Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

46 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONAL LIFEReplacing Islamic Identity with Corporatist IdeologyBitter opposition of PPP at elections and in parliament led Suharto to implementmeasures aimed at separating Islamic organisational activity more firmly from itsideological base, although these efforts had been under way for, at least, the pastdecade. For example, before the PPP merger in 1973, the government obliged theIslamic parties to add ‘Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution’ to their partyconstitutions. PPP had to reaffirm its ‘double basis’ of state ideology and Islamicidentity, with the aim of diminishing the importance of the latter. The Minister ofInternal Affairs tried to prohibit the use of PPP’s party symbol (the Ka’bah) atthe 1977 elections, but PPP refused to comply and threatened to boycott theelection. 31 After the NU-led walkout in 1978, the government embarked on anaggressive campaign to induct civil servants, professionals, students and ‘themasses’ into indoctrination courses in the state ideology of Pancasila, coordinatednationally. In particular, the Pancasila (P4) courses sought to unifycitizens’ perceptions regarding state ideology, especially concerningdevelopment. In other words, the courses aimed to lessen people’s identificationwith alternative ideologies such as Islam (and Marxism and Liberalism). Morfitargues that Pancasila (P4) was primarily an ideology of containment andexclusion, as it ensured that both communism and the political goals of Islamremained ‘outside the arena of permissible political activity’. 32Chapter three has considered how the New Order leaders propagated ‘stateorganicist’notions of corporate harmony through Golkar channels and the stateideology of Pancasila and how this conformed to a pattern of corporatistideology and organisation. The P4 courses represented such an attempt tounderwrite Islam’s organisational existence with ‘organicist’ ideologies as anadjunct to the corporatist reordering of organisational life. The connectionbetween state ideology and organisation became clear when Pancasila wasdeclared as the sole ideological foundation (azas tunggal) of all organisations inIndonesia. Before elaborating upon this connection, however, the chronology ofthe introduction of azas tunggal will be discussed.The government viewed PPP’s continued adherence to its ‘double’ basis,writes Faisal, as ‘proof’ that the Muslims were not completely committed toPancasila. 33 Suharto announced his concerns in a speech before an ABRIleadership meeting at Pekanbaru, Sumatra in March 1980. In the speech, Suhartospoke of a national ‘consensus’ in 1966 between ABRI and the political partiesconcerning Pancasila as the state ideology. He maintained that the consensushad not been fully ‘successful’ because ‘there was still a party [PPP] using otherprinciples (azas) in addition to Pancasila. This led to a “question mark” withregard to their commitment to Pancasila.’ 34 He referred to the (NU-led) walkoutover the P4 policy in 1978 and the Election Law Amendment Bill in 1980, astwo obvious points of tension between the government and PPP, although he didnot mention the party by name.