Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
166 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAregime’s lift<strong>in</strong>g of restrictions on freedom of assembly (December 1995) <strong>and</strong> its<strong>in</strong>troduction, <strong>in</strong> January 1996, of regulations enabl<strong>in</strong>g people to hold social,cultural <strong>and</strong> political gather<strong>in</strong>gs without official permits. 16 Overall, theproliferat<strong>in</strong>g ‘ra<strong>in</strong>bow’ groups constituted <strong>in</strong>itiatives by opponents of the regimeto open up democratic space <strong>and</strong> establish alternative channels of <strong>in</strong>terestrepresentation <strong>and</strong> political participation outside the restrictive corporatiststructure.Although PRD was viewed as a potentially significant threat to Suharto’sregime because of its grassroots follow<strong>in</strong>g (discussed below), the other‘ra<strong>in</strong>bow’ organisations did not constitute a direct threat to power arrangements.As elite-centred <strong>in</strong>itiatives with no real grassroots membership, theseorganisations were limited <strong>in</strong> their ability to represent people’s unfulfilled <strong>and</strong>ris<strong>in</strong>g expectations. They were, at the end of the day, set up as vehicles withwhich to promote the ambitions <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of one set of (sidel<strong>in</strong>ed) elitefigures, who wanted to ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>in</strong> the power structure, aga<strong>in</strong>st another setof elite <strong>in</strong>terests that were more closely allied to the state.Hav<strong>in</strong>g said this, the power holders still perceived the ‘ra<strong>in</strong>bow’ organisationsas a threat because they operated outside of the authorised political rules, whichprohibited the formation of new political organisations. Moreover, the highlypaternalistic state normally regarded open dissent as an <strong>in</strong>tolerable act of<strong>in</strong>subord<strong>in</strong>ation or subversion. Although Suharto tolerated a certa<strong>in</strong> level ofdissent <strong>in</strong> order, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, to allow people to let off steam, he was notaccustomed to the extent of criticism that leaders of the new organisationsdirected aga<strong>in</strong>st the New Order establishment. An example of this criticism was,at a two-day national meet<strong>in</strong>g of YKPK <strong>in</strong> Surabaya (8–9 January 1996), whenspeakers highlighted the Suharto government’s failure to provide democratic,accountable <strong>and</strong> transparent government that would permit people’s genu<strong>in</strong>eparticipation. Included among the dignitaries present at the national meet<strong>in</strong>gopened by Wahono, were Marzuki Darusman of the National Human RightsCommission, the NU Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid <strong>and</strong> several prom<strong>in</strong>entformer PPP <strong>and</strong> Golkar leaders. The ‘de-Wahono-isation’ <strong>and</strong> the ‘de-YKPKisation’of the parties had hurt a number of these figures. 17The Suharto government, no doubt, also was worried about the prospect of adom<strong>in</strong>o effect should the new organisations provide an example for others tofollow. Despite the government’s apprehensions, it was not until the ‘ra<strong>in</strong>bow’organisations lent their support to broader dissent <strong>in</strong> society coalesc<strong>in</strong>g round afaction of PDI led by the popularly-elected Chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri,that Suharto’s circle of power holders decided to take decisive action aga<strong>in</strong>stthem.