Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISATIONS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 167GROWING DISSENT OF THE ‘RAINBOW’OPPOSITION AND STATE RETALIATIONThis section of the chapter shifts to an analysis of grassroots agitation, much of itled by student, NGO and pro-democracy leaders seeking to harness populardissent. It considers how the newly established quasi-parties and rainbow groupsjoined coalition-building efforts, centred round Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDIfaction, against the political status quo. The analysis also deals with theretaliation by Suharto’s regime, as it engaged state instruments of coercion andrepression and its propaganda machine in a systematic campaign to eradicateopposition. Suharto’s regime resorted to policies of more direct coercion onceexisting political arrangements had clearly failed to ensure the continuedexclusion of autonomously organised interests that could mobilise mass society.In addition, Suharto’s circle sought to mobilise pro-government forces, includingincorporated Muslim interests, against the opposition. Finally, this sectionconsiders how societal interests retaliated against harsh state repression, reprisalsand manipulations, as these interests sought to create new space for their own—long denied—participation in the political life of the nation.Increasing challenges to, and confrontation with, the established order camefrom elements both within and outside of the state’s corporatist structure. Inparticular, the PDI faction led by Megawati became a rallying point for massdissent and a catalyst for coalition building against Suharto’s regime. This wasdespite the fact that PDI, until then, had been a largely subordinate andcompliant part of the corporatised party system. Megawati was the first popularlyelected party leader since the beginning of the New Order and she came torepresent a symbol of opposition. Some scholars argue that disgruntled segmentsof ABRI backed Megawati’s nomination to PDI leader (December 1993) inpossible rebuke to Suharto for reducing the military’s political role in Golkar andas a counter to Habibie and Muslim political interests. 18 Megawati’s election wasan historic defeat for Suharto, as it was the first time that heavy stateinterventions had failed to impose a pro-regime leader on a politicalorganisation. Subsequently, a diverse array of pro-democracy groups, new‘rainbow’ organisations, NGO activists, disaffected government opponents, andmillions of supporters rallied to her political banner in reaction to efforts bySuharto’s regime to derail her from leadership of the party. 19Megawati was perceived as a threat to the political status quo largely becauseSuharto’s regime did not tolerate any form of organised opposition to its rule,and because it constituted a challenge mounted from within the authorisedpolitical arrangements. It appeared as if PDI might break loose from itscorporatist containment, as it became a crucial rallying point for the forces ofopposition. The attraction of grassroots movements to Megawati’s banner wasdiametrically opposed to the established party system, which sought to preventthe autonomous mobilisation of social-political forces and the institutionalisationof opposition. Megawati was highly critical of the government’s record of
168 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAcorruption and cronyism, and had her name put forward as a presidentialcandidate. Suharto was unwilling to tolerate anything less than his ownunanimous endorsement as Indonesia’s next president at the MPR session of1998, and Megawati threatened his chances of being elected unopposed. Suhartowas also backing his daughter Siti Rukmana’s campaign to bring about a Golkarvictory in the PDI stronghold of East Java, which necessitated the defeat of thenew chairwoman. Megawati’s popularity as the eldest daughter of late PresidentSukarno—deposed by Suharto—her image as an incorruptible democrat andmotherly figure, and her symbolisation of Sukarno’s comeback against Suharto’scorrupt and arbitrary regime, attracted millions of new followers to PDI. 20Suharto’s battle against Megawati began in earnest after her assumption of thePDI leadership since 1993. Since then, constant attempts were instigated byofficers loyal to Suharto to unseat Megawati, including the setting up ofgovernment-backed rival boards of PDI. For instance, Gen. Hartono (then thearmy chief-of-staff) supported a rival board led by Yusuf Merukh against thePDI chief. At the provincial level, similar splits also were created in 1994 as thegovernment was behind the setting up of rival boards. The manipulations werejust one recent example of a common practice of Suharto’s circle to interfere inthe selection of party leaders, with the aim of cultivating rival factions in order toweaken the internal cohesion of parties. It was a classic example of Suharto’sexclusionary politics and tactical use of divide-and-rule based on fragmentingand neutralising opposition and preventing grassroots mobilisation.In 1996, the situation heated up considerably as the Commander-in-Chief ofthe Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung, the Chief-of-Staff of Social-Political Affairs,Lt Gen. Syarwan Hamid, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Lt Gen. (ret.)Yogie S.Memet, were behind efforts to establish a rival PDI congress in Medan.They recruited a former Chairperson of PDI, Soerjadi, and the leader of PDI’sparliamentary faction, Fatimah Achmad, to lead the campaign against Megawati.In East Java, the provincial government refused to allow Megawati to attend aPDI meeting to be held in January. The government-backed faction engaged in anumber of meetings and actions to support Fatimah’s and Soerjadi’s leadership ofPDI. 22The state-sponsored measures to cow and drive into retreat opponents metwith initial stiff resistance. Indonesia’s ‘floating mass’ of political and economicunder classes retaliated against their political exclusion as they sought re-entry intopolitics, not through existing channels, but through acts of civil and mass protest.In June, hundreds of thousands of Megawati supporters demonstrated against theplanned Medan congress in cities and towns throughout Indonesia. 23 On 20 June,security forces violently broke up about 12,000 pro-Megawati and prodemocracysupporters as they were conducting a peaceful long-march to thenational monument in central Jakarta. Megawati rejected the results of theMedan congress, held between 20–23 June, which elected Soerjadi as the newparty leader. Megawati supporters defiantly occupied the PDI headquarters inJakarta, holding a series of ‘mimbar bebas’ (free speech forums), at which they
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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