Daniel l. Rubinfeld
Daniel l. Rubinfeld
Daniel l. Rubinfeld
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220 Part 2 Producers, Consumers, and Competitive Markets<br />
We can rewrite this condition slightly as follows:<br />
Chapter 7 The Cost of Production 22<br />
(7.4) ]<br />
MPdw is the additional output that results from spending an additional dollar<br />
for labor. Suppose that the wage rate is $10 and that adding a ,yorker to the<br />
production process will increase output by 20 units. The additional output per<br />
dollar spent on an additional worker \·vill be 20/10 = 2 units of output per dollar.<br />
Similarly, MPdr is the additional output that results fronl spending an<br />
additional dollar for capital. Therefore, equation (7.4) tells us that a cost-mini_<br />
mizing finn should choose its quantities of inputs so that the last dollar's :vorth<br />
of any input added to the production process yields the same amount ot extra<br />
output<br />
\,\ihy must this condition hold for cost minimization Suppose that in addition<br />
t~ the 510 wage rate, the rental rate on capital is $2. Suppose also that<br />
adding a unit of capital will increase output by 20 units. In that case, the additional<br />
output per dollar of capital input would be 20/52 = 10 units of output per<br />
dollar. Because a dollar spent for capital is five times more productive than a<br />
dollar spent for labor, the firm will want to use more capital and less labor. If the<br />
finn reduces labor and increases capital, its marginal product of labor ,vill rise<br />
and its marginal product of capital vl'ill fall. Eventually, the point will be<br />
reached where the production of an additional unit of output costs the same<br />
regardless of which additional input is used. At that point the finn is minimizing<br />
its cost.<br />
~eel plan~s are often bui~t on or near riv~rs. A river offers r~adily ava,ilable,<br />
S mexpensl\'e h'ansportahon for both the Iron ore that goes mto the production<br />
process and the finished steel itself. Unfortunately, it also pro\'ides a cheap<br />
disposal method for by-products of the production process, called eff7uent. For<br />
example, a steel plant processes its iron ore for use in blast furnaces by grinding<br />
taconite deposits into a fine consistency. During this process, the ore is<br />
extracted bv a ma£cnetic field as a flow of water and fine ore passes through the<br />
• b d<br />
plant. One by-product of this process-fine taconite particles-can be dumpe<br />
in the river at relatively little cost to the firm. Alternative removal methods Of<br />
private h'eahnent plants are relatively expensive.<br />
Because the taconite particles are a nondegradable waste that can harm vegetation<br />
and fish, the Elwironmental Protection Agency (EPA) has imposed an<br />
effluent fee-a per-unit fee that the steel finn must pay for the effluent that<br />
goes into the river. How should the manager of a steel plant deal with the<br />
imposition of this effluent fee to minirnize the costs of production<br />
Suppose that without regulation the plant is producing 2000 tons of steel ~er<br />
month, using 2000 machine-hours of capital and 10,000 gallons of water (wluch<br />
contains taconite particles when returned to the river). The manager estimates<br />
that a machine-hour costs $40 and dumping each gallon of waste\','ater in the<br />
river costs 510. The total cost of production is therefore 5180,000: 580,000 for<br />
capital and 5100,000 for ·wastewater. How should the manager respond to an EPAimposed<br />
effluent fee of 510 per gallon of waste\\'ater dumped The manager<br />
(machinehours<br />
per<br />
month)<br />
1,000<br />
20,000 Wastewater<br />
(gallons per month)<br />
When th~ firm is not ch~rged for dumping its wastewater in a rivel~ it chooses to produc.e<br />
a gwen output usmg 10,000 gallons of 'wastewater and 2000 machine-hours of<br />
capItal, at A. Howevel~ an effluent fee raises the cost of wastewatel~ shifts the isocost<br />
curve h'om Fe to DE, and causes the finn to produce at B-a process that results in<br />
much less effluent.<br />
~10WS that there is sOI1:e He:,ibility in the production process. If the firm puts<br />
mto place more expensIve etHuent treatment equipment, the finn can achieve<br />
the same output with less wastewater"<br />
F~ur: ~.5 shO\\:s the cost-minimizing response. The vertical axis measures<br />
the hrm s rnput ot capital in machine-hours per month-the horizontal axis<br />
measures the quantity of wastewater in gallons per month. First, consider the<br />
level at w~lich th~ firm produces when there is no eft1uent fee. Point A represents<br />
the rnput ot capital and the level of wastewater that allows the firm to<br />
produce its quota of steel at minimum cost. Because the firm is minimizina<br />
cost: A lies O~l th~ isocost line Fe, which is tangent to the isoquant. The slope of<br />
the ISCoSt lme IS equal to $10/540 = - 0.25 because a unit of capital costs<br />
four times more than a unit of wastewater.<br />
When the eft1uent fee is imposed, the cost of wastewater increases from 510<br />
per gallon to $20: For e\'ery gallon of wastewater (which costs 510), the firm has<br />
to pay the, gO\'ernment an additional 510. The eft1uent fee therefore increases<br />
the cost ot wastewater relati\'e to capital. To produce the same output at the<br />
~~,~es~ Possib2e ~os~' the l:nanager must chose the isoco:,t line with a slope<br />
a S-~(540.- O"J .that IS tange:'t to the Isoquant. In FIgure 7.5, DE is the<br />
:PlO~I1ate IS0COSt lme, and B glyeS the appropriate choice of capital and<br />
1\ aste\\~ter" The move from A to B shows that with an eft1uent fee the use of an<br />
alternatll'e production technology that emphasizes the use of capital (3500