Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 139of the state and nation. These conservative scholars and bureaucrats desired tosee a greater proportion of Islamic laws incorporated in national laws. Theyclaimed that they did not seek a dominance of Islamic law and therefore rejectedgoals for the establishment of an Islamic state. Muslim radicals, many of themassociated with the organisation, Dewan Dakwah, were more firmly committedto the implementation of state Islamic laws, although a range of alternative viewsalso existed within this organisation. The ‘shar’iah-minded’ scholars did notnecessarily consider ICMI as the principal vehicle through which they couldachieve their objectives. Nonetheless, they belonged to pro-establishment forcesthat viewed their collaboration with Suharto’s circle as an opportunity toinfluence the state to enact Islamic laws. They viewed the state’s enactment ofIslamic family and court laws and the founding of an Islamic bank, and otherconcessions to Muslim interests as a step in the right direction to establishing amore Islam-oriented government and society. 35There was a possible convergence between the two orientations, as someadvocates of an Islamic society envisaged that ICMI could be at the vanguard ofefforts to turn state officials into more pious, practising Muslims. Theyconsidered that a deepening of religious belief within the state would then radiateout to wider society, as it too became more Islamised. ICMI member, MasdarMas’udi (a liberal scholar and NGO leader), argues that there was a growingtendency of Muslim ‘modernists’ to ‘Islamise the state’ both by placing moreand more Muslims in the government bureaucracy and by implementing Islamiclaws. 36In summary, agendas within ICMI for demilitarisation, democratisation andIslamisation were evidence of a re-politicisation of Muslim middle-classinterests. State sponsorship of Islam had kindled hopes among its intelligentsiathat they might be able to advance their political agendas through ICMI. ABRIleaders were unlikely to view too kindly any attempts by ICMI’s intelligentsia toformulate openly, or to realise, their goals.ABRI’s Objections to ICMI’s AgendasObjections within ABRI to ICMI’s different agendas arose from ABRI’sperceived role as guardian of national stability against the forces ofdisintegration. ABRI leaders perceived themselves as defenders of an Indonesianunitary state based on Pancasila—an integralist ideology of a dominant state andsubordinate society constituting an indivisible organic union. The state ideologyprecluded establishment of an Islamic theocracy or liberal democracy fromconstitutional possibilities. Military leaders regarded Islamic political andideological movements, communism, and liberal democracy as the three principalthreats to the Pancasila state. In particular, they were concerned about Islam’spotential as an agent of independent political organisation, especially becauseMuslim leaders could mobilise the masses against other religious communities orin opposition to state authority. Military leaders had an historical distrust of
140 INTRA-ELITE RIVALRYpartisan political parties and religious groups that might assert their own‘sectarian’ interests above and beyond those of the national interest which, theleaders argued, could lead to national disintegration. 37Thus, ICMI’s agendas for democratisation (demilitarisation), Islamisation, andthe prospect of Islam becoming a force for democracy, were all good reasons foran entrenched military state to deeply suspect ICMI. Islam was a latent politicalforce that had immense potential for mobilising Indonesians for various causesand ICMI represented an organised block. As Aswab Mahasin observed, ‘ICMIwas a bigger threat [to power holders] than unorganised dissenting communities,and ABRI was worried about ICMI’. 38 Ramage argues that significant segmentsof the ABRI leadership opposed ICMI on the grounds that it acted like a party.ABRI leaders pointed out that ICMI had established a nationwide organisationalstructure, with provincial, district (and overseas) branches and was trying tobuild grassroots support. Ramage notes, there was ‘a generalised concern thatICMI could be a potential manifestation of newly politicised Islam’. 39 However,it is possible also that ABRI leaders were concerned that ICMI provided a meansfor ‘civilians’ to bypass ABRI-dominated Golkar branches in the provinces anddistricts and would compete for people’s allegiances at election times. 40 Anumber of ABRI officers also claimed that ICMI constituted a sectarian religiousthreat to the multi-religious nation, and that the organisation ‘surreptitiously’supported an Islamic state in contravention of Pancasila. 41Suharto shared ABRI’s allergy to political Islam, inherited from earlierperiods in Indonesia’s pre-and-post-independence history. Indonesia’s recenthistory included Islamic rebellions in Aceh and West Java, and constitutionaldebates over the final form of the post-independence nation-state (Islamic,secular or Pancasila). Accordingly, the perception of Islamic threat wasimbedded in the psyche of commanders who had inherited a deep apprehensionabout the growth of Islamic militancy in Indonesia. 42 In order not to give extraammunition to ABRI against ICMI, members of the Muslim intelligentsia werecareful to distance themselves from the Islamic state ideal. Of course, many ICMImembers also opposed the ideal of an Islamic state. They rejected the idea ofIslamic clerics gaining control of the state apparatus and proclaiming a theocraticstate as had occurred in (Shi’ite) Iran. 43 In addition, although Suharto ensuredthat ICMI’s Muslim intelligentsia did not pose such a threat by keeping themoutside of key political institutions and the public-policy arena, his effortsapparently failed to mollify entirely ABRI’s concerns.Concerns about ICMI’s democratising and Islamising agendas, perhaps, werenot the main motivation behind ABRI’s apprehension of ICMI. The militaryleadership might well have raised the spectre of ICMI as an ‘Islamic threat was ameans of discrediting their political rival, Habibie. 44 By associating hischairmanship of ICMI with the potential spread of Islamic political ideology,they could hope to ruin Habibie’s prospects of ascending to the vice-presidency.Habibie was Suharto’s favoured candidate for the post against the military’scandidates. Nurcholish Madjid (a liberal scholar and ICMI member)
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Page 126 and 127: Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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