Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGIME 205presidency, and they realised this required Suharto’s imprimatur. With Habibieas Indonesia’s future president, they could hope, as Habibie’s most trustedadvisors, to exert real influence on government policy. Therefore, senior ICMIleaders, Adi Sasono, Jimly Asshidiqie, and Achmad Tirtosudirjo, andintellectuals like Dawam Rahardjo and Nurcholish Madjid, promoted Habibie’scredentials as a man of research and technology, with ‘democratic’ leanings, areform-minded man who was well qualified to lead Indonesia into a new era of‘global knowledge economy’.They backed Habibie in tough competition with the technology minister’sopponents in Golkar, who preferred the choice of Harmoko, Try Sutrisno orother candidates for the strategic post. Suharto’s children, Siti Rukmana andBambang Trihatmojo, the majority of Golkar MPs, and Golkar memberorganisations such as the Self-help Family Association (MKGR), the TotalSelfhelp Cooperative (Kosgoro), and the Central Organisation for IndonesianSocialist Functionaries (SOKSI) strongly opposed Habibie’s candidacy for thesecond-in-command. 45 Suharto’s nomination of Habibie as the sole candidate forthe vice-presidential post subsequently saw the power struggle spill over intocompetition for cabinet posts.Contests for Cabinet PostsThis contest became obvious with the holding of the MPR general session, whenthe interim list of proposed cabinet members went into circulation (discussedabove). With Suharto’s close associates and family members gaining the lion’sshare of posts, finally it dawned on the ICMI intelligentsia that Suharto would notcountenance their presence in government, or their direct input into policy. Thestate’s strategy of incorporation no longer suited them and, consequently, theybegan to turn on Suharto’s New Order. They were slipping inexorably frombeing aspirant insiders into an irrevocable position of disadvantaged outsiderswho would have little stake in the current status quo under Suharto’s leadership.On 12 March, ICMI held a plenary meeting and outlined six points of concernover the proposed cabinet list then in circulation. A meeting at ICMIheadquarters followed this on the 13 th , at which Adi Sasono, accompanied byHabibie advisor, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, and ICMI intelligentsia, declared that ‘Ihope the cabinet list, which has been circulated, does not become reality’. 46 Aneditorial board of the magazine, Ummat, which included ICMI intellectuals andother reform minded luminaries, proposed an alternative ‘wish list’ of cabinetministers in rejection of the interim list. The Ummat’s list gave prominent rolesto ICMI members and figures sympathetic to the cultivation of small-scale, non-Chinese business interests. Topping the Ummat’s list was Adi Sasono, as Secretaryof State, the pro-ICMI Muslim general, Syarwan Hamid, as Minister of InternalAffairs, and the ICMI moderate, Nurcholish Madjid, as Minister of Educationand Culture. Another ICMI member and Gajah Mada academic, Mubyarto,would gain Minister of Cooperatives, Habibie’s advisor, Marwah Daud Ibrahim,
206 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAMinister of Social Development, and the economist and pro-Megawati PDIleader, Kwik Kian Gie, Minister of Industry and Trade. 47Yet, the aspirations of pro-ICMI Muslim interests were not accommodated, asthe government’s interim list turned out to be a close approximation of thecabinet announced by Suharto on the 14 th and sworn in on 16 March. The hopesof the ICMI intelligentsia that, with Habibie as vice-president, their ownaccess to power wer and influence over government policy would be enhancedwere shattered. Consequently, they became openly critical of Suharto and hisnewly appointed cabinet, in which Suharto’s children reportedly had played arole in choosing ministers and diminishing Habibie’s influence. 48Prominent Muslim leaders announced their immense dissatisfaction over thefact that those ICMI leaders who had gained cabinet portfolios were governmentbureaucrats regarded as unrepresentative of the Muslim community’saspirations. They expressed regret that figures like Adi Sasono, DawamRahardjo, Marwah Daud Ibrahim and Jimly Asshidiqie—leaders who wereconsidered to represent Muslim interests in ICMI—were overlooked. Thegeneral chairmen of Muhammadiyah, KISDI, Persis, Al-Irsyad, and PMIIstrongly articulated this viewpoint. A despondent Dawam Rahardjo bestexpressed the profound sense of betrayal. He complained that the ICMIintelligentsia had, until then, continually defended government officials againstcriticism and in return the government had simply abandoned them. 49ICMI’s Secretary General was more stoic in his response but nonethelessadmitted his disgruntlement at the results, whilst calling for patience of his coreligionistsin order to avoid social conflict. 50 ICMI was not alone in expressingits disenchantment over the cabinet, as Indonesian’s social-political organisations(including the parliamentary fraction of the Islamic-oriented PPP), which werenot included on the cabinet, protested their exclusion. 51Events through to the middle of March, then, saw the ICMI intelligentsia shiftits position from one of cautiously broaching the need for reform to one of opendisaffection as they were displaced from power. Mutual displeasure andantagonisms between Suharto’s circle and ICMI spilled over into a tug-of-warover the choice of the organisation’s new chairman. At ICMI’s plenary meetingheld on 12 March for the election of a new chairman, the rumour circulated thatSuharto wanted Azwar Anas, the former Coordinating Minister for CommunityWelfare, as ICMI’s new head. The ICMI intelligentsia, not wanting a governmentbureaucrat in the top job, hurriedly collected signatures in support of their owncandidate. Their choice was Gen. (ret.) Achmad Tirtosudirjo (a founder of HMIand former head of Bulog who was already in his seventies) as chairman incharge of the daily affairs of ICMI. Achmad was elected by acclamation. Habibieremained the de jure chairman until his election to the presidency.The Muslim intelligentsia hoped that Achmad would provide the opportunityfor ICMI to loosen its dependence on Suharto’s circle and promote its ownagendas. Meanwhile, Achmad promised that he would try to make theorganisation a more independent and critically vocal forum for ‘voicing
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Page 176 and 177: MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
Page 184 and 185: MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Page 236 and 237: Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
Page 254 and 255: Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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Page 262 and 263: ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
Page 264 and 265: REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
Page 266 and 267: REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
Page 268 and 269: REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
Page 270 and 271: REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
Page 272 and 273: REFERENCES 251National University,
Page 274 and 275: REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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