Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 25Emmerson illustrates how the Minister of Internal Affairs, Amir Machmud(also a military general) implemented the Golkar strategy, beginning within hisown department, as part of a broader effort to eliminate party influence from thegovernment bureaucracy. The aim was to create a new cadre of de-politicised civilservants and to imbue them with internal discipline and undivided loyalty to acentralised chain of command, presided over by President Suharto (the supremecommander of the armed forces). In line with the Golkar strategy, Machmudrequired staff at the Ministry to join a Corps of Functionaries for the Ministry(Korps Karyawan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Kokarmendagri), or face the threat ofdismissal. 10During the 1971 election campaign, Ali Murtopo organised rival KorpsKaryawan (Kokar) in governmental departments, ministries and institutions and,after the election, they were fused into a single organisation, the Corps of CivilServants of the Republic of Indonesia, Korpri. Machmud issued GovernmentalRegulation (PP No.6/1970), requiring civil servants to swear their sole allegiance(‘mono-loyalty’) to the government and cut their ties with the political parties. Inpractice, at general elections, civil servants were organised into voting forGolkar, and faced dismissal if they refused to comply. 11The Korpri strategy undermined the strength of some of the political partiesand the trade unions, by depriving them of substantial bases of support. Forexample, the Indonesian National Party (PNI) had drawn much of its supportfrom the bureaucracy, and the Islamic party, Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening ofReligious Scholars), had entrenched itself in the Department of Religion. Underthe new provisions, independent trade unions also were refused access to Korprimembers, and therefore were greatly weakened. In reality, however, state leaderswere unable to enforce rigidly mono-loyalty provisions, as some governmentemployees (especially from the Department of Religion) continued to vote forthe parties. 12The Korpri initiative was part of a wider strategy of the ‘Big Golkar Family(Golkar, Korpri, and ABRI)’, to enable the military and the bureaucracy topenetrate all levels of Indonesian society from the national level downward to theprovince, district, sub-district and village levels. This coincided with greatermilitary intrusion into the government bureaucracy, with military officersholding civilian office as governors, and district heads. These officials werecharged with bringing about a Golkar victory at local and national elections.Before the 1982 election, village chiefs became Korpri members under a newregulation, which effectively linked village headmen to the national governmentand helped facilitate the mobilisation of rural populations behind Golkar. 13Complementing this militarisation and Golkarisation of state and society, wasthe introduction of the ‘floating mass’ concept in 1971, whereby the politicalparties were denied access to their traditional constituencies below the districtlevel. Golkar established non-party functional and professional organisationswith which to re-channel the interests of the rural population. Between 1973 and1974, the government required various professional and community
26 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA UNDER SUHARTOorganisations to merge into state-dominated, non-competitive national peakorganisations (wadah tunggal) to represent the respective community interests inrelation to the state. For instance, the army-controlled Central Coordinating Bodyfor Farmers’ Mass Organisations (BKS Tani) was transformed into a morecentralised and unified Indonesian Farmers’ Harmony Association (HKTI) andsix fishermen’s organisations were amalgamated into the All-IndonesianFishermen’s Association (HNSI). After several trial attempts, the All-IndonesianFederation of Labourers (FBSI) was established as the sole association for thelabour movement. In 1985, FBSI was transformed into a more centralised andmonolithic organisation called the All-Indonesian Workers’ Association (SPSI).The state gave license to a re-defined Congress of Indonesian Women (KOWANI)and a re-defined Teachers’ Union of the Republic of Indonesia (PGRI). 14The functional groups system gave the government bureaucracy the means toby-pass the political parties and make direct links with society. Antlov, Cederothand Sullivan argue that in reality there was a sharp discontinuity between thepeak organisations and rural communities, which were organised into a plethoraof village-level cooperative and vigilance bodies along quasimilitary lines.Instead of having their interests channelled upward through these functionalinstitutions, rural communities were shut-off from national politics and decisionmakingabove the sub-district level. Instead, the functional institutions acted asmechanisms for sending state directives downward, and for managing andsupervising lower-level social activities. 15Suharto’s regime sought to contain the political parties within the corporatistframework, resulting in the law on party simplification of 1973, wherein theexisting nine political parties were forced to merge into two state-sponsoredparties. Four Muslim parties joined a new amalgam, the United DevelopmentParty (PPP) and two nationalist, two Christian, and a ‘socialist’ party entered theIndonesian Democracy Party (PDI). PPP and PDI were the only two partiesofficially permitted to contest the five-yearly general elections against the muchstronger Golkar machine. Ward, Liddle and Suryadinata have demonstrated thatmilitary and bureaucratic backing of Golkar, interventions in party leaderships,security vetting of party candidates, election fraud, vote-buying and intimidationall helped ensure that Golkar obtained landslide victories at the polls and that theparties remained fragmented and weak. 16The general elections aimed to garner for the New Order rulers a modicum oflegitimacy, and Golkar’s dominance was seen as a test of Suharto’s ability toimpose his will on the political system. One year after each general election, aPeople’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) would convene to ‘elect’ the presidentand vice president and decide on the broad outlines of state policy (GBHN) forthe next five-year term. The initial composition of the MPR was 920 members,consisting of the 460 members of the DPR (People’s Representative Council)and 460 appointees (including a quota of regional, special and functionalrepresentatives). At that time, the DPR comprised of 360 elected membersfrom Golkar and the parties in accordance with their share of the votes at general
Page 2 and 3: Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
Page 5 and 6: ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
Page 7 and 8: viThe University Student Movement 1
Page 9 and 10: viiiWhile many authors have used a
Page 11 and 12: PrefaceThe book is the product of d
Page 13 and 14: Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
Page 15 and 16: xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
Page 17 and 18: xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
Page 19 and 20: xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
Page 21 and 22: xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
Page 23 and 24: 2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
Page 31 and 32: 10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
Page 45: 24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
Page 49 and 50: 28 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
Page 59 and 60: 38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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