Daniel l. Rubinfeld
Daniel l. Rubinfeld
Daniel l. Rubinfeld
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296 Part 2 Producers, Consumers, and Competitive Markets<br />
Chapter 9 The Analysis of Competitive Markets 297<br />
organs. Each year, about 8000 kidneys, 20,000 corneas, and 1200 hearts<br />
h'ansplanted in the United States, but there is considerable excess demand<br />
these organs, and many potential recipients must do \\'ithout them.<br />
potential recipients die as a result<br />
To tmderstand the effects of this la,\" let's consider the supply and<br />
for kidneys. First the supply curve. Even at a price of zero (the effective<br />
under the law), donors supply about 8000 kidneys per year. But many<br />
people who need kidney transplants cannot obtain them because of a<br />
of donors. It has been estimated that 4000 more kidneys would be<br />
the price 'were $20,000. We can fit a linear supply curve to this d<br />
supply curve of the form Q a + bP. When P = 0, Q = 8000, so a = 8000.<br />
P = $20,000, Q = 12,000, so b = (12,000 8000)/20,000 = 0.2. Thus the<br />
curve is<br />
Price I 5'<br />
5-10,000<br />
30,000 D<br />
20,000<br />
Supply: QS = 8000 + 0.2P<br />
Note that at a price of $20,000, the elasticity of supply is 0.33.<br />
It is expected that at a price of $20,000, the number of kidneys ~".lllClltUI:!U.<br />
would be 12,000 per year. Like supply, demand is relatively price inelastic;<br />
reasonable estimate for the elasticity of demand at the $20,000 price is<br />
This implies the following linear demand curve:<br />
10,000 A<br />
In §2.6, we explain how to fit<br />
linear demand and supply<br />
curves from information<br />
about the equilibrium price<br />
and quantity and the price<br />
elasticities of demand and<br />
supply.<br />
Demand: QD = 16,000 - 0.2P<br />
These supply and demand curves are plotted in Figure 9.6, which shows<br />
market-clearing price and quantity of $20,000 and 12,000, respectively.<br />
Because the sale of kidneys is prohibited, supply is limited to 8000<br />
number of kidneys that people donate). This constrained supply is shown<br />
the vertical line Sf. How does this affect the welfare of kidney suppliers and<br />
recipients<br />
First consider suppliers. Those who provide kidneys fail to receive the<br />
520,000 that each kidney is worth-a loss of surplus represented by rectangle A<br />
and equal to (8000)($20,000) = $160 million. Moreover, some people who would.<br />
supply kidneys if they were paid do not These people lose an amount of sm~<br />
plus represented by triangle C, which is equal to (1/2)(4000)($20,000) = $40mi1~<br />
lion. 111erefore the total loss to suppliers is $200 million.<br />
What about recipients Presumably the law intended to treat the kidneyasa<br />
gift to the recipient. In this case, those recipients who obtain kidneys gaill rectangle<br />
A ($160 million) because they do not have to pay the $20,000 price. Those<br />
who cannot obtain kidneys lose surplus of an amOtmt given by triangle B<br />
equal to $40 million. 11us implies a net increase in the surplus of recipients<br />
$160 - $4:0 = $120 million. It also implies a deadweight loss equal to the<br />
of h'iangles Band C (i.e., 580 million).<br />
111ese estimates of the welfare effects of the policy may need adjushl1ent<br />
two reasons. First, kidneys will not necessarily be allocated to those who<br />
them most highly. If the limited supply of kidneys is partly allocated to peoplE;<br />
with valuations below $40,000, the true deadweight loss will be higher than oUT<br />
estimate. Second, with excess demand, there is no way to ensure that recipients<br />
will receive their kidneys as gifts. In practice, kidneys are often rationed 011 the<br />
basis of willingness to pay, and many recipients end up paying all or mo~t<br />
the $40,000 price that is needed to clear the market when supply is constnuned<br />
market-clearing price is $20,000; at this price, about 12,000 kidneys per year<br />
i .. would be supplied. The act effectively makes the price zero. About 8000 kidneys per<br />
are still donated; this constrained supply is shown as Sf. 111e loss to suppliers is<br />
, given by rectangle A and triangle C. If constilllers received kidneys at no cost, their<br />
would be given by rectangle A less triangle B. In practice, kidneys are often<br />
,rationed on the basis of willingness to pay, and many recipients pay most or all of the<br />
$40,000 price that clears the market when is constrained. Rectangles A and D<br />
measure the total value of when is constrained.<br />
to 8000. • A good part of the value of the kidnevs-rectanales _ 1:) A and D in the fia- 1:)<br />
me-IS then captured by hospitals and middlemen. As a result, the law reduces<br />
the surplus of recipients as well as of suppliers. 3<br />
There are, of course, arguments in favor of prohibiting the sale of organs.~<br />
One. argument st~ms from the problem of imperfect information; if people<br />
receive payment tor organs, they may hide adverse information about their<br />
health histories. This argument is probably most applicable to the sale of blood,<br />
where there is a possibility of h"ansmitting hepatitis, AIDS, or other viruses. But<br />
~~ fu:ther analyses of these efficiency costs, see Dwane L Barney and R. Larry Reynolds, "An<br />
D .omlC/Analysls at Transplant Organs," At/alltlc Ecollolllic Journal 17 (September 1989): 12-20;<br />
a~Id L Kaserman and A H Barnett, "An Economic Anah'sis of Transplant Oraans: A Comment<br />
an Extension," Atlalltic Ecollolllic Journnl19 (June 1991): 57-64; and A. Frank "'Adams III, A. H<br />
and Da\2d L Kaserman, "Markets for Organs: The Question of Supplv," COlltclIlpOral'l{<br />
FohCij, II (April 1999); 147-55 ~,<br />
"tor discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments, see Susan Rose-Ackerman,<br />
Ron:e~e~abIllty and the Theory of Property Rights," Colllllibin Lilli' Rel,icl1' 85 (June 1985): 931-69, and<br />
" ' BlaIr and DaVid L Kaserman, "The Economics and Ethics of Alternati\'e Cadaveric Oraan<br />
Policies," Ynle Joumal Oil Regulatioll 8 (Summer 1991): 403-52.<br />
'"