Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

More documents

Recommendations

Info

THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGIME 207injustices experienced by the people’. 52 Ongoing frictions and the battle forcontrol of ICMI, between its bureaucrats and its reform-minded members, on thisoccasion were resolved in favour of the latter. Whereas Suharto’s circle hadpromoted ICMI bureaucrats to cabinet rank, the cost of this uncompromisingpolicy (of rewarding his closest loyalists with posts) was that ICMI’sintelligentsia sought to unhitch the association from bureaucratic influenceand control. Failing to gain inclusion in the power structure, they wished to makeICMI a much more autonomous associational expression of their interests,unfettered by the constraints and controls of corporatism.Habibie tried to placate the discontent of the intelligentsia by appointing AdiSasono and other ICMI supporters as advisors to the vice-president’s office. Inreturn, Achmad Tirtosudirjo and other ICMI figures talked optimistically of theorganisation assuming the role of think-tank on government policy. 53 Accordingto Asiaweek, Habibie’s new reform-minded advisors believed that they couldtransform Habibie and ‘remake him—in their own image’, to become ‘a Muslimwho is progressive, sophisticated, market-oriented and media-savvy; someonewho cares about social justice, democracy, human rights, the environment’. 54Although, Adi cautioned, ‘we can’t expect dramatic changes while Suharto is inpower’. 55Efforts to mollify ICMI aspirations did not prevent them from attackingSuharto’s rule. However, they began to call for the president to step down onlyafter the horror of the Trisakti incident, student abductions and ensuing anti-Chinese riots of 14–15 May. Elite opinion and public opinion began to turnresolutely against Suharto as it no longer tolerated such crude methods of terror—against Indonesia’s most treasured youth, university students—as a means ofmanaging dissent and instability. Reflecting this outrage and disaffection overtheir own displacement from power, ICMI’s chairman and Secretary Generalbecame more outspoken in their support for the reform movement.For example, after a meeting in mid-May of the central leadership council ofICMI, Achmad Tirtosudirjo and Adi Sasono announced that ICMI supportedstudent demands for ‘total reform’. However, it is doubtful that, at the time, theyactually desired ‘total reform’, as they were not seeking a significant shift in powerconfigurations but a realignment of them under Habibie’s future presidency. ICMIstill provided an important vehicle for achieving this. They proposed that aspecial session of the MPR be held and the cabinet be reshuffled, in an allusionto the need for Suharto’s government to resign. 56 On 16 May, Adi Sasono gave afiery anti-Suharto speech before an emotionally charged audience at Al-AzharMosque. 57 The press reported Achmad Tirtosudiro as calling for Suharto toresign before the 20 th of the month. 58To conclude, Amien Rais had led the defection from Suharto; eventually someof ICMI’s senior leaders and intelligentsia followed suit. Incorporation in theexisting state structures no longer worked for members of ICMI’s intelligentsianor for a number of its leaders. The March cabinet appointments of Suhartoloyalists proved beyond a doubt that Muslim interests in ICMI would not benefit
208 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIApolitically from continued accommodation with Suharto. The cabinetcomposition also demonstrated that Suharto was not serious about implementingreforms.Although Suharto had previously disappointed the intelligentsia by not givingits members cabinet positions in 1993, this had not led to their defection from thepresident. The difference this time was the political context of deep crisis andintensifying intra-elite rivalry before an anticipated post-Suharto period. Themomentum of student-led public protest and societal activation provided muchof the impetus for change. Only in mid-May 1998, however, when publicsentiment had turned assuredly against Suharto, did more cautious ICMI leadersand intellectuals find the courage to call openly for Suharto to resign. It appearsthat some members of the intelligentsia hoped that under a Habibie presidencythey would gain strategic positions in a reconfigured power structure and wouldbe able to promote democratic reforms. 59Before the clear shift in public mood, members of ICMI’s intelligentsia forseveral years had wished to see Suharto resign. However, with the exceptions ofAmien Rais and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, most of them, before this time, hadbeen unwilling to air their views publicly. They had long desired political reformbut also realised that, through incorporation in ICMI, Suharto gave themprotection from rival groups, especially from nationalist elements in ABRI. It wasalso too dangerous to oppose Suharto, with the imprisonment of Bintang havingdemonstrated this danger. Until this point, incorporation and the threat ofsanctions had acted as relatively effective mechanisms for neutralising dissentingvoices in ICMI.SUHARTO LOSING CONTROLThe groundswell of student-led opposition (and emerging chaos) to Suharto’sNew Order thus far discussed created tremendous pressures on the political eliteto call for the president’s s resignation. Confronted by crisis, corporatism andrepression failed to contain societal demands for participation. From 18 Mayuntil their removal on the 24 th , in an act of open defiance, thousands of studentsoccupied the parliament building in the South Jakarta suburb of Senayan and metwith the parliamentary fractions. A veritable cornucopia of student umbrellaorganisations crowded the parliamentary compound. Muslim leaders andorganisations comprised a significant segment of the student-led reformmovement pushing for change of government in the last days of Suharto’spresidency. Representing Islamic organisational presence was the umbrellaKAMMI, the Regional Corps of HMI Alumni (KAHMI), and the IndonesianMuslim Community Movement for Reform (Gemanusi)—an umbrella toorganisations like HMI, the Muhammadiyah University Students Association,Muhammadiyah Youth, Indonesian Secondary School Students (PII), theIndonesian Muslim Youth Movement (GPII), and the NU’s Ansor Youth. Also
Page 2 and 3:
Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
Page 5 and 6:
ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
Page 7 and 8:
viThe University Student Movement 1
Page 9 and 10:
viiiWhile many authors have used a
Page 11 and 12:
PrefaceThe book is the product of d
Page 13 and 14:
Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
Page 15 and 16:
xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
Page 17 and 18:
xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
Page 19 and 20:
xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
Page 21 and 22:
xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
Page 23 and 24:
2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 96 and 97:
Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
Page 98 and 99:
MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
Page 126 and 127:
Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
Page 128 and 129:
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Tenggara. And later that month, he
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175:
Page 176 and 177:
Page 178 and 179: MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
Page 184 and 185: MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
Page 216 and 217: THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
Page 222 and 223: ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
Page 236 and 237: Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
Page 254 and 255: Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
Page 256 and 257: CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
Page 262 and 263: ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
Page 264 and 265: REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
Page 266 and 267: REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
Page 268 and 269: REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
Page 270 and 271: REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
Page 272 and 273: REFERENCES 251National University,
Page 274 and 275: REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
Page 276 and 277: IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
Page 278 and 279:
INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
Page 280:
INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
show all

Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?