Work and Leisure

Gender, work and leisure 71and they exist alongside each other (Stanley and Wise 1993: 191; Maynardand Purvis 1994: 19).Feminist empiricists emerged from the 1960s ‘liberal tendency’ whichhoped and believed that it would be possible to engage traditional epistemologistswith changes by using reason and logic in ways similar to theirs, toshow not only that there could be several worldviews but also that these couldbe measured, and so new types of knowledge could be acknowledged andgiven status. The belief that debate, the use of rigorous research methods, andcommon sense would sway the traditionalists was, in retrospect, naive. It alsounderestimated the power of rationality, the criteria used for the receptionand acknowledgement of knowledge and, simply, the deep suspicion of anyknowledge which was seemingly grounded in gender. The difficulties for liberalempiricists were compounded in the 1970s by the scarcity of women inthe academy, and the multiple campaigns with which they were involved;there was too much to do and neither enough time or resources with which todo it. This was as true of leisure studies as any other field. It had been definedand dominated by men, who had invented and sustained the ‘work–leisure’divide as it fitted their experience and seemingly kept them in a dominantposition. It is notable that only one chapter out of thirteen in the 1975volume Work and Leisure, which the current volume celebrates, was by awoman (Emmett 1975). Feminist academics recognised this world but knew itwas not theirs.Standpoint epistemologists have tried to explain the impact and effect ofdifferent value systems on knowledge; they have seen a need to work with andarticulate the views of those groups of women who have been marginalisedby the dominant groups of women who have tended to be more like thedominant groups of men in the liberal empiricist tradition: white, middleclass,heterosexual intellectuals. Standpoint epistemologies argued that forfeminism to have any acceptability it had to recognise the diverse and differingstandpoints of different women, accepting and celebrating these andincorporating them into knowledge and common, conflicting, or contrastingstandpoints (Harding 1993: 56). Harding saw this as a ‘strong objectivity’,demonstrating the essential social ‘situatedness’ of beliefs and thoughtswhich could be used to develop analysis and policy in ways not dissimilar tothose used by ‘objective scientists.’ Although Stanley and Wise (1993)applauded the concept, which allowed diversity to be acknowledged throughembracing a variety of feminist viewpoints, they were worried about itspotential ethnocentricity.More recently, feminist postmodern theorists have adapted a Foucauldianapproach, the argument being that, as power resides within individuals, eachof us has the opportunity to create our own distinctive knowledges, which areuniquely our own and not rule-bound by tradition (Wearing 1998; Aitchison2000). Attractive as this may be, and despite its potential to empower individualsin ways which are not otherwise available, there are concerns about its