Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISATIONS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 165reportedly for their membership of YKPK. Indonesia’s media carried reports of aso-called ‘de-Wahono-isation’ of Golkar and ‘di-YKPK-isation’ of PPP. 13One of the main objectives of the ‘rainbow group’ was to prevent Habibiefrom becoming Indonesia’s next vice-president in 1998. Gen. Edi Sudrajat wasone of the military top brass who had, in 1993, supported Try Sutrisno’snomination for vice-president against Suharto’s choice of Habibie, and had sincedecided to back those forces allied with the rainbow group. As Minister ofDefence, Edi had opposed openly Habibie over the latter’s appropriation ofdefence contracts. The former Minister of Environment and YKPK leader,Sarwono, had strongly criticised the sixth development cabinet of 1993, calling itunco-ordinated and of low-calibre, and had been castigated by Suharto for hiscriticism. Gen. (ret.) Harsudiono Hartas who, together with his mentor Gen.(ret.) Benny Murdani, had been sidelined after the appointment of the newcabinet in 1993, also apparently backed YKPK. Thus, the sharp rivalry in the oldcabinet had subsequently spilled over into support for organisations like YKPK,as the politically marginal forces prepared to retaliate against Habibie in theapproaching presidential election of 1998. 14It was hoped that the mushrooming organisations would provide the marginalfigures with political vehicles with which they could gain access to power andhave better bargaining positions vis-à-vis Habibie and ICMI in an anticipatedpost-Suharto era. People of all political shades speculated that the 1998 electionwould bring about a period of transition triggered by presidential succession. Theorganisations were also a response to the inability of the established politicalsystem to channel people’s aspirations. As such, there was a strong tendency ofpoliticians to hark back to a pre-Suharto period by trying to resurrect oldpolitical affiliations of the 1950s as a means of re-channelling people’saspirations. We have already mentioned the New Parkindo. On 26 October, aNew PNI was created under the leadership of Nyonya Supeni, a former PNIleader and ambassador under President Sukarno. Following this, a NewMasyumi was established but few old Masyumi sympathisers were willing toidentify with the party, partly out of fear of a military reprisal, but also becausethey had made accommodations with Suharto through ICMI. 15An independent elections watch-dog (Komite Independent Pemantau Pemilu,KIPP) was also set up on 15 March 1996 to monitor the approaching generalelection and make sure that no ballot-box or other election irregularities occurred.To the government’s consternation, the formation of KIPP spawned a number ofother initiatives to establish independent election monitoring bodies in April. InMarch, the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Gen. (ret.) Rudini, made a publicappeal to Suharto’s regime not to suppress new organisations like PCPP, YKPK,the New PNI, and the KIPP. He insisted that these organisations reflected awidespread desire of the people to participate in the life of the nation. In additionto these organisations, quasi-political parties, including the People’s DemocraticParty (PRD), and the Indonesian Democratic Union Party (PUDI) were founded.The decision to found new quasi-parties was encouraged, no doubt, by the
166 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAregime’s lifting of restrictions on freedom of assembly (December 1995) and itsintroduction, in January 1996, of regulations enabling people to hold social,cultural and political gatherings without official permits. 16 Overall, theproliferating ‘rainbow’ groups constituted initiatives by opponents of the regimeto open up democratic space and establish alternative channels of interestrepresentation and political participation outside the restrictive corporatiststructure.Although PRD was viewed as a potentially significant threat to Suharto’sregime because of its grassroots following (discussed below), the other‘rainbow’ organisations did not constitute a direct threat to power arrangements.As elite-centred initiatives with no real grassroots membership, theseorganisations were limited in their ability to represent people’s unfulfilled andrising expectations. They were, at the end of the day, set up as vehicles withwhich to promote the ambitions and interests of one set of (sidelined) elitefigures, who wanted to gain inclusion in the power structure, against another setof elite interests that were more closely allied to the state.Having said this, the power holders still perceived the ‘rainbow’ organisationsas a threat because they operated outside of the authorised political rules, whichprohibited the formation of new political organisations. Moreover, the highlypaternalistic state normally regarded open dissent as an intolerable act ofinsubordination or subversion. Although Suharto tolerated a certain level ofdissent in order, among other things, to allow people to let off steam, he was notaccustomed to the extent of criticism that leaders of the new organisationsdirected against the New Order establishment. An example of this criticism was,at a two-day national meeting of YKPK in Surabaya (8–9 January 1996), whenspeakers highlighted the Suharto government’s failure to provide democratic,accountable and transparent government that would permit people’s genuineparticipation. Included among the dignitaries present at the national meetingopened by Wahono, were Marzuki Darusman of the National Human RightsCommission, the NU Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid and several prominentformer PPP and Golkar leaders. The ‘de-Wahono-isation’ and the ‘de-YKPKisation’of the parties had hurt a number of these figures. 17The Suharto government, no doubt, also was worried about the prospect of adomino effect should the new organisations provide an example for others tofollow. Despite the government’s apprehensions, it was not until the ‘rainbow’organisations lent their support to broader dissent in society coalescing round afaction of PDI led by the popularly-elected Chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri,that Suharto’s circle of power holders decided to take decisive action againstthem.
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Page 140 and 141: Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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