Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 95the sixty-eight strong delegation from Aceh. In addition, the most senior leaderof NU, Rais Aam Ilyas Ruhiyat, who was also an active member of MUI’smanaging board, led the West Java delegation. 85In June 1996, the Golkar amalgam of thirty-one Islamic groups, FKOI, coordinatedby MDI, arranged a signed political statement recording a unanimousendorsement and prayer of support by thousands of Muslims for Suharto’srenomination. The Chairman of Golkar, Harmoko, and the Chairman of MUI,Hasan Basri, delivered speeches and witnessed the endorsement. Again, inMarch 1997, 150 Muslim leaders represented in MUI prayed at the state palacefor Suharto’s good health and next term in office. 86 ICMI did not join the othercorporatist organisations in declaring public support for Suharto, possiblybecause of its eagerness to deny earlier allegations that the association wasestablished as a support base for Suharto before the 1993 presidential election.However, this did not detract from the fact that ICMI still was a major pillar ofsupport for the Suharto regime.CONCLUSIONAlthough the New Order state’s corporatist initiatives spanned two to threedecades that witnessed state-Islamic relations shift from antagonism to closercollaboration, there emerged a common pattern. Throughout much of the NewOrder period, the regime sought to compartmentalise and fragment Musliminterests by capturing components (mosque, preachers’, ulama, dakwah,women’s, and intellectuals’ associations) of independent organisations (such asNU, Muhammadiyah, Dewan Dakwah, Persis) in state-chartered entities. Theamalgams were linked to government agencies and to Golkar so that thepotential for autonomous political organisation was subdued, deflected and underclose supervision. The regime re-channelled organisational activities into stateguideddevelopment oriented tasks and in support of Suharto’s presidency.ICMI shared similarities with the other corporatist initiatives. A broadspectrum of Islamic organisations and interests were brought into a peakorganisation for Muslim intellectuals. The grouping together of diverse politicalinterests within ICMI appeared to serve further Suharto’s strategy of stimulatingfragmentation, by bringing rival interests into the organisation. ICMI also soughtto absorb and re-channel the activities of the Muslim intelligentsia intodevelopment-oriented projects, in accordance with Habibie’s ‘iptek’ vision.However, ICMI was a product of state-Islamic accommodation. It wasestablished to co-opt strategic middle-strata elite into the existing powerarrangements, without providing them with sufficient means to endanger thestatus quo. If co-option failed to silence the dissension of individual members,they were excluded from incorporating arrangements and punished. Moreimportantly, ICMI was an example of the tactical deployment of incorporatedMuslim interests as a support base with which to counter-balance rival networksof power, such as influential segments of the military. This carried implications