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Table 2–2 Supply-Side Components of Actual and Potential Real GDP Growth, 1952–2024 Component History, peak-topeak Recent history, since peak 1953:Q2 to 2007:Q4 to 2007:Q4 b 2013:Q3 Growth rate a Forecast 2013:Q3 to 2024:Q4 Out-year forecast 2020:Q4 to 2024:Q4 1. Civilian noninstitutional population aged 16+ 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 2. Labor force participation rate 0.2 –0.7 –0.2 –0.3 3. Employed share of the labor force 0.0 –0.5 0.2 0.0 4. Ratio of nonfarm business employment to household employment 0.0 –0.5 0.0 –0.4 5. Average weekly hours (nonfarm business) –0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 6. Output per hour (productivity, nonfarm business) c 2.2 1.7 2.1 2.2 7. Ratio of real GDP to nonfarm business output c –0.2 –0.1 –0.3 –0.1 8. Sum: Actual real GDP c 3.3 1.1 2.7 2.3 9. Memo: Potential real GDP 3.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 a. All contributions are in percentage points at an annual rate, forecast finalized in November 2013. Total may not add up due to rounding. b. 1953:Q2 and 2007:Q4 are business-cycle peaks. c. Real GDP and real nonfarm business output are measured as the average of income- and product-side measures. Note: Population, labor force, and household employment have been adjusted for discontinuities in the population series. Nonfarm business employment, and the workweek, come from the Labor Productivity and Costs database maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Labor Productivity and Costs; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Department of the Treasury; Office of Management and Budget; CEA calculations. The population is projected to grow 1.0 percent a year, on average, over the projection period (line 1, column 3), following the projection published by the Social Security Administration. Over this same period, the labor force participation rate is projected to decline 0.2 percent a year (line 2, column 3). This projected moderate decline in the labor force participation rate reflects a balance of opposing influences: a negative demographic trend partially offset by increasing demand. The entry of the baby-boom generation into its retirement years is expected to reduce the participation rate trend by about 0.4 percent a year through 2020 and by about 0.3 percent during the 2020-24 period (as can be seen in column 4). During the next several years, however, rising labor demand due to the continuing business-cycle recovery is expected to offset some of this downward trend. Young adults, in particular, have been preparing themselves for labor-force entry through additional education. The share of young adults aged 16 to 24 enrolled in school between January 2008 and December 2012 rose well above its trend, enough to account for the entire decline in the labor force participation rate for this age group over this period. As these young adults The Year In Review And The Years Ahead | 87
Box 2-5: Immigration Reform and Potential GDP Growth Immigration reform would boost real GDP growth during the 10-year budget window and for the 10 years through 2034 too. Immigration reform would directly raise the growth of the workingage population. As a result, the labor force would grow faster as well. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the labor force would grow 0.35 percentage point a year faster through 2033 than without the legislation. The faster growth of the labor force would be the prime reason supporting an additional 0.3 percent a year of real GDP growth. In addition, CBO also assumes that immigration reform would add to real GDP growth by boosting investment and raising the productivity of labor and capital (known as total factor productivity). Although immigrants constituted just 12 percent of the population in 2000, they accounted for 26 percent of the U.S.-based Nobel Prize winners between 1990 and 2000. Immigrants also comprised 25 percent of the founders of public-venture–backed companies started between 1990 and 2005, and they received patents at twice the rate of the native-born population. complete their education, most are expected to enter or reenter the labor force. The employed share of the labor force—which is equal to one minus the unemployment rate—is expected to increase at an average 0.2 percent a year over the next 11 years. It is expected to be unchanged after 2018 when the unemployment rate converges to the rate consistent with stable inflation. The workweek is projected to be roughly flat during the forecast period, somewhat less of a decline than its long-term historical trend of -0.3 percent. The workweek is expected to stabilize because some of the demographic forces pushing it down are largely spent, and because a longer workweek is projected to compensate for the anticipated decline in the labor force participation rate. Labor productivity is projected to increase 2.1 percent a year over the forecast interval and 2.2 percent in the long run (line 6, columns 3 and 4), roughly the same as the average growth rate from 1953 to 2007 (line 6, column 1). The elevated rate of long-term unemployment poses some risk to the projection insofar as the human capital of workers may deteriorate with prolonged unemployment. That said, higher rates of school enrollment among young adults in recent years, as noted, should contribute to productivity growth in the coming years. 88 | Chapter 2
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ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT To
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C O N T E N T S ECONOMIC REPORT OF
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economic report of the president To
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year-old. In the meantime, I’m go
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the annual report of the council of
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C O N T E N T S CHAPTER 1. PROMOTIN
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APPENDIX 1: COMPONENTS OF THE RECOV
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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S RECORD
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2.15. Housing Starts, 1960-2013....
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3.1. Forecasted and Actual Real GDP
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C H A P T E R 1 PROMOTING OPPORTUNI
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Opportunity, Growth, and Security i
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crisis—continue to rebound and co
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Figure 1-4 Real GDP Per Working-Age
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Figure 1-6 Change in Poverty Rate F
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Figure 1-7 Domestic Crude Oil Produ
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Figure 1-8 Growth in Real Per Capit
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Figure 1-9 Unemployment Rate by Dur
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Page 44 and 45: Annual percent change 2.50 15-year
Page 46 and 47: Figure 1-14 Share of National Incom
Page 48: Along with steps that create jobs,
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Page 57 and 58: Percent 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 Figure 2-3
Page 59 and 60: In the euro area, the unemployment
Page 61 and 62: Figure 2-6 Cumulative Flows into Mu
Page 63 and 64: Figure 2-7 Household Deleveraging,
Page 65 and 66: Box 2-1: The 2013 Comprehensive Rev
Page 67 and 68: Percent 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 Figure 2
Page 69 and 70: Figure 2-11 State and Local Pension
Page 71 and 72: Percent of GDP 2 1 0 Figure 2-14 Cu
Page 73 and 74: Box 2-2. Administration Trade Polic
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Page 77 and 78: percent of households report that i
Page 79 and 80: Figure 2-18 Petroleum Net Imports,
Page 81 and 82: Figure 2-21 U.S. Per Capita Consump
Page 83 and 84: Percent 11 Figure 2-22 Unemployment
Page 85 and 86: Figure 2-25 Predicted vs. Actual Ma
Page 87 and 88: Box 2-4: Unemployment Duration and
Page 89 and 90: The Long-Term Outlook The 11-Year F
Page 91: Growth in GDP over the Long Term As
Page 95 and 96: Even with this growth, however, the
Page 97 and 98: families. The other half was for in
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Page 101 and 102: Obama Administration and the 111th
Page 103 and 104: Figure 3-1 Recovery Act Programs by
Page 105 and 106: other cases, new measures expanded
Page 107 and 108: Figure 3-2 Recovery Act and Subsequ
Page 109 and 110: Box 3-1: Other Administration Polic
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Page 113 and 114: Table 3-5 Estimated Output Multipli
Page 115 and 116: Figure 3-7 Quarterly Effect of the
Page 117 and 118: Table 3-6 Estimates of the Effects
Page 119 and 120: International Comparison The 2008 c
Page 121 and 122: Box 3-2: The U.S. Recovery in Compa
Page 123 and 124: Table 3-7 Tax Relief and Income Sup
Page 125 and 126: traditionally been jointly financed
Page 127 and 128: downturn in the economy. Even thoug
Page 129 and 130: Figure 3-11 Recovery Act Cumulative
Page 131 and 132: The Recovery Act also invested in r
Page 133 and 134: helped individuals who chose to ret
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Page 139 and 140: Alternative Minimum Tax relief, bus
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y Poterba (1994), states and locali
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Table 3-11 Fiscal Support for the E
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spells. Because the resulting unemp
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literature uses two different appro
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Table 3-12 Summary of Cross-Section
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the CMS projections show real per-c
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will accrue to workers as higher wa
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Box 4-1: Two Measures of Growth in
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Figure 4-1 Growth in Real Per Capit
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in particular may not exactly track
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find that even those seniors who di
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the slowdown in real (that is, infl
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health care costs for an individual
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estimate for the ACA found that its
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Figure 4-4 Medicare 30-Day, All-Con
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agreements among the providers them
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payment for physician services, the
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Box 4-3: The Cost Slowdown and ACA
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2010a; 2011; 2012c; 2013a; 2014), w
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Figure 4-6 Recent CBO Projections o
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Conclusion The evidence is clear th
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facilitated this private-sector tec
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esulting gap between the actual gro
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Table 5-1 Sources of Productivity I
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Table 5-2 Nonfarm Private Business
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of the productivity improvement res
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Figure 5-3 Growth in Productivity a
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improving and college completion ra
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Box 5-2: Does Inequality Affect Pro
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Percent 3.5 Figure 5-5 Composition
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• Just two of the largest U.S. te
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Box 5-3: Just-in-Time Manufacturing
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Figure 5-7 Exclusive and Shared All
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Box 5-4: Spectrum Investment Polici
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To stimulate investment in more adv
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Because current uses of technology
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Box 5-5: Electronic Health Records
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about the array of services and sup
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and, in such cases, provides partie
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Box 5-6: The Leahy-Smith America In
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Box 5-7: Pay-For-Delay Settlements
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C H A P T E R 6 THE WAR ON POVERTY
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Measuring Poverty: Who is Poor in A
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thresholds ever since. These dollar
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of necessary items, including food,
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Table 6-1 Poverty Rates by Selected
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Box 6-3: Women and Poverty While wo
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However, this reflects smaller decl
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Percent 25 Figure 6-1 Trends in the
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Box 6-4: Social Programs Serve All
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of low- and middle-income workers a
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particularly valuable since they es
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Figure 6-4 Official vs Anchored Sup
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deep market poverty driven by the b
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work: in 2010, for example, unemplo
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out of poverty through job training
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e noted that researchers have found
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2012). Among the children of low-ea
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Education appears to be one of the
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Friedman, and Rockoff (2011) find t
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including an additional $25 a week
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Figure 6-11 Recovery Act and Subseq
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Empowering Every Child with a Quali
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modernize America’s high schools
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low-income Americans and their chil
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C H A P T E R 7 EVALUATION AS A TOO
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program evaluation efforts. For exa
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went to preschool would have had if
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y adopting successful interventions
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Box 7-2: Using Behavioral Economics
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Box 7-3: “Rapid Cycle” Evaluati
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Figure 7-1 Outlays for Grants to St
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performance data, fewer than half o
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Investment Act programs. The PROMIS
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Figure 7-2 Inventory of Beds for Ho
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example, included a nondiscretionar
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Other benefits of considering evalu
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with the treatment effect and thus
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unemployment insurance wage and ben
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hard for researchers to access for
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REFERENCES Chapter 1 Almunia, Migue
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____. 2014. “Press Release: Janua
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and the TPP at the Peterson Institu
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Increase Employment Evidence from t
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___. 2010b. “The Economic Impact
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___. 2012. World Economic Outlook A
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Polak Annual Research Conference. W
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Baicker, Katherine and Amitabh Chan
Page 320 and 321:
Daly, Mary, Bart Hobijn, and Brian
Page 322 and 323:
Nominal Wages,” International Jou
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Learning: A Meta-Analysis and Revie
Page 326 and 327:
Chien, Colleen V. 2012. “Reformin
Page 328 and 329:
GAO (Government Accountability Offi
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Jorgenson, Dale. 2001. “Informati
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Integration in Economic Development
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_____. 2007. “Improving the Safet
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Dahl, Gordon B. and Lance Lochner.
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Heckman, James J. and Dimitriy V. M
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Ludwig, Jens and Douglas Miller. 20
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Sharkey, Patrick. 2009. “Neighbor
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_____. 2013. “Practical Evaluatio
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www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/comm
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Stock, James H., and Mark Watson. 2
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letter of transmittal Council of Ec
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Council Members and Their Dates of
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The Members of the Council Betsey S
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Act has had on reducing health care
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Statistical Office The Statistical
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A P P E N D I X B STATISTICAL TABLE
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INTEREST RATES, MONEY STOCK, AND GO
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2013-to-2014 TABLE NUMBER MATCH 201
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Year or quarter Table B-1. Percent
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Table B-2. Gross domestic product,
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Table B-3. Quantity and price index
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Table B-5. Real exports and imports
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Year Total 2 Table B-7. Real farm i
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Table B-9. Median money income (in
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Year or month Civilian noninstituti
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Year or month All civilian workers
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Table B-14. Employees on nonagricul
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Table B-15. Hours and earnings in p
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Year and month Interest Rates, Mone
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Year and month Table B-18. Money st
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Table B-20. Federal receipts, outla
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Table B-22. Federal receipts, outla
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Table B-24. State and local governm
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End of month Table B-26. Estimated
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B-7. Chain-type price indexes for g
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B-28. National income by type of in
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B-48. Employment cost index, privat
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B-65. Producer price indexes by sta
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B-81. Federal receipts, outlays, su
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B-99. Farm output and productivity
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B-111. International reserves Inter
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