Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGIME 209calling for Suharto to resign were the Muslim Community Co-ordinating Body(BKUI), Dewan Dakwah and KISDI. 60Some of the Muslim organisations had been established recently as vehiclesspecifically for the promotion of reform, indicating the fluidity of the situationand the tendency of groups to coalesce into larger associational units. Others hadbeen staunch supporters of Suharto since the state-Islamic rapprochement, butnow withdrew their support. In addition, the varied new organisational entitiesconstituted an expression of greater pluralism as students, and Muslims, began tobreak out of state-imposed corporatist constraints. Indicative of this challenge tothe hierarchical political order, was the appearance at parliament of differentprofessional layers of society, including academics, intellectuals, NGO leadersand other middle-class elite to address the students and contribute to demands forSuharto’s resignation. National leaders, including the chairman ofMuhammadiyah, Dewan Dakwah leaders, representatives from the NationalReform Movement, the former head of Indonesia’s Legal Aid Institute, andformer ministers and retired ABRI officers arrived outside parliament to addressstudents with rousing messages of support.This was the first time, since the founding of the New Order, that a crosssectionof society had gathered en masse outside parliament to declare theircommon support for the struggle for change. At the time, some observers mighthave believed that they were witnessing a microcosm of a future civil society inIndonesia. However, as subsequent events proved, the unity deriving from theshared desire to remove Suharto soon dissipated, after the president steppeddown. The opposition forces that were gathering outside parliament lacked anyco-ordinated plan of action to bring about a change of regime, to take overpower, or to build a new government. Many students were distrustful ofpoliticians. The reform movement was weak and divided, but this did notprevent the different elite, middle class, and student activists from coming togetherat a critical point of political tension to assert their demands collectively.The greatest surprise came with the bombshell announcement by theparliamentary speaker, Harmoko that the DPR leadership had decided, in theinterests of national unity, that President Suharto should resign ‘wisely’ and with‘dignity’. Students were jubilant as one of the deputy speakers for parliament, LtGen. (ret.) Syarwan Hamid, thrust his fist into the air in a victory signal. Supportfor Suharto was rapidly crumbling, as loyalists and sycophants alike were cavingin to public pressure and responding to the obvious dissipation of support forSuharto among elite circles, including the military hierarchy. 62The clear loss of legitimacy and support suffered by Suharto by mid-Maycaused a defection of New Order stalwarts from the president. Even members ofSuharto’s palace circle finally regarded the president’s resignation as a necessarystep in order to minimise the potential damage of the reform momentum topersonal careers and established institutions. A major blow to Suharto was whenon the 19 th fourteen economics ministers refused to serve on his reshuffledcabinet. At the eleventh hour, the military also withdrew its support from Suharto
210 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAin an effort to protect its own institutional interests and salvage a badly tarnishedprofessional reputation. The fall of Suharto delegitimised much of his NewOrder, which was already under challenge from broadening societal pressures,and created the conditions for the unravelling of authoritarian institutions. Yet, asmuch as this open defiance of Suharto by regime insiders might have seemed torepresent a political breakthrough for pro-reform forces, much of the politics thatfinally brought Suharto down consisted of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring,backroom deals and pact-making. The circumstances of elite defections fromSuharto and divisions in the military have been discussed by other authors andtake us too far away from the central concern of the book. 63CONCLUSIONAn analysis was made of the withdrawal of Muslim support from Suharto in thecontext of broadening dissent against his rule. Under circumstances of deepeningpolitical and economic crisis, students galvanised into an anti-regime movementin retaliation against two decades of exclusion from political arrangements. Thisgave greater impetus to disaffected elite members to oppose Suharto’s rule. Inthis context, ICMI leaders and the intelligentsia were among the defecting eliteinterests that had lost out in recent power struggles to Suharto’s family interests.However, it must be noted that throughout his presidency, Suharto had managedto maintain exclusionary corporatist barriers to Muslim access to power. Thewider incorporation of Muslim interests in state structures in the 1990s also hadsucceeded in muffling much of the critical voice of Muslims, while still denyingthem real positions of power. Nonetheless, the shift in corporatist strategy togreater inclusion of Muslim interests raised expectations—among ICMI-linkedinterests at least—for greater representation of Muslims in the near future. Therefusal of Suharto to provide ICMI members with cabinet posts at a time thatelite opinion was turning against him lost the president the support of Muslims.The withdrawal of Muslim support from Suharto was not the decisive factor thatbrought his presidency to an end. The mounting pluralist challenges against theauthoritarian regime followed by elite defections, however, did indicate thatcorporatist exclusion was no longer a viable strategy of social-politicalmanagement.NOTES1. Indonesians realised that the refusal of Suharto’s circle to implement meaningfulpolitical reforms and bring about a measure of responsiveness, accountability andtransparency was greatly responsible for the government’s failure to deal with thedeepening economic crisis. It was widely recognised that Suharto and his familyhad siphoned off much of Indonesia’s wealth through their own businessmonopolies and foundations, and that government corruption was at epidemicproportions. Confronted by growing domestic and international demands to
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Page 180 and 181: MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Page 254 and 255: Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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Page 262 and 263: ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
Page 264 and 265: REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
Page 266 and 267: REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
Page 268 and 269: REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
Page 270 and 271: REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
Page 272 and 273: REFERENCES 251National University,
Page 274 and 275: REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
Page 276 and 277: IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
Page 278 and 279: INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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