Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 61Religion and its education institutes was part of broader efforts to eliminate thedual loyalties of civil servants and bureaucrats to the government and thepolitical parties. Compulsory membership of Korpri and the teachers’association, PGRI, and the mono-loyalty provisions were paramount to theseefforts.Murtopo, in particular, re-assigned the programs and activities of professionalorganisations to development-oriented tasks and away from political activism.Education was one crucial area that progressively came under political control—which, to some extent, was achieved through the incorporation of academics andteachers into corporatist organisations like Golkar, Korpri and PGRI and throughthe formation of co-ordinating bodies as the intended sole mechanism forchannelling student activities on campus. Campus restrictions, however, hadforced Muslim students to establish numerous study groups and cells that bypassedthe authorised co-ordinating bodies and university hierarchy and therebyremained unmediated by the state. Subsequent regime initiatives for the moraldevelopment of students and youth aimed to recapture, in state frameworks,unmediated activities. Like memberships of the political parties andorganisations, students also were expected to undergo intensive ideologicalreorientation programs (P4). These programs had as their central goal thecreation of academics, scholars, and students who would spearheadmodernisation processes and remain disengaged from political parties andorganisations.MANAGING RELIGIOUS HARMONYSimilar to state initiatives regarding the political parties and Islamic educationalinstitutions, Suharto’s administration tried to increase its supervision overreligious communities and to bring them into state-delineated parameters—especially as it sought conformity to Pancasila and to national goals fordevelopment and stability. Part of these efforts involved corporatist capturethrough state charter of national-level religious institutions. Thus, during the1970s, the regime assigned religious associations as national peak bodies tochannel the interests of Indonesia’s five main religious communities—Islam,Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism—religions that wereaccorded official recognition. There was the Indonesian Council of Ulama(MUI), the Communion of Indonesian Churches (PGI), the Indonesian Councilof Bishops (MAWI), the Indonesian Association of Hindu Dharma, and theRepresentation of the Indonesian Buddhist Community (WALUBI). In 1980, theregime brought these five councils into a single Forum for Inter-religiousConsultation (WMAB). WMAB was intended largely as a dialogue forumbetween religious communities and through which the regime couldcommunicate official concerns and policy to selected spokespersons of the fivereligions. 86
62 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONAL LIFEThese organisations provided the regime with one formal means with which toregulate and inter-mediate relations between the state and religious communities.The regime sought to ‘harmonise’ state-religious relations, after a decade ofsporadic inter-religious strife and growing antagonisms between the state andIslam (mid-1960s to late-1970s) had raised concerns about stability. As aculmination of these concerns, in 1978, the Minister of Religious Affairs,Alamsjah, issued a policy statement called ‘three harmonies (tri kerukunan)’,which was an attempt at reorientation and guidance of religious life, so that itwould not disrupt social harmony and order. 87 The most important of the threeharmonies was the attainment of harmony between the state and religion,especially Islam. The stated aim was to assist the government to establishnational stability and security by reorienting religious life to the priorityof national development. Good state-religious relations, it was stipulated,depended on the implementation of Pancasila (P4) indoctrination courses withinsociety. In particular, the aim was to unify and harmonise the perceptions ofMuslims concerning government policy. It sought to ‘remove mutual suspicionsbetween the state and Islam caused by sharp criticism of government policy’during the 1977 general election and at the MPR general session of 1978. 88Alamsjah identified as a second priority the attainment of internal harmony ofeach religious community, by removing ‘internal contradictions’, ‘especiallydoctrinal ones.’ 89 In practice, this meant that each religion was supposed to havea single interpretation of their creed, in conformity with Pancasila ideology. Thus,internal harmonising entailed defining and circumscribing what constitutedmainstream religion, although efforts to define orthodoxy pre-dated the NewOrder. Suharto reinforced a decree, issued by Sukarno, that to obtain legalrecognition in Indonesia, a religion must demonstrate belief in a transcendentalmighty God, possess a prophet and have a holy scripture as a major point ofreference and prayer. 90 In 1966, as an anti-communist measure, the ProvisionalMPR decided to ban atheism and make religious education compulsory. 91The objective of ‘internal harmonising’ was to bring religious groupings underthe management of the state thereby eliminating unmediated religious tendencies.Suharto used the religious institutions to rubber stamp decisions to ban‘suspicious’ religious movements. The main reason given for officialprohibitions was that the group in question demonstrated unorthodox behaviourthat deviated from mainstream religious practice and posed a threat to local and/or national order and security. The regime required religious splinter groups(kelompok sempalan) and spiritual movements that laid claim to being a religion,but fell outside of the official definitions, to merge with one of the five worldreligions that they most closely resembled. For instance, Religious Minister’sInstruction No.8 of 1979 outlined the state’s position regarding Islam. It clarifiedthat, in joint cooperation, the Attorney General, the Department of InternalAffairs, Bakin intelligence, regional governments, MUI and Islamic institutionswere to provide intensive ‘reorientation, guidance and surveillance’ of Islamicorganisations and movements that were found to be in conflict with Islamic
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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Page 126 and 127: Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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