BENEDICT DE SPINOZA: Theological-Political Treatise

On miracles
is not distinct from God’s will, we showed that we are asserting the same
thing when we say that God wills something as when we say that God
understands it. Hence by the same necessity by which it follows from the
divine nature and perfection that God understands some thing as it is, it
also follows that God wills it as it is. But since nothing is necessarily true
except by divine decree alone, it most clearly follows that the universal
laws of nature are simply God’s decrees and follow from the necessity 83
and perfection of the divine nature. If anything therefore were to happen
in nature that contradicted its universal laws, it would also necessarily
contradict the decree and understanding and nature of God. Or if anyone
were to assert that God does anything contrary to the laws of nature,
he would at the same time be compelled to assert that God acts contrary
to his own nature, than which nothing is more absurd. The same thing
can also easily be shown from the fact that the power of nature is the
divine power and virtue itself, and the divine power is the very essence of
God, but this I am happy to leave aside for the time being.
[4] Consequently, nothing happens in nature 1 that contradicts its universal
laws; and nothing occurs which does not conform to those laws or
follow from them. For whatever happens, happens by God’s will and his
eternal decree, i.e., as we have already shown, whatever happens, happens
according to laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth.
Nature therefore always observes laws and rules which involve eternal
necessity and truth ^ albeit not all are known to us ^ and therefore also
a ¢xed and immutable order. No sound reasoning convinces us that we
should attribute only a limited power and virtue to nature or believe its
laws are suited to certain things only and not to all. For, since the virtue
and power of nature is the very virtue and power of God and the laws
and rules of nature are the very decrees of God, we must certainly
believe that the power of nature is in¢nite, and its laws so broad as to
extend to everything that is also conceived by the divine understanding.
For otherwise what are we saying but that God has created a nature so
impotent and with laws and rules so feeble that He must continually give
it a helping hand, to maintain it and keep things going as He wills; this
I certainly consider to be completely unreasonable.
1 Spinoza’s footnote: note that here I mean not only matter and its properties, but other in¢nite
things besides matter.
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