BENEDICT DE SPINOZA: Theological-Political Treatise

Foundations of the state
almost impossible that the majority of a large assembly would agree on the
same irrational decision. In addition, there is its foundation and purpose
which is precisely, as we have also shown, to avoid the follies of appetite and
as much as possible to bring men within the limits of reason, so that they
may dwell in peace and harmony. Without this foundation, the whole
structure soon disintegrates. It is the duty of the sovereign alone to provide
for these things, and it is the subjects’duty, as we have said, to carry out its
command, and acknowledge no law other than what the highest power
proclaims as law.
[10] Perhaps someone will think that in this way we are turning subjects
into slaves, supposing a slave to be someone who acts on command,
and a free person to be one who behaves as he pleases. But this is not
true at all. In fact, anyone who is guided by their own pleasure in this
way and cannot see or do what is good for them, is him or herself very
much a slave. The only [genuinely] free person is one who lives with his
entire mind guided solely by reason. Acting on command, that is, from
obedience, does take away liberty in some sense, but it is not acting on
command in itself that makes someone a slave, but rather the reason for
so acting. If the purpose of the action is not his own advantage but that
of the ruler, then the agent is indeed a slave and useless to himself. But
in a state and government where the safety of the whole people, not that
of the ruler, is the supreme law, 6 he who obeys the sovereign in all things 195
should not be called a slave useless to himself but rather a subject. The
freest state, therefore, is that whose laws are founded on sound reason;
for there each man can be free whenever he wishes, 7 that is, he can live
under the guidance of reason with his whole mind. Similarly, though
children are obliged to obey all their parents’ commands, they are nonetheless
not slaves, since a parent’s commands are mostly directed to the
good of the children.We thus recognize a vast di¡erence between a slave,
a child and a subject, and we distinguish them on these grounds as follows.
A slave is someone obliged to obey commands from a master which
look only to the advantage of the master; a child is one who at the command
of a parent does what is advantageous for himself; and a subject
is one who does by command of the sovereign what is useful for the
community and consequently also for himself.
6 Cicero, On the Laws, 3.3.8.
7 Spinoza’s footnote: see Annotation 33.
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