Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

44 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONAL LIFEexclusion to ensure that it maintained preponderant control of the MPR and DPRthrough an overwhelming Golkar victory. By contrast, the increasinglycorporatised parties were locked into a system that, through engineeredelections, greatly restricted their access to legislatures and government office.The mix of state strategies, including corporatism, to control the parties andelections represented an ongoing process that sought to ensure the two-waypolitical exclusion of PPP from society and the state.The government was concerned by PPP’s increased vote, as Golkar’s share ofthe vote dropped marginally to 62.1 per cent (down 0.7 per cent), while PPPgained 29 per cent (up 2.18 per cent) of the final vote. 24 Suharto was not willingto have a ‘loyal opposition’ party in parliament that could disrupt enactment ofgovernment legislation. Vindication of the government’s concerns came in 1978,when the dominant faction of PPP, NU, led a walkout from the MPR generalsession in protest over two decrees. One decree gave religious status to mysticalbelief systems (aliran kepercayaan), equal to that of the official religions, andincorporated them into the broad outlines of state policy (GBHN). This decreewas aimed at reducing the strength of Islam by offering an officially approved,alternative form of organisational representation to non-practising Muslims, whomight otherwise have felt obliged to register under the religion of Islam. Theother decree introduced Pancasila moral instructions called P4 (Guidelines forthe Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila). Muslims perceived theP4 courses as being an attempt to turn Pancasila into a religion, particularly as itcould displace religious lessons in schools. NU staged a second walkout in 1980,as it refused to participate in the passing of new election laws in parliament,which NU leaders viewed as undemocratic. 25 At its national conference in 1981,NU unequivocally defied (the by now almost routine) national consensus bydeclining to endorse Suharto for a third presidential term, or to endorse his title of‘Father of Development’. 26The challenge posed by the NU faction of PPP convinced Suharto that moreinterventions were required to push NU further to the political margins. He beganby replacing Mintaredja with Jaelani Naro, who had instigated the earlier coup inParmusi, as chairman of PPP. Naro was imposed on PPP to discipline the partyand to neutralise the influence of NU within it. 27 Corporatist restructuring ofinterests allows the state to manoeuvre itself into a position of greater autonomyand prevent potential challenges to its power, by readjusting an ‘imbalance’ ofcontending group interests. Naro’s subsequent manipulations of PPP appeared toconform to this principle of reordering. Thus, Naro sought to resolve an ongoingdispute between the MI and NU elements over leadership of DPR commissions,by preparing a provisional candidate list for the 1982 general elections. Hedelivered the list on 27 October 1981 to the National Election Board, andunilaterally reallocated seats away from NU. NU lost seven of its seats to MI inthe list of candidates for the next DPR election, which eliminated itscommanding position of being able to over-rule the decisions of the otherconstituent members. These members now held a combined majority by one