BENEDICT DE SPINOZA: Theological-Political Treatise

Foundations of the state
such an agreement and render what was said to be unsaid. This, I say, is
allowed by natural right, whether I see it by true and certain reason or
whether it is out of mere belief that I appear to grasp that I was wrong to
make the promise. For whether I discern things truly or falsely, it is the
greater harm that I shall fear and, by nature’s design, strive by every means
to avoid.
[7] We conclude from this that any agreement can have force only if it
is in our interest, and when it is not in our interest, the agreement fails
and remains void. For this reason, we also conclude that it is foolish to
call for someone else to keep faith with oneself, in perpetuity, if at the
same time one does not try to ensure that violating the agreement will
result in greater loss than gain for the violator.This principle should play
the most important role in the formation of a state. For if everyone were
readily led by the guidance of reason alone and recognized the supreme
advantage and necessity of the state, everyone would utterly detest deceit
and stand fully by their promises with the utmost ¢delity because of
their concern for this highest good of preserving the state, and, above all
things, they would keep faith, which is the chief protection of the state;
but it is far from being the case that everyone can easily be led by the 193
sole guidance of reason.
For everyone is guided by their own pleasure, and the mind is very often
so preoccupiedwith greed, glory, jealousy, anger, etc., that there is no room
for reason. Accordingly, even if people promise and agree to keep faith by
o¡ering sure signs of sincerity, no one can be certain of another person’s
good faith, unless something is added to the promise. For everyone can act
with deceit by the right of nature and is not obliged to stand by promises
exceptwhere there is hope of a greater good or fear of a greater evil. Now we
have already shown that natural right is determined solely by each person’s
power. If, therefore, willingly or unwillingly someone surrenders to
another a portion of the power they possess, they necessarily transfer the
same amount of their own right to the other person. Likewise, it follows
that the person possessing the sovereign power to compel all men by force
and restrain them by fear of the supreme penalty which all men universally
fear, has sovereign right over all men. This person will retain this right,
though, for only so long as he retains this power of doing whatever he
wishes; otherwise his commandwill be precarious, and no stronger person
will be obliged to obey him unless he wishes to do so.
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