Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISATIONS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 183regional party leaders had called off rallies in order to avert further bloodshed.PPP supporters and sympathisers had become a mass dynamic in their own right,without the need for leadership in order to take action. Like the PDI massesbefore the post-July crackdown, PPP and Mega-Bintang masses had little choicebut to participate directly through demonstration and protest. These were theonly remaining outlets for the bottled-up frustration of economically andpolitically marginalised electorates. Previous elections had served asopportunities for Indonesians to let off steam, but in a fairly controlled andmanageable environment. This time, however, violence appeared to escalate outof control and move beyond predictable or acceptable limits for the regime.However, it was easy for the state’s security apparatus to disperse suchleaderless actions, which often resulted in rioting and were open to manipulationby security forces. 85 Immediately after the campaign, Suharto’s governmentplaced a strict ban on all street rallies and brought 20,000 troop reinforcementsinto Jakarta to re-establish order before the scheduled poll of 29 May. The armedforces announced that it would shoot rioters on sight, and a steady calm soonreturned to Indonesia. The MUI chairman outraged Indonesia’s educated elitewhen he reinforced the military threat by proclaiming that to shoot rioters andlooters was permitted (‘halal’) by Islam. Again, a leader of a corporatistorganisation sought to provide Islamic legitimacy to the regime’s repressiveactions.CONCLUSIONThe chapter has considered how different members of the elite, who weredisaffected with the conduct of New Order politics, began to identify withgrowing resentment in society against Suharto’s corrupt and arbitrary rule.Suharto’s rule was underpinned by a political system that was weighted heavilyin favour of the regime and fortified by Golkar’s landslide victories at the fiveyearlygeneral elections. The unleashing of public resentment and social protest,and the organisation of sidelined elite against Suharto’s regime, becameincreasingly apparent as the 1997 general and the 1998 presidential electionsdrew near, and as anticipation of a presidential succession increased. Contendingelite interests aligned to and against Suharto’s regime jostled for advantagebefore a succession took place. This was why the ‘rainbow’ forces inorganisations like YKPK had as one of their central objectives, the prevention ofHabibie from becoming Indonesia’s next vice-president. Constitutionally, thevice-president would automatically inherit the presidency if Suharto steppeddown mid-term, as many speculated he would. Should Habibie becomeIndonesia’s next president, then it would be Habibie’s main supporters in ICMI,Golkar and the military that would ascend to power. Meanwhile, those civilianand military figures who had lost out in power contests to Habibie since the 1993reshuffles would stand to be further marginalised from power.
184 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAThe ‘rainbow’ groups identified with mounting grassroots opposition toSuharto’s rule. Meanwhile, members of the intelligentsia, opposition politicians,and pro-democracy activists played important roles in organising societalprotest. There even were significant efforts to build an opposition coalition,which transcended class and group interests, round Megawati’s PDI. After theremoval of Megawati as party leader, more spontaneous attempts were made toform a loose coalitional grouping of Mega-Bintang supporters with which tocombat the strength of Golkar. This was a phenomenon never before observed inIndonesian politics. Nevertheless, the coalition-building initiatives were tacticalrather than enduring. The frailty of coalition building, and the lack of coordinatedplanning between opposition groups, contributed significantly to thefailure of societal interests to combat the state’s much superior resources. Onereason for this failure was that disaffected members of the political elite(reformers and dissidents both within and outside of the state) generally did notattempt to build grassroots support for their organisations. This wasnotwithstanding efforts by PDI and PPP party leaders to organise grassrootsfollowing for the purpose of contesting the election. Disaffected members of theelite were more interested in gaining concessions from the regime, in terms oftheir own participation in the political system, in competition with Musliminterests backing Habibie, than with creating societal movements that one daymight bring down Suharto’s regime. Largely, this elite-centred approach was aproduct of decades of Suharto’s patronage games, divide-and-rule tactics, and the‘floating mass’ policy, which still effectively severed links between elite levelpolitics and the masses.As one of his divide-and-rule tactics, Suharto sought to draw on Muslimsupport, including his mobilisation of incorporated Muslim interests, in order todiscredit the rival forces. The recruitment of incorporated and collaboratingMuslims behind his anti-Megawati/PDI campaign, nonetheless, did not preventthe Muslim community from becoming a source of opposition to Golkar duringthe election campaign. Instead, Muslim interests associated with PPP becamealienated by the government’s over-zealous Golkar campaign, and began tosupport grassroots causes against key aspects of Suharto’s corrupt and arbitraryrule. The ‘Mega-Bintang’ phenomenon was the peak of this trend of opposition.Opposition to the regime from within PDI and PPP demonstrates the increasingineffectiveness of exclusionary, or for that matter inclusionary, corporatism intrying to contain societal interests. The systematic use of repression against theopposition was further evidence of this failure.Despite the growing opposition to Suharto’s rule in the pre-election period,Golkar won 74.5 per cent of the votes cast (its largest victory yet at the polls),with PPP coming second (22.43 per cent), and PDI trailing with only 3.07 percent. 86 In the subsequent months until the holding of the March 1998 session ofthe MPR, Suharto once again demonstrated his mastery at establishing his controlover Indonesia’s political system. In March, he was re-elected unopposed for aseventh term as president, with his largest mandate yet ensuring that the 1,000–
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Page 154 and 155: MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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