Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 41role performed by its most prominent leaders Muhammad Natsir, SjafruddinPrawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap in giving support to the regionalrebellion in Sumatra.Nonetheless, Suharto and army leaders, who were less anti-party than somesegments of the military, viewed with sympathy calls by Muslim modernistleaders for the re-establishment of a political party to represent their interests. Amodernist party made amenable to the Suharto regime could prove useful, as itwould help counterbalance the considerable influence of NU at future generalelections. Suharto settled on a strategy of permitting the formation of a newparty, the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), which was registered as apolitical party by Presidential Decision No.70 of February 1968. 10Through a series of interventions in the selection of leaders, and manipulationsof the party by Murtopo’s OPSUS, Suharto ensured the effective emasculation ofParmusi as an independent political force. Suharto made it clear that party listswere to include no senior Masyumi leaders. The Muhammadiyah leaders,H.Djarnawi Hadikusomo and Lukman Harun, were appointed party leader andSecretary General respectively, as a temporary expedient. However, attempts byold guard modernists to establish Masyumi’s control over Parmusi at its firstcongress in Malang in 1968, resulted in army interference in leadershipselection. In 1969 the pro-army appointees to Parmusi, Jaelani Naro and ImranKadir, instigated an internal party coup to oust Djarnawi’s leadership. Bothfigures were known to be close to Ali Murtopo and the coup was thought to bepart of Murtopo’s OPSUS. The impasse that this created prepared the ground forSuharto to intervene and impose an amenable figure, M.S.Mintaredja (a stateminister), as party chairman (Presidential Decision No.77/1970). 11Rising to leadership positions in Parmusi were young educated Muslims fromMuhammadiyah Youth and HMI, who possessed educational and technical skills(in economics, engineering and law); skills, which, generally, were not held byolder Masyumi leaders. These young Muslims were well placed to takeadvantage of the kinds of ‘technocratic-dominated’, ‘construction-oriented’policies of the New Order and fitted in well with the government’s preference ofpromoting into government positions administrators who had no party affiliation. 12Part of the regime’s corporatist strategy also entailed the dismantling ofMasyumi’s party base—the array of supporter organisations called the KeluargaBulan Bintang (the Moon and Star Family)—and re-attaching them to Parmusi.In doing so, the regime hoped to channel Muslim modernist energies into the newvehicle, whilst excluding Masyumi’s senior politicians and cutting the BulanBintang masses from old party loyalties. During the 1971 election campaign,Parmusi allied itself to Golkar and the army against NU and PNI, which helpedsplit the Muslim political community and dissipate its energies. Before theelection, Muhammadiyah had announced its formal withdrawal from politics,disassociated itself from Masyumi and, together with HMI, withdrew its supportfrom Parmusi. Muhammadiyah leaders, many of them ex-Masyumi figures, weredisaffected by regime manipulations of Parmusi. Although Parmusi failed to