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Daniel l. Rubinfeld

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300 Part 2 Producers, Consumers, and Competitive Markets<br />

Chapter 9 The Analysis of Competitive Markets 301<br />

How can we measure this cost Remember that the supply curve is the<br />

gate marginal cost curve for the industry. The supply curve therefore gives<br />

the additional cost of producing each incremental unit. Thus the area lmder<br />

supply curve from Q3 to Q2 is the cost of producing the quantity Q2 - Q3'<br />

cost is represented by the shaded trapezoid D. So unless producers respond<br />

unsold output by cutting production, the total change in producer surplus is<br />

Pmin f-------~------___:7f<br />

Po I---------!---<br />

:..'lPS = A - C - D<br />

Given that trapezoid D can be large, a minimum price can even result in a net<br />

loss of surplus to producers alone! As a result, this form of government interven_<br />

tion can reduce producers' profits because of the cost of excess prodUction.<br />

Another example of a government-imposed price minimum is the minimum<br />

wage la,,\'. The effect of this policy is illustrated in Figure 9.8, which shows the<br />

supply and demand for labor. The wage is set at 'lUmin' a level. hig.her than the<br />

market-clearing wage Woo As a result, those workers who can fmd Jobs obtain a<br />

higher wage. However, some people who want to work will be unable to. The<br />

policy results in unemployment, which in the figure is L2 - Lj. We \'1,ill examine<br />

the minimum wage in more detail in Chapter 14.<br />

o<br />

Before 1980, the airline industry in the Unite~ States looked very differ:~t<br />

than it does today. Fares and routes were hghtly regulated by the CIVil<br />

Aeronautics Board (CAB). The CAB set most fares well above v,that would have<br />

prevailed in a free market. It also restricted entry, so that many route~ were<br />

served by only one or two airlines. By the late 1970s, however, the CA.B lIberalized<br />

fare regulation and allowed airlines to serve any routes they wIshed. By<br />

1981, the industry had been completely deregulated, and the CAB itself was<br />

dissolved in 1982. Since that time, many new airlines have beglli1 service, and<br />

price competition is often intense. .<br />

Many airline executives feared that deregulation would lead to,.chaos ill the<br />

industry, with competitive pressure causing sharply reduced prohts and e~en<br />

bankruptcies. After all, the original rationale for CAB regulation was to proVide<br />

"stability" in an industry that was considered vital to the US. economy. And<br />

one miaht think that as lona as price was held above its market-clearing level,<br />

o 0<br />

profits would be higher than they would be in a free market. ..<br />

Dereeulation did lead to maJ'or chanaes in the industrv. Some mrlmes merged<br />

o 0 J • fll<br />

or went out of business as new ones entered the industry. Although pnces e<br />

considerably (to the benefit of consumers), profits overall did not fal.l.rr:u~<br />

because the CAB's minimum prices had caused inefficiencies and artIflCIally<br />

hiah costs. The effect of minimum prices is illush'ated in Figure 9.9, where Pfi<br />

o . 1 .. . eset<br />

and Qo are the market-clearing price and quantity, P min IS t 1e ffillUmUm pnc<br />

by the CAB, and Q1 is the amount demanded at this higher price. The problem<br />

was that at price P min<br />

, airlines wanted to supply a quantity Q2' much .larger<br />

than Q1' Although they did not expaI:d output to.Q2' the~ did expand It "'4<br />

beyond Qj-to Q3 in the fiaure-hopmg to sell this quantity at the expense 0<br />

co~petitors. As a result, lo~d factors (the percentage of seats filled) were relatively<br />

low, and so were profits. (Trapezoid D measures the cost of unsold output.)<br />

At price P min' airlines would like to supply Q2' well above the quantity Q1 that consumers<br />

will buy. Here they supply Q3' Trapezoid D is the cost of unsold output.<br />

Airline may have been lower as a result of regulation because triangle C and<br />

tralJezlDid D can together exceed rectangle A In addition, consumers lose A + B.<br />

Table 9.1 gives some key numbers that illustI'ate the evolution of the industry.5<br />

The number of carriers increased dramatically after deregulation, as did<br />

passenger load factors. The passenger-mile rate (the revenue per passengermile<br />

Hown) fell sharply in real (inHation-adjusted) terms from 1980 to 1985, and<br />

then continued to drop from 1985 to 1996. This decline was the result of<br />

increased competition and reductions in fares. And 'what about costs The real<br />

cost index indicates that even after adjusting for int1ation, costs increased by<br />

about 20 percent from 1975 to 1980. But this \,\'as largely due to the sharp<br />

1975 1980 1985<br />

Number of carriers 33 72 86<br />

Passenger load factor (%) 54 59 61<br />

Passenger-mile rate (constant 1995 dollars) .218 .210 .166<br />

Real cost index (1995 = 100) 101 122 111<br />

Real cost index corrected for fuel increases 94 98 98<br />

-5 Department of Commerce, us. Statistical Abstract, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998.<br />

1990 1995 1996<br />

60 86 96<br />

62 67 69<br />

.150 .129 .126<br />

107 100 99<br />

100 100 98

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