30.06.2013 Views

How does the operation of PHARMAC's 'Community Exceptional ...

How does the operation of PHARMAC's 'Community Exceptional ...

How does the operation of PHARMAC's 'Community Exceptional ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

in every sense, and attenuates <strong>the</strong> right by deciding what <strong>the</strong> client will or won’t<br />

get.<br />

The third element <strong>of</strong> distributive justice described by Malin et al. (2002) is <strong>the</strong><br />

idea <strong>of</strong> desert or that which one deserves. This criterion is not generally an<br />

acceptable one on which to apportion health care because it attempts to assert<br />

blame for <strong>the</strong> causes <strong>of</strong> disease or provide a reward for avoidance <strong>of</strong> disease.<br />

O<strong>the</strong>r factors such as genetic inheritance, family history, educational<br />

opportunities, physical, social and political environment are not subject to what<br />

a person can claim to deserve. Given and acquired talents are also<br />

incomparable and defeat allocations based on this element.<br />

The final element described by Malin et al. (2002) is utility or maximising well<br />

being. Primarily this element rests on <strong>the</strong> assumption that <strong>the</strong> well being <strong>of</strong><br />

every person is equally important. Secondly it asserts that taxpayers paying<br />

taxes are doing so on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> fairness and thirdly it asserts that <strong>the</strong><br />

distributions are efficiently applied and <strong>the</strong>re is no wastage. The main problem<br />

with distributing on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> utility is that <strong>the</strong> indicators for utility and<br />

efficiency are value-laden and not easily agreed upon. Given that <strong>the</strong>re is not<br />

an unlimited resource to meet <strong>the</strong>se priorities, we are taken back to <strong>the</strong><br />

questions <strong>of</strong> how society can agree on levels <strong>of</strong> priority while at <strong>the</strong> same time<br />

satisfying any level <strong>of</strong> equality.<br />

Klein and Williams (1998) debated in <strong>the</strong> literature <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> prioritisation<br />

<strong>of</strong> scarce resources in <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom. Klein argued that <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong><br />

priority setting is inevitably a process <strong>of</strong> debating <strong>the</strong> values <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions<br />

making <strong>the</strong> decisions. Such a debate generates wide discussion about values<br />

and context. For this reason, institutions must be equipped to hold <strong>the</strong> debate<br />

and analyse <strong>the</strong> answers. He believed that <strong>the</strong> right process will produce<br />

socially acceptable answers and will be arrived at by an expression <strong>of</strong> societal<br />

values and not by any amount <strong>of</strong> cost-benefit analysis.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> same article Williams argued <strong>the</strong> opposite position to that <strong>of</strong> Klein.<br />

Williams (1998) stated that priority setting required clarity about objectives,<br />

information about costs and outcomes and an ability to measure <strong>the</strong><br />

performance <strong>of</strong> competing interests in <strong>the</strong> priority line <strong>of</strong> choices. This is<br />

because <strong>the</strong> decisions about priority must be framed in a context <strong>of</strong> adequate<br />

19

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!