Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 149Suharto’s effort to readjust the balance of influence away from the economictechnocrats and towards economic nationalists after the preceding (fifth)development cabinet had accorded enhanced influence to the technocrats. Thecompeting interests brought into the cabinet reflected earlier struggles andcabinet compositions, as the pendulum of economic influence swung betweenthe technocrats and nationalists and each school of thought sought to gainSuharto’s ‘preferential’ ear. 78A rival of Habibie’s, the State Secretary, Murdiono (a military general whohad spent most of his career in civil administration), was appointed for a secondterm. Both officials were close advisors to Suharto, no doubt competingfor influence with the president. There existed potential points of tensionbetween the two ministers. Hadiz identified one point of tension, noting that‘ICMI’s new-found prominence has…encroached on Sekneg’s [the StateSecretariat’s] role of controlling access to the president’. 79 In addition, Murdionohad leaned in favour of policies promoted by the economic technocrats,anathema to Habibie’s brand of economic nationalism. Gaffar also identified analliance between Murdiono and Gen. Edi Sudrajat, one of Habibie’s majoropponents in the mainstream military. 80 Murdiono-Habibie tensions stemmedfrom Suharto’s cultivation of rival networks, particularly between economicsministers and departments, and allowing disputes to build before mediating infavour of one side.Corruption Allegations Against an ICMI BureaucratThus, the entry of Habibie’s team of bureaucrats and loyalists at BPPT into the1993 cabinet, at the expense of other state interests, stimulated continuing intraelite/intra-cabinetconflict. These tensions came to a head in 1995. The politicalstorm began on 10 October, when the Inspector General of Development, Maj.Gen. (ret.) Kentot Harseno (a former military adjutant to the president, and aconfidant of Benny Murdani’s), sent the first of three reports marked ‘top secret’to Suharto of corruption allegations against the ICMI bureaucrat, the Minister ofTransport Haryanto Dhanutirto. Harseno’s office was loosely within the orbit ofthe State Secretariat. His report, written on State Secretariat letterhead, accusedHaryanto of diverting 9 billion rupiah of funding, in the form of 392 nonbudgetarylevies, for his own personal enrichment from eighteen of twenty-sevenState-Owned Companies (BUMN) under his supervision at the Department ofTransport. 81The report was leaked to the press, by an unknown source, and was distributedwidely to government departments and community leaders. One photocopiedreport landed on the desk of Amien Rais, then the head of ICMI’s council ofexperts (before his ouster). A controversy was soon sparked by detailed coverageof the corruption allegations, which indicated that Habibie’s rivals in the statebureaucracy, associated with Murdiono’s State Secretariat, were behind efforts toundermine the technology minister’s reputation. Murdiono promptly gave his
150 INTRA-ELITE RIVALRYpublic support to Harseno’s report and called for an internal investigation ofHaryanto. The report caused a furore as Muslim interests associated with ICMIclosed ranks to defend the ICMI bureaucrat against corruption allegations, in anopen rift with Habibie’s antagonists at the State Secretariat. 82After the corruption allegations against Haryanto became public, the ABRIfraction and the PDI fraction of parliamentary commission II quickly backedHarseno’s report and demanded Haryanto’s immediate resignation. The twoparliamentary fractions stressed that the source of the leak was not at issue, butthe contents of Harseno’s document were of upmost importance because itcentred on the damaging problem of corruption. 83 Meanwhile, Musliminterests centring on ICMI considered Harseno to have falsified the report, andviewed the vital issue to be the source of the leak, which they believed led to theoffices of Murdiono’s State Secretariat and to Harseno’s office. 84Suharto assigned to Vice-President Try Sutrisno the task of investigating theallegations. After a meeting with Suharto and meetings with Try, Haryantoannounced that he had been reprimanded and requested to undergo a period ofintrospection and to make procedural corrections to the administrative conduct ofhis transport department. After the investigation by the vice-president’s office,Murdiono announced the president’s decision on 26 December that ‘there was novalid proof’ that Haryanto had ‘used state money…for his own needs or gain’. 85Other Muslim members of parliament, Muslim student groups, the radicalorganisation Solidarity Committee for the Islamic World (KISDI) and the ICMIintelligentsia were far from persuaded by Murdiono’s assurances that he had notleaked ‘state secrets’. They were upset by what appeared to be a governmentwhitewash of the case, and what some perceived as Murdiono’s backhandedswipe against the transport minister. They were convinced that Suharto’sinvestigation was not motivated by the desire to establish ‘clean government’,and therefore that it had not sought to investigate those responsible for leakingHarseno’s report to the press. Amien Rais was among the ICMI leaders whoaccused Harseno of falsifying the report, and added his voice to demands for thegovernment to bring to trial whomsoever was found to have leaked the reportcontaining ‘state secrets’. Amien claimed that the offices of Harseno andMurdiono were responsible for the leak aimed at discrediting Habibie’s ministersand ICMI interests. 86Muslim student organisations (including the Muslim University Student’sCommunication Forum, the Islamic University Student’s Association, HMI andthe University Students Solidarity Forum for Anti-Deviationism) held severaldemonstrations outside of parliament and the Attorney General’s office. Theycalled for the Attorney General to investigate the leaking of state secrets and torehabilitate Haryanto’s name. Protests also occurred in Bandung, Surabaya andother cities. The CIDES leader, Eggi Sugjana (an underling of ICMI’s SecretaryGeneral Adi Sasono), organised a student demonstration at Murdiono’s offices atthe State Secretariat in Jakarta, demanding a clarification of earlier accusationsagainst Haryanto.
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
Page 216 and 217: THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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