Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 53turned the Department of Religion into a bureaucratic bastion forthe traditionalists during a period of accommodation (late-1950s to mid-1960s)with President Sukarno’s guided democracy government. This was at a time thatmodernists were agitating against Sukarno’s government, resulting in thebanning of Masyumi, and therefore they were greatly disadvantaged by new powerrelations. NU was thereby able to use the department as a major source ofpatronage and positions and exercise an enormous influence over the direction ofIslamic education under the department’s control during this period. Before the1971 general election, New Order leaders, especially Ali Murtopo’s OPSUS,initially sought to contain NU’s influence in the department by co-opting its staffinto Golkar as a means of separating them from their loyalties with the NU party.This was in line with national efforts to establish control of the civilianbureaucracy and remove the political influence of both NU and the PNI.Government decisions on compulsory membership of the Civil Service Corps(Korpri) for public servants, and mono-loyalty provisions prohibited all civilservants from having party allegiances or voting for them at the elections. 52Teachers of Islamic educational institutes, like their secular counterparts, alsowere drawn further into the corporatist arrangements through their compulsorymembership of the Teachers Association of the Indonesian Republic (PGRI).PGRI was formed in 1945 and brought into Golkar as a professional group in1973. 53However, these efforts were initially unsuccessful as the department staffcontinued to identify with the NU party. The then Minister of Religious Affairs,K.H.Muhammad Dahlan (a NU figure), resisted the Golkar strategy ofcooptation, including his refusal to apply legislation concerning mono-loyaltyand the requirement that civil servants join Golkar. Instead, he placed NU figuresin senior positions in the department and its tertiary institutes. He relieved fromtheir posts non-NU affiliated staff, such as Mulyanto Sumardi (a graduate fromColombia University, USA), Harun Nasution (Dean of the post graduate programat IAIN in Jakarta and graduate from the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGillUniversity), and Sunarjo (former Rector of IAIN Jakarta). 54Following this setback, Murtopo’s OPSUS began to recruit technocrats andadministrators into the religious bureaucracy with which to replace traditionalistbureaucrats. Sumardi and other displaced department staff at the IAIN in Jakartawere among the Muslim administrators recruited by Murtopo. They soughtretaliation against Dahlan and joined forces with Murtopo in order to purge NUbureaucrats and establish Golkar’s control of the department. Before the generalelection of 1971, Sumardi and his colleagues at IAIN founded a forum, theGolkar-linked Korps Karyawan Department Agama (Corps of GovernmentEmployees of the Department of Religion), to assist them with this strategy.They worked closely with the mostly Chinese-Catholic run Centre for Strategicand International Studies (CSIS), which Murtopo had turned into a centre for hisOPSUS campaigns. In August 1970, Sumardi’s group met with Murtopo andSujono Humardani (another of President Suharto’s personal assistants who was
54 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONAL LIFEinstrumental to GUPPI initiatives) in Bogor, West Java. There they agreed on thechoice of Abdul Mukti Ali (a long-time department employee, a leading scholarin the educational field, and a known moderate with a background in theMuhammadiyah) as the next Minister of Religious Affairs to replace Dahlan.After his appointment in 1971, Mukti Ali presided over the purging of NUaffiliateddepartment staff. He placed Sumardi as director general of Islamictertiary institutes in charge of IAINs nationally. Sumardi then implemented aprocess of institutional rationalisation by, among other things, replacing (NUaffiliated)IAIN rectors. 55 Thus, in the early 1970s, Golkar’s strategy to establish‘mono-loyalty’ in the Department of Religion and its tertiary institutes largelywas directed towards the goal of removing the political and bureaucraticinfluence of NU, both before and immediately after the election.New direction for Islamic educationThe purge and corporatist reordering of institutional affiliation was to help pavethe way for New Order administrators—mostly non-NU aligned Korpri members—to reorient Islamic education. Murtopo had outlined this New Order priority inhis book, ‘National Political Strategy’, which aimed to attain political, institutionaland ideological supervision of the Indonesian people, especially to gain people’sfull participation in national development. People’s participation in ‘acceleratedmodernisation’ would be implemented through their membership of Golkarlinkedprofessional organisations for youth, women, farmers, fishermen, labourunions, academics, teachers and civil servants. 56 In particular, Murtopo hadpursued a strategy of recruiting non-NU graduates from western universities intoacademic positions, who shared the New Order’s anti-party bias, its vision for asecular process of modernisation, and had no background of political activism.Once appointed, the modernisers (such as Mukti Ali, Sumardi, HarunNasution, and much later Munawir Sjadzali) embarked on a program torestructure Islamic education, partly in order to replace the ‘legalistic’ orientationof classical Islamic methodologies with a comparative, ‘scientific’ approach toIslamic studies viewed as more conducive to development goals. Thesemodernisers regarded NU’s jurisprudence-centred approach as being responsiblefor creating ‘narrow-minded’ scholars and graduates, who, it was thought, werenot equipped to deal with the contemporary challenges thrown up by anindustrialising and increasingly urban society. Suharto’s administration also wasconcerned that this preoccupation with a ‘legalistic’ approach to Islamiceducation had encouraged psychological attachment to the ideological andpolitical goals of establishing an Islamic state. 57As minister, Mukti Ali wished to bring about a reorientation of religiouseducation in Indonesia, which dovetailed with the New Order’s determination tomodernise religious education and outlook. 58 He was the first in a line ofministers of religion to preside over policies for the creation of a cadre ofwestern educated Muslim intellectuals to counter the practice of sending Muslim
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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Page 31 and 32: 10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
Page 45 and 46: 24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
Page 59 and 60: 38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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