Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto’s Regime:Muslims Join Call for ChangeINTRODUCTIONBy early 1998, major cracks were appearing in the established politicalarrangements underpinning Suharto’s rule. A nascent university studentmovement mobilised against Suharto and by May spearheaded a popularchallenge to the New Order. As the deepening political crisis converged with adebilitating economic crisis, the reliance of Suharto’s regime on old tactics andpatterns of survival politics was no longer able to cope with the nature of thegrowing pressures for change. These pressures emanated from broad sections ofsociety as well as from key elements of the New Order elite. The legitimacy ofSuharto’s continued right to rule rested on the twin claims that his New Ordercould deliver the benefits of economic development and political stability to itspeople. Indonesia’s economic collapse of 1997–1998, which witnessed mostbusinesses go into insolvency, placed millions of Indonesians out of work andthreatened to have almost 50 per cent of Indonesians living below the poverty lineby 1999, undermined Suharto’s first claim to power. Political signs of instabilityevident in 1996, and spiralling out-of-control by mid-1998, undermined hissecond claim to power. 1 The Suharto regime’s inability to cope with the Asianeconomic meltdown of the late-1990s exacerbated the ongoing political crisis ofpresidential succession and resulted in Suharto’s resignation on 21 May.The analysis focuses on two aspects of the popular challenge to Suharto. First,the student movement is examined, with attention given to the role of Muslimstudent organisations in opposing Suharto. Second, a study is made ofincorporated Muslim interests as they withdrew their support from Suharto.There are two interrelated parts of the argument presented. The first part of theargument reinforces discussion (in chapter eight) that managing state-societyrelations through policies of exclusion could no longer contain social interests ordeter them from organising against the political status quo. InHuntington’s terms (1968), people’s demands for political participation wereoutstripping the poorly institutionalised structures of authoritarian rule, whichwere unable to absorb the multiplying demands. The establishment since theearly-1990s of a growing number of independent organisations and coalitions
194 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAunrecognised by the state, and intensification of protest actions and unrest werestrong indications of mounting societal pressures for participation. Theseorganisations and activities both by-passed and, thus, fundamentally challengedthe corporatist framework.The second part of the argument is that Muslim interests associated with ICMIturned against their patron when their expectations of finding a role in the 1998cabinet remained unfulfilled. Suharto’s corporatist strategy through ICMI, untilthis point, had succeeded in dampening the political dissent of Muslims to hisrule. However, by denying significant inclusion of these interests in politicalinstitutions at a time that support for Suharto was crumbling, Suharto effectivelyscuttled what remained of Muslim support for his presidency. Instead, Muslimsjoined opposition voices in the call for Suharto to resign and threw their supportbehind Habibie’s presidency. After having been sidelined from the seventhdevelopment cabinet announced in March, ICMI members were among ‘strategicinsiders’ who defected from Suharto because of his failure to overcome thepolitical and economic crises. In the past, exclusion of the majority ofIndonesians from political participation had relied on a consensus of strategic(middle and elite) classes that had a stake in the maintenance of Suharto’s rule.Suharto had managed challenges to his presidency by maintaining shiftingalliances of supporting elite groups and by isolating opponents. However, thecabinet line-up (consisting of his most trusted loyalists, family members,business associates, and corrupt bureaucrats) disrupted the managed consensusof supporting elite for his regime. This time the sidelining of elite interests frompower had the effect of tilting the otherwise careful balance of forces against thestatus quo. Fewer and fewer elite and middle-class groups had a stake inSuharto’s narrowly based, coercive and repressive rule and hence supported thestudent-led impetus for political change. The brief convergence of elitedisaffection and societal pressures for Suharto to resign contributed to a volatileand politicised environment. A detailed analysis of the elite defections is notgiven, as the analysis focuses primarily on the defection of corporatised Musliminterests. 2THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT MOVEMENTEarly in 1998, students supported by Indonesia’s educated classes were the firstto call for major reform of the political system and for Suharto to step down. It iscommon for students to spearhead protest movements, however—in the case ofIndonesia—university students represented a section of society affected by thestate’s corporatist controls since the Minister of Education’s CampusNormalisation Act of 1978. 3 Under the normalisation policy, which prohibitedindependent student councils and political activities on campus, studentswere effectively excluded from participation in Indonesia’s formal politicalprocesses. 4 However, the recent student agitations were largely the result of anew period of relative openness, beginning in the late-1980s, when the
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 262 and 263: ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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