Comparative Syntax of the Balkan Languages (Oxford ... - Cryptm.org

CONTROL AND RAISING 83example, which is typically found in complement position to modal predicates.Although a lexical decomposition analysis that derives a modal part might workfor implicatives like manage, and for volitionals in general, it is not so clearthat it works for try , which does not seem to contain a modal component (cf.Quer 1998).Leaving finite complements aside for the time being, we note that infinitivaland subjunctive complements cannot be simply characterized as "irrealis".Farkas (1992a, 1992b) offers an analysis that reformulates the realis/irrealis distinctionand captures mood/finite distinctions in complement clauses by meansof the lexical properties of the selecting predicates. The first assumption is thatsentences (the predicate and its participants) denote situations, that is, individuals.The relation of the participants to the situation is determined by the propertiesof the predicate. Consider the following example (from Farkas 1992a.80):(17) #John believes/thinks/knows that Mary is sick and/but he believes/thinks/knows that she isn't sick.The proposition denoted by the that complement in (17) has to be true or falseaccording to John, that is, the matrix subject. This explains the contradiction in(17). Thus, according to Farkas's analysis, propositions are anchored to worlds(a collection of situations), which are in turn anchored to individuals. This is thenotion of individual anchoring and is schematically represented in (18):(18) p = Tmw R (J)In (18) we see the characterization of a situation with p being true (T) in the actualworld (R) as seen by John (the individual anchor). This relation is standardlyexpressed by finite/indicative mood in the complement. Note that in (17) the individualanchor is the matrix subject and not the speaker (unless the speaker andthe subject are the same). Consider volitional predicates next:(19) John wants Mary to leave.The predicate want introduces a set of worlds (the buletic set): one can have contradictingwishes at the same time; this set of alternatives is anchored to the matrixsubject John. The situation denoted by the complement clause is true if itholds in some world that is added to the background WR (the real world). Accordingto Farkas (1992a, 1992b), the complement to these predicates is realized asa subjunctive (or infinitive in English type languages). Thus, the complementto cognitive predicates introduces an independent world (extensional anchoring),while that of volitionals and others introduces a set of worlds (intensional anchoring).This account provides a better formulation of the realis/irrealis distinction(see also Giannakidou 1997 and Quer 1998 for further elaboration).2.3. Control predicatesLet us now consider the case of (obligatory) control predicates. Apart from worlddependency, one more type of semantic dependency is introduced by Farkas