Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGIME 203political joke’. He called on Suharto’s government to return its mandate to theMPR, if it could not solve the crisis within a period of six months.By late March, the pendulum of Amien’s stance again swung back in favourof conciliation and he announced that he would support Suharto’s governmentif it overcame the crisis. The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Subagyo Hadisiswoyo,with Gen. Prabowo at his side, declared that the recent attitude and commentsmade by Amien were ‘sufficiently mature’. Amien’s conciliatory approach wasclosely linked to his regular meetings with the military’s top brass. He hadcultivated close relations with Prabowo and spoke warmly of the general (aknown supporter of Habibie) as well as meeting with senior officers of the rivalcamp under Gen. Wiranto’s command. Amien understood, as did other civilianleaders, that for any future government to survive—whether it be one led by him,Habibie or another leader—it would require the backing of ABRI. He thereforeproceeded carefully with his calls for reform and a change of government, itseemed, by trying to keep the military leadership on side, whilst seeking to drawthem closer to the aspirations of the reform movement. In late February, Amienhad talked of there being ‘a strong understanding that the armed forces must notconfront their own people, let alone shoot them’. 40 It is obvious that one of theresults of negotiations with the military top brass was that Amien sometimessubdued his attacks against Suharto’s government.Overall, Amien’s tactic regarding ABRI was to appeal to its senior leaders toside with the people-driven reform movement against the narrow interests ofSuharto’s regime. After the Trisakti shootings and the broad moral outragesparked by it, Amien’s plea to ABRI became more of an ultimatum. At amemorial service for the victims, he presented ABRI with two stark choices ofeither protecting the interests of the wealthy Suharto family or defending thepeople’s interests. 41 A week later, however, he was forced to cancel a plan tobring his millions of supporters onto the streets of Jakarta on the anniversary ofnational awakening day (20 May). This, reportedly, was because a senior generalhad threatened to create a bloody Tienanmen Square incident in response. 42Thus, it appears that Amien’s vacillation between condemning Suharto andgiving Suharto a chance to undertake reform was influenced by his own searchfor a leadership role, amid a rapidly deteriorating and uncertain situation inwhich he adjusted his stance to the contingency of developments. He was acutelyaware that for any reform to succeed it would require ABRI’s imprimatur and thekind of reform he sought was not the ‘total reform’ enunciated by the moreradical student activists. Rather, it was one of measured reform that would betterlocate him in future power configurations (of a more democratically electedgovernment) after the anticipated political demise of Suharto. Amien was anambitious politician who aspired to gaining, if not the presidency, a central rolein the new government. Moreover, his removal as the head of ICMI’s council ofexperts had not entirely precluded him from being an aspirant ‘insider’ who stillsupported ICMI against its opponents. In February and March, at least, his