Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISATIONS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 18938. The author was a participant-observer to the unfolding events and riots of the 27 thand 28 th , insofar as he was caught in the middle of the riots and clashes betweenpolice-military units and protestors.39. Sjadzali and Lopa, Keterangan Pers, pp.17–18; author’s own eyewitness accountsof incidents on 27 and 28 July 1997 in Menteng-Central Jakarta locations.40. The government had already brought blasphemy charges (for insulting the ProphetMuhammad) against Permadi, with the trial opening on 6 July 1995, after he hadpublicly contradicted a statement made by the military commander of Central Javathat Megawati was unfit to lead the PDI. Earlier in the year, in March, and inretaliation against Permadi, the government sought to mobilise Muslim outrageagainst the Permadi for having, in April 1994, called the Prophet a dictator at agathering of students at Gadjah Mada University. At the gathering Permadi hadbeen highly critical of Golkar, Harmoko and Habibie and had focused on the issueof the presidential succession. 1996: Tahun Kekerasan, pp.34–5; Fealy,‘Indonesian Politics, 1995–96’, pp.32–4.41. See chapter five for an account of BAKOMUBIN and other corporatist initiatives;interview with Toto Tasmara (leader of BAKOMUBIN and BKPRMI), 13November 1997.42. Interview with Toto, 13 November 1997; Ummat, 2 September 1996; Serial KutbahJu’mat, September 1996; Media Dakwah, September 1996; Serial Khotbah Ju’mat,September 1996.43. The head of the women’s wing of NU (Muslimat), Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi,attended the meeting at which the joint statement was made. According to Aisyah,‘Representatives of all Islamic organisations attended. At the meeting the MUIcondemned the riots. Without avail, I tried to suggest a softening of MUI’s language.Not long after this gathering at the MUI headquarters the social political wing ofABRI invited all Islamic groups to attend the armed forces’ clarification of eventssurrounding the riots.’ Interview with Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi, 11 March 1997;Gatra, 10 August 1996; Tiras, 25 July 1996; Media Dakwah, August 1996.44. Gatra, 14 September and 5 October 1996.45. Gatra, 10 August 1996.46. Gatra, 10 August 1996.47. Gatra, 17 August 1996.48. Tekad, 5 August 1996.49. Interview with Hussein Umar, 24 September 1996; Media Dakwah, September1996.50. For example, on 9 August, Yusuf Hasyim (the NU leader of Tebuireng Pesantren,Jombang, Central Java, and the uncle and adversary of the NU chairman) helpedorganise a meeting of 200 ulama at the Shangri-la Hotel in Surabaya. At themeeting, attended by East Java’s Brawijaya Military Commander and its Governor,the ulama publicly denounced the 27 July riots. Two days later, Suharto’s generalsmarshalled together a crowd of between 30–50,000 people in Jakarta to declaretheir oath of allegiance to the government and to denounce PRD as the architect ofthe riot. Chief of ABRI’s Social and Political Affairs, Lt Gen. Syarwan Hamid, theJakarta regional military commander, Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, the Jakarta regionalpolice chief and the Jakarta governor were among the state officials who attendedthe public gathering. On 31 August and 1 October, two separate mass gatherings ofIndonesia’s main Islamic youth organisations were held in East Java. Clad in
190 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAdistinct military-style uniforms, the Barisan Ansor (the para-military wing of GPAnsor) organised the first gathering of approximately 40,000 of its supporters at theBrawijaya Stadium, Kediri. The Muhammadiyah Youth Preparedness Commandarranged a gathering of around 70,000 of its supporters at the Tenth of NovemberGelora Stadium in Surabaya. As on other such occasions, East Java’s Governor andtop-military brass attended the mass meetings. Indonesian Times, 12 August 1996;Straits Times, 12 August 1996; Media Dakwah, September 1996; Gatra, 5 October1996.51. Gatra, 5 October 1996.52. Republika, 12 March 1997.53. ‘Wawancara Anwar Harjono’, Humas Manajmen Kampanye Pemilu.54. Abdurrahman’s usually critical voice became somewhat muted in late-1996, oncehe had made his rapprochement with Suharto, Siti Rukmana and Gen. Hartono.Heryanto, ‘Indonesia: Towards the Final Countdown?’, p.111.55. Fealy, ‘Indonesian Politics 1995–96’, p.34.56. See chapter nine.57. Louise Williams, ‘Victory at a cost’, Asia OnLine, 31 May 1997.58. Forum Keadilan, 2 June 1997.59. Tiras, 28 March 1996; Lowry, The Armed Forces, pp.211–12.60. Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, p.143.61. Tiras, 11 April 1996.62. Rasyid, ‘Indonesia: Preparing for Post-Soeharto Rule’, pp.155–6.63. Panji Masyarakat, 15–31 January 1996.64. Other accounts reported incidents of growing dissent within PPP, as disaffectedleaders at branch and provincial level (West Java, West Sumatra, South Sulawesi,Riau, and West Nusa Tenggara) protested the selection of leaders by PPP’s CentralLeadership Council. Tiras, 28 March and 25 April 1996.65. Panji Masyarakat, 15–31 January 1996.66. Panji Masyarakat, 15–31 January 1996.67. Republika, 13 January 1996.68. Jawa Pos, 4 June 1996; Tiras, 4 April and 2 May 1996; Jawa Pos, 21 May 1996.69. ‘Wawancara: Drs H Jusuf Syakir’, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu.70. ‘Kolom Buya: Ulama dan Pemilu’, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu.71. ‘Kolom Buya: Mewaspadai Politik’, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu.72. Suara Pembaruan, 23 February 1997; The Jakarta Post, 24 February 1997.73. ‘Kolom Buya: Pilihan Partai Persatuan’, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu.74. Interviews with leaders of GP Ansor (Bangil, East Java), 10 August 1997; KH.Choiron Syakur (Chairman of the Pesantren Wahid Hasyim in Bangil), 10 August1997; Hj. Ahmad Jaman (leader of Ansor, Pasuruan), 10 August 1997; KH. HafidHasyim (leader of Pesantren Darul Ulum in Pasuruan), 10 August 1997.75. Jawa Pos, 12 May 1997.76. ‘PPP Minta Aparat Tidak Bertindak’ and ‘DPC Se-Jateng Sepakat’, HumasManagemen Kampanye Pemilu: Tempo Online, 5–19 May 1997; Forum Keadilan,2 June 1997; Aspinall, ‘What price victory?’, Inside Indonesia, July-September1997; Louise Williams, ‘Jakarta acts against alliance’, Asia OnLine, 14 May 1997;Louise Williams, ‘Jakarta poll riots flare’, Asia OnLine, 22 May 1997; LouiseWilliams, ‘Growing violence a sign of Indonesian regime’s legitimacy is leakingaway’, Asia OnLine, 21 May 1997; Forrester, ‘Towards March 1998’, p.60.
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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