdown on the press.Rivalry within ICMISuharto’s sponsorship of ICMI had not only created a political divide betweenpro-ICMI and anti-ICMI interests. It had also stimulated rivalry within ICMIbetween competing patrons seeking to use ICMI as a potential client base for theadvancement of their own future power aspirations. That is, at ICMI’s congressin 1995, several of Habibie’s adversaries joined the Muslim intellectualsassociation, including Suharto’s daughter Siti Rukmana (see chapter five).Measures to offset Habibie’s influence within ICMI also included theappointment in August 1997 of Siti’s close ally Lt Gen. (ret.) Hartono, the newMinister of Information, to a senior advisory role within ICMI. At the time, Siti
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Page 126 and 127: Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
Page 140 and 141: Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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