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Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between Incorporation<strong>and</strong> IndependenceINTRODUCTIONThe voluntary organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of Religious Scholars), isthe most problematic of the <strong>Islam</strong>ic associations to analyse <strong>in</strong> terms of Suharto’scorporatist strategies. The reasons for this are not only because of NU’s large,sprawl<strong>in</strong>g organisational structure <strong>and</strong> mass membership, much of which wasbased <strong>in</strong> rural Java <strong>and</strong> only loosely tied to the organisation, but also because NUhad rema<strong>in</strong>ed largely outside of state structures for much of Suharto’s NewOrder period, had resisted state <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>ternal affairs, <strong>and</strong> thus hadrema<strong>in</strong>ed a fairly <strong>in</strong>dependent but marg<strong>in</strong>alised political <strong>and</strong> economic force.Nonetheless, Suharto did seek to capture, channel, <strong>and</strong> politically exclude the<strong>in</strong>terests of NU, <strong>and</strong> marshall NU support beh<strong>in</strong>d his presidency at elections. Theargument can be made that NU’s peripheral position <strong>in</strong> the political system<strong>in</strong>deed highlighted the success of Suharto’s strategy of corporatist exclusion, ofshutt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests out of power <strong>and</strong> deny<strong>in</strong>g effective channels of participation togroup, <strong>and</strong> especially Muslim group, <strong>in</strong>terests. This chapter considers howSuharto’s corporatist strategy both exacerbated <strong>and</strong> created divisions <strong>in</strong> NU. Anexam<strong>in</strong>ation also is made of how Golkar <strong>and</strong> ICMI became organisationalchannels through which Suharto sought to consolidate more <strong>in</strong>formal types ofclientelistic co-optation of leaders of NU’s pesantren (<strong>Islam</strong>ic board<strong>in</strong>g schools).Much of the study concerns Abdurrahman’s chairmanship of NU (1984–1999), because he was representative of, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluenced different trends <strong>in</strong>, theorganisation <strong>and</strong> had a major voice <strong>in</strong> national politics. He was an outspokencritic of Suharto, vocal advocate of democracy, <strong>and</strong> an opponent of Habibie <strong>and</strong>ICMI. He was later to become <strong>Indonesia</strong>’s fourth president <strong>and</strong> the first to bedemocratically elected. He strongly disagreed with the state-<strong>Islam</strong>icaccommodation through ICMI. He claimed that the accommodation, amongother th<strong>in</strong>gs, was an unacceptable attempt to build formal l<strong>in</strong>ks between the state<strong>and</strong> <strong>Islam</strong>ic politics. He defended NU’s <strong>in</strong>dependence from state encroachments.Significant segments of the NU membership (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g many leaders of thepesantren) also were determ<strong>in</strong>ed to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent from state frameworks.His leadership of NU, nonetheless, was often controversial <strong>and</strong> contested. There

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