Daniel l. Rubinfeld
Daniel l. Rubinfeld
Daniel l. Rubinfeld
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300 Part 2 Producers, Consumers, and Competitive Markets<br />
Chapter 9 The Analysis of Competitive Markets 301<br />
How can we measure this cost Remember that the supply curve is the<br />
gate marginal cost curve for the industry. The supply curve therefore gives<br />
the additional cost of producing each incremental unit. Thus the area lmder<br />
supply curve from Q3 to Q2 is the cost of producing the quantity Q2 - Q3'<br />
cost is represented by the shaded trapezoid D. So unless producers respond<br />
unsold output by cutting production, the total change in producer surplus is<br />
Pmin f-------~------___:7f<br />
Po I---------!---<br />
:..'lPS = A - C - D<br />
Given that trapezoid D can be large, a minimum price can even result in a net<br />
loss of surplus to producers alone! As a result, this form of government interven_<br />
tion can reduce producers' profits because of the cost of excess prodUction.<br />
Another example of a government-imposed price minimum is the minimum<br />
wage la,,\'. The effect of this policy is illustrated in Figure 9.8, which shows the<br />
supply and demand for labor. The wage is set at 'lUmin' a level. hig.her than the<br />
market-clearing wage Woo As a result, those workers who can fmd Jobs obtain a<br />
higher wage. However, some people who want to work will be unable to. The<br />
policy results in unemployment, which in the figure is L2 - Lj. We \'1,ill examine<br />
the minimum wage in more detail in Chapter 14.<br />
o<br />
Before 1980, the airline industry in the Unite~ States looked very differ:~t<br />
than it does today. Fares and routes were hghtly regulated by the CIVil<br />
Aeronautics Board (CAB). The CAB set most fares well above v,that would have<br />
prevailed in a free market. It also restricted entry, so that many route~ were<br />
served by only one or two airlines. By the late 1970s, however, the CA.B lIberalized<br />
fare regulation and allowed airlines to serve any routes they wIshed. By<br />
1981, the industry had been completely deregulated, and the CAB itself was<br />
dissolved in 1982. Since that time, many new airlines have beglli1 service, and<br />
price competition is often intense. .<br />
Many airline executives feared that deregulation would lead to,.chaos ill the<br />
industry, with competitive pressure causing sharply reduced prohts and e~en<br />
bankruptcies. After all, the original rationale for CAB regulation was to proVide<br />
"stability" in an industry that was considered vital to the US. economy. And<br />
one miaht think that as lona as price was held above its market-clearing level,<br />
o 0<br />
profits would be higher than they would be in a free market. ..<br />
Dereeulation did lead to maJ'or chanaes in the industrv. Some mrlmes merged<br />
o 0 J • fll<br />
or went out of business as new ones entered the industry. Although pnces e<br />
considerably (to the benefit of consumers), profits overall did not fal.l.rr:u~<br />
because the CAB's minimum prices had caused inefficiencies and artIflCIally<br />
hiah costs. The effect of minimum prices is illush'ated in Figure 9.9, where Pfi<br />
o . 1 .. . eset<br />
and Qo are the market-clearing price and quantity, P min IS t 1e ffillUmUm pnc<br />
by the CAB, and Q1 is the amount demanded at this higher price. The problem<br />
was that at price P min<br />
, airlines wanted to supply a quantity Q2' much .larger<br />
than Q1' Although they did not expaI:d output to.Q2' the~ did expand It "'4<br />
beyond Qj-to Q3 in the fiaure-hopmg to sell this quantity at the expense 0<br />
co~petitors. As a result, lo~d factors (the percentage of seats filled) were relatively<br />
low, and so were profits. (Trapezoid D measures the cost of unsold output.)<br />
At price P min' airlines would like to supply Q2' well above the quantity Q1 that consumers<br />
will buy. Here they supply Q3' Trapezoid D is the cost of unsold output.<br />
Airline may have been lower as a result of regulation because triangle C and<br />
tralJezlDid D can together exceed rectangle A In addition, consumers lose A + B.<br />
Table 9.1 gives some key numbers that illustI'ate the evolution of the industry.5<br />
The number of carriers increased dramatically after deregulation, as did<br />
passenger load factors. The passenger-mile rate (the revenue per passengermile<br />
Hown) fell sharply in real (inHation-adjusted) terms from 1980 to 1985, and<br />
then continued to drop from 1985 to 1996. This decline was the result of<br />
increased competition and reductions in fares. And 'what about costs The real<br />
cost index indicates that even after adjusting for int1ation, costs increased by<br />
about 20 percent from 1975 to 1980. But this \,\'as largely due to the sharp<br />
1975 1980 1985<br />
Number of carriers 33 72 86<br />
Passenger load factor (%) 54 59 61<br />
Passenger-mile rate (constant 1995 dollars) .218 .210 .166<br />
Real cost index (1995 = 100) 101 122 111<br />
Real cost index corrected for fuel increases 94 98 98<br />
-5 Department of Commerce, us. Statistical Abstract, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998.<br />
1990 1995 1996<br />
60 86 96<br />
62 67 69<br />
.150 .129 .126<br />
107 100 99<br />
100 100 98