Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

62
Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basin Özeti
By Gonul Tol
A
March 22, 2013
The PKK cease-fire
and Syria's Kurds
fter nearly three decades of bloody
struggle with the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), Turkey
might finally be entering a post-conflict
era. On Wednesday, the PKK's jailed
leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has been
serving a life sentence on Imrali Island
since 1999, called for an immediate
cease-fire and for thousands of his fighters
to withdraw from Turkish territory.
The call followed a round of talks that
began in October 2012 between Turkey's
National Intelligence Organization
(MIT) and Ocalan to convince the PKK
fighters to lay down their arms and withdraw
from Turkish soil. On Ocalan's
counsel and in a gesture of good will, the
PKK released eight Turkish soldiers and
civil servants last week that had been
abducted almost two years ago.
Ocalan's call could mark the first step in
ending one of the world's longest running
insurgencies. If it were to succeed,
it would also favorably impact Turkey's
democratization process, as well as possibly
change the course of the Syrian
uprising.
The Syrian conflict has reshuffled the
strategic cards of all regional and international
actors but has posed a particular
challenge for Turkey due to the
unique place Syria occupies in Turkey's
regional and domestic calculations.
Prior to the start of protests in 2011,
Syria had been a key component of the
Turkish government's "zero problems
with neighbors" policy. Following a near
war between the two countries in 1998,
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu made Syria the test case for
his vision to engage all regional actors,
including former adversaries, through
trade, investment, and political and cultural
exchanges. Domestically, engagement
with the Syrian regime ensured its
cooperation with Turkey's nearly threedecade
fight against the PKK.
Confronting a high-stakes crisis on its
southern border, Turkey has pursued a
cautious approach toward Syria's upris-
ing. Ankara initially asked President
Bashar al-Assad to carry out reforms.
However, frustrated with the growing
bloodshed, it finally joined the anti-
Assad camp in the fall of 2011. Beyond
its efforts to shelter refugees and
increase international diplomatic pressure
on the Syrian regime, Turkey took a
proactive role in hosting and providing
an organizational hub for the Syrian
opposition. In retaliation, Assad granted
several concessions to the Kurds and to
the PKK in particular. He allowed Saleh
Muslim, the head of the PKK's Syrian
offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD),
who lived for years in Iraq's Qandil
Mountains, to return to Syria and permitted
the PYD to operate freely in the
northern part of the country. Competing
for influence with the PYD in the
Kurdish areas of Syria is the Kurdish
National Council (KNC), an umbrella
organization of about 16 Kurdish parties
close to the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). Founded under the
patronage of KRG President Massoud
Barzani, the KNC is seen as an ally of the
KRG and lacks legitimacy among the
Kurdish population. The PYD, on the
other hand, is organizationally strong
and active on the ground. It provides
social services as well as security in
Syria's Kurdish areas in the northeast.
Yet, skeptical about Turkey's role in the
Arab dominated Syrian opposition as
well as fearful of an Islamist take-over in
post-Assad Syria, the PYD has largely
remained on the sidelines of the conflict.
Kurds could be the decisive minority in
the Syrian uprising, yet they are either
reluctant to fight against the regime with
full force or stifled by internal divisions.
In an effort to unite Syrian Kurds as well
as boost his image as the leader of
Kurds, Barzani tried to broker a powersharing
agreement between the PYD and
the KNC in June 2012. With the Erbil
Agreement, both parties pledged to
become a unified Kurdish front -- a factor
that might boost the overthrow of the
Assad regime. But the prospect of a longlasting
unity between the PYD and KNC
has been looking slim. The PYD does not
trust the KNC due to Barzani's close ties
to Turkey and the KNC is a loose organization
struggling with internal divisions
without the muscle to exert influence in
the armed conflict.
But that could all change if Ocalan's call
for a cease-fire and withdrawal leads to
disarmament of the PKK and a democratic
resolution of Turkey's Kurdish
problem. In a recent phone interview
PYD leader Saleh Muslim said that the
eventual success of Ankara's initiative
could dramatically change the PYD's
relations with the KNC and Syria's Arab
opposition. The PYD's distrust could
give way to a working relationship with
the non-Kurdish Syrian opposition if the
opposition, freed from pressure by
Turkey, addresses Kurdish demands. It
could also build trust between the KNC
and the PYD and lead to a united
Kurdish front in Syria that has international
legitimacy and strong standing
with a fighting force on the ground.
As the Syrian crisis rages on with no resolution
in sight, a united Syrian opposition
that includes Kurds, fighting with
Arabs on the same front could finally tip
the balance against Assad. Turkey can be
the glue that keeps Arabs and Kurds unified
if it can finally find a long-lasting
solution to its decades-old Kurdish
problem. Only then can Turkey reclaim
its hard-fought image as a regional
superpower on the Arab street and pursue
a confident Syria policy without subcontracting
it to Barzani. So far, Turkey
has refused to meet with the PYD due to
its links to the PKK. Now that Turkey
can talk to Ocalan openly, maybe
Foreign Minister Davutoglu could talk to
the PYD leader Saleh Muslim. That
would tip the balance in Syria. ❐
Gonul Tol is the founding director of the Center
for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute.