National Microfinance Study of Sri Lanka: Survey of Practices and ...
National Microfinance Study of Sri Lanka: Survey of Practices and ...
National Microfinance Study of Sri Lanka: Survey of Practices and ...
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Some 1,176 <strong>of</strong> the 1,476 Co-operative Rural Banks were pr<strong>of</strong>itable in year ended<br />
31 st Dec 2000 <strong>and</strong> previously donors especially the multi-laterals do not want to<br />
give loans <strong>and</strong> do not find organisations having excess funds attractive as a<br />
development partners preferring in the main to ‘prop up’ the weaker NGOs.<br />
However, UNDP is working with 17 MPCS in Jaffna using a combination <strong>of</strong> s<strong>of</strong>t<br />
<strong>and</strong> hard policy tools including leverage strategies.<br />
Another practical reason is the ownership <strong>of</strong> CRBs that is not centralised but<br />
diffused between many Multi Purpose Co-operative Societies. The impressive<br />
record does not mean that CRBs do not have problems in fact their future is very<br />
uncertain as there are many issues which if not addressed soon will lead to a<br />
deterioration <strong>of</strong> the banks as a whole;<br />
1. Ownership<br />
Ownership <strong>of</strong> the CRBs is with the Multipurpose Co-operative Societies (MPCS)<br />
with a few exceptions <strong>and</strong> therefore they not a separate legal entity but a division<br />
<strong>of</strong> the MPCS. MPCS leadership is elected by the members <strong>and</strong> is in many cases<br />
divided along party political-lines, open to political capture rather than the<br />
effective <strong>and</strong> efficient management <strong>of</strong> the CRBs.<br />
The ownership issue is also a threat to the pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>of</strong> the banks with the<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>its considered as part <strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>its or losses <strong>of</strong> MPCSs’ as a whole, where<br />
other divisions are making losses then the incentive for the CRBs to maximize<br />
their pr<strong>of</strong>its is diminished. The salary structures for staff are poor <strong>and</strong> there is no<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>it share for the members both <strong>of</strong> which reduce the incentive for effective <strong>and</strong><br />
efficient operation.<br />
MPCS ownership also means a diffusion <strong>of</strong> the ownership throughout 306<br />
MPCSs that have the 1476 CRBs under their control resulting in a lack <strong>of</strong> focus in<br />
management structures <strong>and</strong> systems. There is a District level CRB but this too has<br />
limited capacity <strong>and</strong> authority -as ownership <strong>of</strong> the CRBs is not with this<br />
organisation.<br />
2. Management<br />
Presently the management too is under the General Manager <strong>of</strong> the MPCS who in<br />
many cases have not come from a Rural banking background. Earlier this was not<br />
the case <strong>and</strong> Bank Managers reported to the Head <strong>of</strong> Banking in the MPCS.<br />
3. Monitoring <strong>and</strong> Capacity Building<br />
From the inception <strong>of</strong> CRBs in 1964 until 1997 the Peoples Bank supervised the<br />
CRBs <strong>and</strong> made a great contribution to the structures <strong>and</strong> systems as well as<br />
building the capacity <strong>of</strong> the staff. Now that this relationship has been terminated<br />
the CRBs do not have a source for capacity building <strong>and</strong> the monitoring task has<br />
been passed to the Assistant Commissioner Co-operative Development in each<br />
district whose <strong>of</strong>fices in the main do not have sufficient capacity for this role.<br />
4. Viability And Deposit Security<br />
With the high level <strong>of</strong> political interference in the MPCS system it is possible that<br />
the risk to members funds <strong>and</strong> non members deposits has grown without neutral<br />
oversight <strong>and</strong> objective external audit.