[ccebook.cn]The World in 2010
[ccebook.cn]The World in 2010
[ccebook.cn]The World in 2010
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As for rewrit<strong>in</strong>g nuclear rules, some governments will resist us<strong>in</strong>g the NPT conference to strengthen the badly<br />
weakened treaty on the ground that the nuclear powers have still not done enough. North Korea, once a<br />
member, won’t be there this time: it has left the treaty and declared itself a nuclear power. Iran, which denies<br />
nuclear ambitions but refuses full co-operation with <strong>in</strong>spectors, will be—work<strong>in</strong>g hard to block progress.<br />
One idea is to require all countries (so far the process has been voluntary) to sign up to enhanced safeguards,<br />
known as the Additional Protocol, to replace the more basic ones that came with the 40-year-old NPT. Another<br />
is to demand that any country leav<strong>in</strong>g the treaty hand back equipment or materials acquired while a member.<br />
Half-life of a dream<br />
In theory, almost everyone <strong>in</strong> the treaty except Iran (and Syria, another alleged miscreant) supports the idea<br />
of tighten<strong>in</strong>g the rules. In practice, Brazil has been hold<strong>in</strong>g out aga<strong>in</strong>st the Additional Protocol on the<br />
(improbable) ground that it could put at risk commercial secrets from its uranium-enrichment programme.<br />
Egypt says it will accept the protocol only when Israel, not an NPT member, gives up its bombs. All this looks<br />
like lett<strong>in</strong>g Iran off the hook.<br />
Fuel-mak<strong>in</strong>g technologies <strong>in</strong> the wrong hands can be abused for bomb-mak<strong>in</strong>g. But<br />
plans to curb their spread will move ahead only slowly, if at all. Australia, Canada<br />
and South Africa, all with deposits of natural uranium, are reluctant to accept limits<br />
on their future rights to enrich it for profit. If they don’t budge, plans for an<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational fuel bank of last resort, to help dissuade countries go<strong>in</strong>g for nuclear<br />
Copyright © 2009 <strong>The</strong> Economist Newspaper and <strong>The</strong> Economist Group. All rights reserved.<br />
All this looks like<br />
lett<strong>in</strong>g Iran off<br />
the hook<br />
power from th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g they need proliferation-prone uranium-enrichment and plutonium-mak<strong>in</strong>g capacities too,<br />
are likely to fail.<br />
Even the test ban and a new treaty to cut off production of fissile material—both obvious first steps to a<br />
nuclear-free future—will be dogged with difficulty. India, see<strong>in</strong>g Ch<strong>in</strong>a as its chief nuclear rival, will refuse to<br />
swear off nuclear tests and will go on build<strong>in</strong>g up its arsenal; and Pakistan won’t sign up unless India does.<br />
When it comes to a fissile-material ban, foot-dragg<strong>in</strong>g roles are reversed, with Pakistan the chief hold-out,<br />
sav<strong>in</strong>g India the bother. That is because new trade arrangements under a controversial civil nuclear deal with<br />
America will allow India to devote more of its scarce domestic uranium to its military programme. Pakistan,<br />
with Ch<strong>in</strong>a’s help, is determ<strong>in</strong>ed to keep up.<br />
So there will be lots of disarmament talk <strong>in</strong> <strong>2010</strong>. But not a whole lot will get done.<br />
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