Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basin Özeti
BY HENRI J. BARKEY
March 26, 2013
Op-Ed
Iraq's great divider
Prime Minister Maliki's actions may lead to the country's
breakup, as the U.S. stands idly by.
I
raq is on its way to dissolution, and
the United States is doing nothing
to stop it. And if you ask people in
Iraq, it may even be abetting it.
With very few exceptions, an important
event in Iraq went unnoticed in the U.S.
media this month. Prime Minister Nouri
Maliki sent a force that included helicopters
to western Iraq to arrest Rafi
Issawi, the former finance minister and a
leading Sunni Arab opposition member.
Issawi, who was protected by armed
members of the Abu Risha clan, one of
post-2003 Iraq's most powerful Sunni
tribes, escaped capture.
This action came on the heels of Maliki's
telephone conversation with Secretary
of State John F. Kerry and took
Washington by surprise. Had a confrontation
ensued, the results would
have been calamitous. It could even
have provided the spark for the beginning
of a civil war. Still, Maliki's actions
represent another nail in the coffin for a
unified Iraq. Maliki, a Shiite Muslim,
had previously accused Vice President
Tariq Hashimi, a leading Sunni political
figure, of terrorism, forcing him to flee
Iraq in 2011. Hashimi was subsequently
tried in absentia and sentenced to death.
Maliki's policies have significantly
raised tensions in the Sunni regions of
Iraq. There are demonstrations in many
of the Sunni provinces that seek to emulate
those of the Arab Spring. They are
one reason Maliki has targeted Issawi.
He wants to contain the dissent before it
spreads.
Maliki's confrontational and increasingly
dictatorial style has also alienated
Iraqi Kurds, who, unlike the Sunnis,
have succeeded in having the Iraqi
Constitution recognize their federal
region and the Kurdistan regional government.
The Kurds, for all intents and
purposes, run an autonomous area with
its own defense forces. However, the
relationship between Baghdad and the
Kurdish regional capital of Irbil has
become severely strained as the central
government has made cooperation difficult,
if not impossible. Baghdad, ostensibly,
is angry at the Kurds' attempts to
make independent deals with foreign oil
companies.
But at the heart of Maliki's policies is his
unease with the developments in Syria.
Convinced that Syrian President Bashar
Assad, who belongs to the Shiite-related
Alawite sect, is on his way out, Maliki
fears a tidal wave of Sunni fighters will
cross the border to rekindle the civil war
that has threatened to erupt in Iraq since
the U.S. occupation. He thinks the Kurds
have established their region and that
their independence is only a matter of
time. Hence, his primary concern is to
solidify his control over the Shiite
Muslim regions and Baghdad.
Maliki's increasingly dictatorial tendencies
are ensuring that the country will
split along sectarian and ethnic lines.
This is not what the United States wants,
nor is it conducive to stability in the
region, as Iraq would succumb to the
interference of its often-rapacious neighbors.
Washington has abetted the process by
playing into Maliki's hands. It seems
every time the U.S. engages Maliki, he
feels emboldened and takes risks.
Washington has not tried to contain him.
Take, for example, the U.S. relationship
with the Kurdish regional government.
The Kurds complain that Washington
has been siding with Baghdad at their
expense. From the oil deals to simple
education exchanges, Washington seems
petrified about crossing Maliki.
What explains this seeming American
inattention to Iraq's deepening problems?
One possible explanation is that
Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri Maliki
the U.S. sees support for Maliki as a lastditch
effort to contain the Shiites in Iraq
and prevent them from becoming Iran's
wholly owned subsidiary. After all, Iran
exerts a great deal of influence in the
Shiite provinces of Iraq and is likely to
increase its hold in Iraq as sectarian tensions
intensify, especially if Syria collapses.
Making matters worse is the absence of
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd,
who suffered a stroke in December and
is being treated in Germany. Wily and
savvy, Talabani's primary function was
to provide adult supervision to all the
quarreling parties in Baghdad. His illness
has created a dangerous vacuum. It
is unlikely that anyone will replace him
any time soon because within the
Kurdish regional government, where he
is revered, any mention of succession is
taboo.
Iraq may be destined for a breakup. But
the way to prevent it is not by strengthening
the hand of the one person who is
most responsible for pushing the parties
apart. The answer is for Iraq to further
develop its federal structures, make
Baghdad a federal district and devolve
power to the provinces. Then it needs to
create a stake for all to want to remain
within such a federation.
Decentralization with a promise of equitable
sharing of the country's oil revenue
is the only glue that will hold the country
together.
The next time Maliki, buoyed by real or
imagined U.S. support, resorts to force
against his opposition, the outcome may
not end as quietly as it did in the Issawi
incident. ❏
Henri J. Barkey is a professor of international
relations at Lehigh University.
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