Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISATIONS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 185member MPR would be filled with compliant politicians, Suharto stalwarts andfamily members. Given his commanding control of Indonesian politics, ananalyst at the time might have been forgiven for concluding that the mountingpre-election opposition and violence was fairly inconsequential to the overallpolitical process. 87The PPP chairman and leaders did complain about vote rigging after the poll,with several branches threatening to boycott the election results. In some parts ofthe country, PPP supporters rioted in protest over the election result with at leastone rioter being shot dead. In the district of Sampan, Madura (East Java) thegovernment even conducted an unprecedented re-count of dozens of pollingbooths in an effort to assuage PPP tensions. At the end of the day, however, PPP,under Metareum’s leadership, assumed its more characteristicallyaccommodating stance and signed the official election results, which still saw theIslamic-oriented party increase its share of the vote from 1992. In an interview,Metareum admitted that neither a boycott nor protest would measurably alter theestablished political arrangements. 88Was it the case, then, that Golkar’s over-zealous campaign strategy had beenan outstanding success, as it did garner a robust result for Golkar in the face ofrising opposition? To the contrary, analysts had quite correctly perceived at thetime that the Suharto government still had a price to pay for the underlyingresentment to its rule, harboured by Indonesia’s politically excluded anddisadvantaged classes. Seismic shifts were destined to occur in the Tectonicplates of Indonesian politics, as long suppressed resentments of Suharto’s ruleand intra-elite machinations were eventually to erupt into the open and bringabout the demise of President Suharto and his New Order. The 1997 electioncontest had set in motion a new dynamic, providing an early example of agitationby Indonesia’s excluded lower classes. By identifying with the concerns ofIndonesia’s hitherto disenfranchised ‘floating mass’, Indonesia’s elite therebyhad shifted political competition beyond the predictable boundaries of the NewOrder political system. The ramifications of this shift in politics were soon to befelt.NOTES1. By ‘the elite’ I mean the ‘political elite’, which includes the ruling elite (thepresident and his immediate circle) and supporting elite (ministers, bureaucrats,legislators, politicians, economics advisers and the like) within the state. It alsoincludes leaders of non-government organisations and high-profile intellectuals,government opponents, and dissidents, who interact with the state elite, arerecognised for their contribution to national discourse, or are involved in elite-levelpolitical negotiation and contest.2. Tiras, 2 November 1995; Ummat, 27 November and 11 December 1995; Gatra, 11November 1995; Tempo, 4 June 1994.
186 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA3. Tiras, 2 November 1995; Gatra, 31 October-25 November 1995; Tirtosudarmo,‘Indonesia 1991: Quest for Democracy’, p.131.4. See footnote 20, chapter six.5. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp.156–65; Tirtosudarmo, ‘Indonesia 1991: Questfor Democracy’, p.128.6. Gatra, 18 November 1995; Editor, 1 May 1993.7. Uhlin argues that ‘the banning of Tempo, Editor, and DeTik in 1994 was a hardblow against the Indonesian press, but it also led to the creation of new groupsfighting for press freedom and democracy in general’. Uhlin, Indonesia and the‘Third Wave’, p.115. For example, in June protesters established an organisationcalled Indonesian Solidarity for Press Freedom (SIUPP—these initials were adeliberate play on the acronym for the press publishing license, also called SIUPP).In August, a group of journalists and editors established the Alliance ofIndependent Journalists (AJI) as an alternative to the government-sanctionedIndonesian Journalists Association (PWI). From June to August, journalists,students, NGO groups and other pro-democracy forces held a series ofdemonstrations against the closures. Although the demonstrations met with policerepression, ABRI permitted a student protest to reach the gates of the PresidentialPalace.8. The Limits of Openness, p.11.9. The Limits of Openness, pp.5–20; Ramage, Politics of Indonesia, pp.11–51.10. Tiras, 2 November 1995; Kompas, 8–10 November 1995; Tempo, 4 June 1994;Suara Independen, October-November 1995.11. Imaduddin Abdulrahim told of how Alamsjah facilitated Imaduddin’s first meetingwith Habibie in order to persuade the technology minister to establish ICMI.Interview with Imaduddin, 15 February 1994; Hefner, ‘Islam, State, and CivilSociety’, p.17.12. Tempo, 4 and 18 June 1994; Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995; Gatra, 2September 1995.13. Gatra, 28 September 1996; Tiras, 1 August 1996; Kompas, 9 January 1996.14. Gatra, 28 September 1996; Kompas, 26 October 1995; Suara Independen, December1995.15. The New Masyumi no longer served the political interests of ex-Masyumi figureswho had joined ICMI and hoped for greater access to power through the newarrangements. Surabaya Post, 24 November 1995; Tiras, 23 November 1995;Kompas, 5 November 1995; Ummat, 27 November 1995.16. Greg Fealy, ‘Indonesian Politics, 1995–96’, pp.27–9; Heryanto, ‘Indonesia:Towards the Final Countdown?’, pp.117–19.17. Kompas, 9–10 January 1996; Tiras, 1 August 1996; Gatra, 28 September 1996.18. Lowry only went so far as to say ‘it is clear that some elements of ABRI saw astrong PDI as a potential counter to the lure of Islam and a reaction to tensions withinGolkar’. Lowry, The Armed Forces, p.204; McIntyre, ‘In Search of MegawatiSukarnoputri’, p.13; Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, pp.230–32.19. McIntyre, ‘In Search of Megawati’, pp.12–13; Kingsbury, The Politics ofIndonesia, pp.230–32; Heryanto, ‘Indonesia: Towards the Final Countdown?’, pp.113–21; Rasyid, ‘Indonesia: Preparing for Post-Soeharto’, p.154.20. McIntyre, ‘In Search of Megawati’, pp.17–19; Fealy, ‘Indonesian Politics, 1995–96’, p.30; interviews with Marzuki Darusman (leader of Komnas HAM), 16 July
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Page 156 and 157: MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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