Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 151One of the largest protests was co-ordinated by KISDI and held at the Al-Furqon Mosque on the grounds of the Dewan Dakwah organisation. KISDI’sleader, Ahmad Sumargono, asserted that the leaking of Harseno’s report wasclearly an ‘illegal act’ that must face ‘heavy sanctions’. In Manado, NorthSulawesi, fifteen Islamic organisations representing a broad spectrum oforganisational interests, including NU, Muhammadiyah and HMI, urged thegovernment to investigate the circumstances surrounding the leak of Harseno’sreport. The ICMI leader, Amien Rais, went further than most by calling the leak‘an act of subversion’. 87Concluding CommentsICMI was part of Suharto’s corporatist strategy aimed at neutralising Muslimpolitical aspirations. Yet, ICMI, and the general Muslim backlash againstHaryanto’s accusers created a highly politicised and potentially embarrassingclimate for the government. Attempts by Harseno and Murdiono to discreditHaryanto had backfired. That is, the ICMI intelligentsia redirected the focus ofdebate from one of corruption allegations against Haryanto to one of demands topunish the official who leaked the state secrets. Members of ICMI’s intelligentsiaperceived that the attack against Haryanto was part of a planned strategy byABRI-linked forces hostile to ICMI and Habibie to reduce Muslim influence inthe future MPR and cabinet. They tried to deflect the allegations against the ICMIbureaucrat by accusing other senior government officials— Murdiono andHarseno—of collusion against Muslim interests. They claimed the collusion waspart of a broader systemic corruption afflicting the New Order political system. 88One interpretation of the corruption controversy is that Suharto’s circle did notlook kindly upon ICMI’s role in arousing political opposition to Murdiono, inexposing the intra-elite rivalry, or in claiming that the government wassystemically corrupt. This would have reflected badly on the president’s ownrule. A corporatist organisation, top-heavy in government bureaucrats who werepositioned there by Suharto in order to subdue the potential for anti-governmentdissent, in this instance, had the contrary effect. It became embroiled in conflictin a manner presumably undesired by Suharto’s power-holding elite. Had statesupervision of ICMI therefore failed to suppress political agitations of itsintelligentsia?An alternative interpretation is that the intra-elite rivalries were simply aconsequence of strategies pursued by Suharto of cultivating competing patronagenetworks. That is, the president was happy to witness contestations betweenMurdiono and Habibie, as the two state leaders offset each other’s power and, indoing so, ensured that Suharto retained his role as ultimate goalkeeper andarbiter of dispute. Suharto’s attempt to resolve the controversy, by delegating aninvestigation to Vice-President Try Sutrisno’s office, did not detract from thefact that the intra-bureaucratic conflict arose in the first place from pro-Habibie/anti-Habibie cleavages in the cabinet. And Suharto had consistently compiled
152 INTRA-ELITE RIVALRYcabinets to reflect, and exacerbate, competing interests, visions and trends innational politics.The ICMI intelligentsia became embroiled in political controversy by sidingwith Habibie against the minister’s detractors. This outcome was contrary to oneof the main stated aims of ICMI (see chapter five) to remain outside of politics.In the final analysis, contests between different patron-client interests— Habibie(ICMI) and Murdiono/Harseno (State Secretariat)—had caused a client-base, theICMI membership, to be drawn into that conflict. The defence of Habibie and ofother ICMI interests was tied integrally to perceptions about ICMI’s ownposition within future power constellations as the 1997 general election and the1998 MPR election approached. 89The Seventh Development Cabinet: Continuing CleavagesThe swearing in of the seventh development cabinet in 1998 further exacerbatedthe divisions and contest. Some of Vice-President B.J.Habibie’s allies were reappointedto a cabinet that was widely recognised as a ‘crony cabinet’ of thepresident’s loyalists, business associates and family members. Despite earliercorruption allegations, Haryanto Dhanutirto (the new Minister of Food,Horticulture and Medicine), was among three of Habibie’s associates who wereappointed as ministers. 90 At the end of the day, Haryanto was regarded as aSuharto loyalist. Meanwhile, Murdiono was replaced after two stints as StateSecretary. 91Along with the appointment of former presidential military adjutant, Wiranto,and Suharto’s son-in-law, Prabowo, to the military leadership, the cabinet wasmeant to bolster Suharto’s authority at a time of deepening economic andpolitical crisis when he was experiencing narrowing support for his presidency.Suharto’s children, Siti Rukmana and Bambang Trihatmodjo, reportedly had adecisive say in the cabinet’s formation, which saw Habibie’s influence diminish.Economic technocrats and conservatives, including Mar’ie Muhammad, weredisplaced by economic nationalists under the new Minister of Finance, GinandjarKartasismata’s leadership. 92Despite enormous hopes that Habibie’s ascension to the vice-presidencywould result in cabinet appointments for the ICMI intelligentsia, Suharto ensuredthat they did not gain a single seat. They were disappointed sorely by theirexclusion from the 1998 cabinet and from power configurations and began tocriticise openly Suharto’s crony cabinet. Amien Rais and other members ofICMI identified Haryanto as one of Suharto’s most corrupt ministers. 93 They nolonger identified with Habibie’s minister against other state interests, as theirstance regarding Haryanto and corruption seemed greatly determined by theirperception of their own position within the power configurations and contests.This time they opposed a cabinet in which Haryanto had become a minister andthey had become clear losers.
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Page 126 and 127: Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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