BENEDICT DE SPINOZA: Theological-Political Treatise

Theology and reason
his own authority and that neither reason nor Scripture assert anything
comparable. He ought to have shown from the character of the language 183
and the purpose of the passage, that all passages that are in con£ict with
others only by implication, can be properly construed metaphorically as
well as that Scripture has come down to us uncorrupted.
But let us examine the issue methodically and consider the ¢rst point:
what if reason protests Are we still obliged to accept as true what
Scripture a⁄rms and reject as false whatever Scripture denies Perhaps
he will say that nothing is found in Scripture which is in con£ict with
reason. But Scripture, I contend, expressly a⁄rms that God is jealous
(namely in the Ten Commandments and at Exodus 24.14 and Deuteronomy
4.24 and several other passages). This is in con£ict with reason,
despite which we should supposedly regard this as true. Any passages in
Scripture implying that God is not jealous would then necessarily have
to be explained metaphorically, so that they would not appear to assume
anything of the sort. Likewise, the Bible expressly states that God descended
to Mount Sinai (see Exodus 19.20, etc.), and ascribes other local
motions to Him, and nowhere explicitly asserts that God does not move.
Thus, this too would have to be admitted by all men as true while
Solomon’s assertion that God is not contained in any place (see 1 Kings
8.27), not being a direct statement but just a consequence of deducing
that God does not move, will therefore have to be explained in such a
way that it does not deny local motion to God. Equally, the heavens
would have to be considered the dwelling-place and throne of God since
Scripture expressly a⁄rms it.There are very many things phrased in this
way, in accordance with the beliefs of the prophets and the common
people, which reason and philosophy, though not Scripture, reveal to be
false. Yet all of them, in the view of al-Fakhar, must be accepted as true,
since there is no consultation with reason concerning these questions.
[5] Secondly, he is mistaken in claiming that one passage contradicts
another passage only by implication, and never directly. For Moses directly
asserts that ‘God is ¢re’ (see Deuteronomy 4.24) and £atly denies God has
any similarity to visible things (see Deuteronomy 4.12). If he responds that
the latter does not deny God is ¢re directly but only by implication, and
that we must reconcile it with the other passage, so that it may not seem to
deny it, well then, let us concede that God is ¢re, or rather, in order not
to participate in such nonsense, let us discard this example and proceed
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