BENEDICT DE SPINOZA: Theological-Political Treatise

Theological-Political Treatise
[5] However, we cannot altogether deny that treason may be committed
as much by words as by deeds. Consequently, if it is impossible altogether
to deny subjects this freedom, it is, on the other hand, likewise very dangerous
to concede it without any restriction. For this reason we must now
ask how far this freedom can and ought to be granted to each person, so as
to be consistent with the stability of the state and protecting the sovereign’s
authority.This, as I explained at the beginning of chapter 16,hasbeenmy
principal goal.
[6] It very clearly follows from the fundamental principles of the state
which I explained above that its ultimate purpose is not to dominate or
control people by fear or subject them to the authority of another. On the
contrary, its aim is to free everyone from fear so that they may live in
241 security so far as possible, that is, so that they may retain, to the highest
possible degree, their natural right to live and to act without harm to
themselves or to others. It is not, I contend, the purpose of the state to turn
people from rational beings into beasts or automata, but rather to allow
their minds and bodies to develop in their own ways in security and enjoy
the free use of reason, and not to participate in con£icts based on hatred,
anger or deceit or in malicious disputes with each other. Therefore, the
true purpose of the state is in fact freedom.
[7] Furthermore, when constituting a state one thing which we noted
was indispensable was that the entire power of decision-making should be
lodged in all the people, or else in some, or else just one. But people’s free
judgments are very diverse and everyone thinks they know everything
themselves, and it can never happen that everyone will think exactly alike
and speak with one voice. It would have been impossible therefore for
people to live in peace, unless each one gave up his right to act according to
his own decision alone. Each one therefore surrendered his right to act
according to his own resolution, but not his right to think and judge for
himself. Thus no one can act against the sovereign’s decisions without
prejudicing his authority, but they can think and judge and consequently
also speak without any restriction, provided they merely speak or teach by
way of reason alone, not by trickery or in anger or from hatred or with the
intention of introducing some alteration in the state on their own initiative.
For example, suppose someone shows a law to be contrary to sound
reason and voices the opinion that it should be repealed. If at the same
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