BENEDICT DE SPINOZA: Theological-Political Treatise

On the divine law
[6] If we now consider the character of the natural divine law, as we have
just explained it, we shall see:
(1) that it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it from
universal human nature, and
(2) that it does not require belief in any kind of historical narrative. Since
the natural divine law is inferred from the consideration of human nature
alone, it is certain that we can conceive it in Adam as much as in any other
man, as much in a man who lives among his fellow human beings as in a man
who leads a solitary life. Belief in a historical narrative, however reliable it may
be, can give us no knowledge of God nor consequently love of God either. For
love of God arises from knowledge of him; and knowledge of him has to be
drawn from universal notions which are certain in themselves and wellknown,
and so it is by no means the case that belief in a historical narrative
is a necessary requirement for us to reach our highest good. But although belief
in such histories cannot give us a knowledge and love of God, we do not deny that
reading them is very useful for the purposes of civil life.The more we observe and 62
the better we understand the manners and conditions of men, which can best be
learned from their actions, the more wisely shall we be able to dwell among them,
and the better we shall be able to adapt our actions and our lives to their ways.
(3) We shall also see that the natural divine law does not require
ceremonies. Ceremonies are actions which are indi¡erent in themselves and
are called good only by convention or which represent some good as necessary
to salvation, or actions (if you prefer) whose rationale is beyond human understanding.
For the natural light of reason requires nothing that this light itself
does not reach; it requires only what carries the clearest evidence of being a
good or a means to our happiness. Things that are good only by command or
tradition or because they are symbolic representations of some good, cannot
improve our understanding; they are no more than shadows and cannot be
counted among actions that are the product or fruit, so to speak, of mind
and sound understanding. We need not demonstrate all this here at greater
length.
(4) Finally, we see that the supreme reward of the divine law is to know the
law itself, that is, to know God and to love him in true liberty with whole and
constant minds; the penalty is lack of these things and enslavement to the
£esh, or an inconstant and wavering mind.
[7] Having made these points, we must now ask: (1) whether by the natural
light of reason we can conceive of God as a legislator or a prince who prescribes
laws to men; (2) what holy Scripture teaches about the natural light of
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