SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATION 15592). As has been widely recognized, the success ofcerta<strong>in</strong> movements (e.g., collective actions, rebellions)relies heavily on the support of <strong>in</strong>dividuals as well ascommunities. By “dissem<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g” grievances, themovement can recruit supporters more cheaply. Hence,“even where the rationale at the top of the <strong>org</strong>anizationis essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirelydom<strong>in</strong>ated by grievance” (Collier 2000, 92). In relationto terrorism and <strong>in</strong>surgency utilis<strong>in</strong>g terror tactics,Stern observed some types of exposed grievances such asalienation, humiliation, demographic shifts, historicalwrongs and claims over territory (Stern 2003).However, grievance theory collides with Olson’s theoryon the phenomenon of free-riders <strong>in</strong> a situation ofcollective action (Olson 1971). S<strong>in</strong>ce justice is a publicgood (Collier 2000), the movement will face the problemof free-rid<strong>in</strong>g. Collier is evocative of the fact that “eventhough everyone is agreed that rebellion is desirable, it iseven more attractive if the costs are borne only by othersand the success of rebellion will not be dependent uponthe participation of any one <strong>in</strong>dividual” (Collier 1999).Thus, grievance-based factors are <strong>in</strong>sufficient to driverebellions or collective violence <strong>in</strong> most cases. This is thecase due to “the non-excludability of the consumptionof justice” (Collier 1999).In view of these problems, Collier looked at theimportant role of economic motives. In order tounderl<strong>in</strong>e the contrast to the grievance theory, he calledthis theory “greed theory.” He suggested that it is greedor the economic motive of certa<strong>in</strong> parties that drives aconflict. The greed theory is also regarded as capableof embrac<strong>in</strong>g the above problems. As Collier foundby means of empirical cases, the true cause of violentconflicts is “not the loud discourse of grievance, but thesilent force of greed.” In his study of worldwide rebellioncases, he found that “greed considerably outperformsgrievance” (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). In summariz<strong>in</strong>gher case studies of terrorism and <strong>in</strong>surgency us<strong>in</strong>gterror tactics, Stern (2003, xix) ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that whatsurprised her most <strong>in</strong> her research was the “discoverythat the slogans sometimes mask not only fear andhumiliation, but also greed—greed for political power,land or money.”Such approaches are useful when analyz<strong>in</strong>g terrorism and<strong>in</strong>surgency us<strong>in</strong>g terror tactics. However, there are somecuriosities left concern<strong>in</strong>g the use of such approaches<strong>in</strong> expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g such terror attacks as suicide bomb<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>in</strong> Indonesia. Hence, this research also attempts to gobeyond these two contend<strong>in</strong>g perspectives.Terror attacks and their orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Indonesia, thePhilipp<strong>in</strong>es and ThailandIndonesia, with a total population of 208.8 million <strong>in</strong>2005, is a Muslim-majority country where Muslimsmake up 87.2 percent of the total population, Christians,6.2 percent; Catholics, 3.3 percent; H<strong>in</strong>dus, 2.2percent; and Buddhists, 1.1 percent (BPS 2005). ThePhilipp<strong>in</strong>es is a Catholic-majority country with a totalpopulation of 76.5 million <strong>in</strong> 2000, where 84.2 percentof its people are affiliated with the Roman CatholicChurch, 5.4 percent with Protestant denom<strong>in</strong>ations,4.6 percent with Islam, 2.6 percent with the Philipp<strong>in</strong>eIndependence Church, 2.3 percent with Iglesia niKristo and 2.2 percent with others (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g animism)(Ab<strong>in</strong>ales and Amoroso 2005). Thailand’s population ispredom<strong>in</strong>antly Buddhist, number<strong>in</strong>g to 95 percent ofthe total population of 60.9 million <strong>in</strong> 2000. Muslimsmake up 4.5 percent of the total population and the restare Christians, H<strong>in</strong>dus and Sikhs (Abuza 2003).These three countries have experienced numerousterror attacks or terror related actions <strong>in</strong> the recent past.Some of the attacks <strong>in</strong> Indonesia were the attacks on16 churches across Indonesia on Chrismas Eve, 2000,result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 16 people dead and over 100 <strong>in</strong>jured; theso-called Bali bomb<strong>in</strong>g I on October 12, 2002, result<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> 202 people dead and 317 <strong>in</strong>jured; the MarriottHotel attack on August 5, 2002, kill<strong>in</strong>g 14 people and<strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g 132 persons; the Australian Embassy attack onSeptember 9, 2004, kill<strong>in</strong>g 11 people and <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g tensof others; and the so-called Bali bomb<strong>in</strong>g II on October1, 2005, kill<strong>in</strong>g 23 people and <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g 148 others.In the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es, some of the attacks were a grenadeattack <strong>in</strong> Zamboanga that killed two female Americanmissionaries; bomb attacks <strong>in</strong> 1993 target<strong>in</strong>g amissionary ship, the MV Doules, <strong>in</strong> Zamboanga;Zamboanga airport, and Catholic churches, <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>gseveral people; the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g of three Spanish nunsand a priest <strong>in</strong> 1994; the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g of 52 teachersand students <strong>in</strong> Tumahubong, Basilan, <strong>in</strong> which twoteachers were beheaded; the Sipadan kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g of19 foreigners and two Filip<strong>in</strong>os; the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g of tenWestern journalists (mostly Germans); the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gof three French journalists <strong>in</strong> 2000; the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g ofthree Americans and 17 Filip<strong>in</strong>os at Dos Palmas Resort(Palawan) on May 27, 2001; the SuperFerry 14 bomb<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> 2004 that killed 118 people and <strong>in</strong>jured hundredsof others; and the Makati, Davao and General Santosbomb<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> February 2005 that killed 13 people and<strong>in</strong>jured 140 others.Some of the attacks <strong>in</strong> Thailand were the attack on three<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Transformations</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Action</strong>The Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows
156 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONBuddhist monks and novices on January 24, 2004, <strong>in</strong>which two were killed; bomb attacks on August 22,2004 <strong>in</strong> Yala, <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g 13 people and damag<strong>in</strong>g morethan 30 vehicles; the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of 95 village headmenand assistant headmen (Buddhists and Muslims) bymilitants from January to June 2005; bomb attacksat a hotel, a restaurant and convenience stores on July14, 2005, <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g 17 Buddhists and Muslims; theattacks on schools and teachers <strong>in</strong> 2004-2007, <strong>in</strong> which71 teachers (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Muslims) were killed, morethan 100 teachers were <strong>in</strong>jured, and 170 schools wereburned down; the attack on a commuter van on March14, 2007, where eight Buddhist passengers were shotto death at close range, execution-style; the kill<strong>in</strong>g oftwo Muslim men by militants <strong>in</strong> a drive-by shoot<strong>in</strong>gon April 14, 2007; the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of a 29-year oldMuslim (a local government official) <strong>in</strong> Naratiwat onJune 22, 2007; and the kill<strong>in</strong>g of a Muslim vendor <strong>in</strong>his pick-up truck by militants on August 13, 2007.There is no doubt that such non-state groups’ actionswere terrorism, terror attacks, or terror related actionsas they systematically and/or repeatedly killed or<strong>in</strong>timidated civilians and spread fear among thecommunities.From a historical perspective, such attacks are notisolated or <strong>in</strong>dependent events. They have their ownhistorical traits. The groups’ actions <strong>in</strong> Indonesiastemmed from the passions of its members to establishan Islamic state of Indonesia, which was first promotedby Kartosuwiryo <strong>in</strong> 1936. (Kartosuwiryo laterestablished Darul Islam (DI) <strong>in</strong> 1947, Tentara IslamIndonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army, TII) <strong>in</strong> 1948, andNegara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State, NII)<strong>in</strong> 1949.) The recent attacks were contributed to by therise of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which vowed to establishsuch a perceived ideal state. In fact, JI was establisheddue to a rift <strong>in</strong> the DI/NII leadership between AbdullahSungkar, the founder of JI, and Ajengan Masduki.In its development, it had a shared ideology with AlQaeda and turned its target to American <strong>in</strong>terests. Inthe Philipp<strong>in</strong>e case, terrorism is rooted <strong>in</strong> the historicaldisputes concern<strong>in</strong>g the forced <strong>in</strong>corporation of theMoro Sultanates <strong>in</strong>to the Philipp<strong>in</strong>e state. The riseof the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which was foundedby Abdurajak Janjalani (a former member of MNLF,or the Moro National Liberation Front), has highlycontributed to these attacks. In its development, theASG had a l<strong>in</strong>k with Al Qaeda operatives and becamenotorious for its kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g-for-ransom activities,particularly aga<strong>in</strong>st Westerners. As for the Thai case, theissue is similar to that of the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es, namely theforced <strong>in</strong>corporation of the former Sultanate of Pattani<strong>in</strong>to the Thai state. In the recent terror attacks, thecentral figure is Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koord<strong>in</strong>asi(National Revolution Front-Coord<strong>in</strong>ate, BRN-C),particularly its mobile combat unit known as RundaKumpulan Kecil (RKK, or small patrol unit). BRN-Chas a loose, cell-based network with a broader newgeneration of village-based separatist militants whocalled themselves Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (PattaniFreedom Fighters), whom local people refer to by thegeneric term “pejuangs” (freedom fighters). While RKKalso belongs to the pejuangs, not all pejuangs are themembers of BRN-C. It is also important to note thatnot all pejuangs attack civilians.In short, the Philipp<strong>in</strong>e and Thai cases have a sharedhistorical orig<strong>in</strong> center<strong>in</strong>g on the issue of rega<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g their“occupied” land. This is totally different from that ofIndonesia, which orig<strong>in</strong>ated from a strong passion toestablish a perceived ideal state.Indonesia The Philipp<strong>in</strong>es ThailandUS <strong>in</strong>vasion of Afghanistan and Iraq,where many Muslims have been killedIsrael’s occupation of Palest<strong>in</strong>e, wheremany Muslims have been killed andare liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> miseryGrievance on secular state ofIndonesiaPerceived suppression of Islamicmovements to establish an Islamicstate and/or sharia lawGrievances on perceivedChristianization and aga<strong>in</strong>stChristians <strong>in</strong> the communal-religiousconflictsGrievance on the suppressionof Bangsamoro identity (e.g.,transmigration program,Filip<strong>in</strong>ization)State-treatment of Muslims (e.g.,Jabidah) and <strong>in</strong>justiceGrievance on secular state of thePhilipp<strong>in</strong>es, particularly <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>danaoNatural resource exploitation <strong>in</strong>M<strong>in</strong>danao (ancestral doma<strong>in</strong>s)Perceived discrim<strong>in</strong>ation andmarg<strong>in</strong>alization <strong>in</strong> economicdevelopmentGrievance on the suppression ofethnic Malay identity (e.g., language/education policies, Tha<strong>in</strong>ization)Injustice towards and state-treatmentof Muslims (e.g., Krue Se, Tak Bai)Grievance on secular state ofThailand, particularly <strong>in</strong> thesouthernmost prov<strong>in</strong>cesNatural resource exploitation <strong>in</strong> thesouthernmost prov<strong>in</strong>cesPerceived discrim<strong>in</strong>ation andmarg<strong>in</strong>alization <strong>in</strong> economicdevelopmentTable 1: Rough rank<strong>in</strong>g of ma<strong>in</strong> grievances <strong>in</strong> Indonesia, the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es and Thailand.<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Transformations</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Action</strong>The Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows
- Page 1 and 2:
Asian Transformations in ActionThe
- Page 3 and 4:
iiiCONTENTSAbout the BookAcknowledg
- Page 5 and 6:
V. APPENDICESCultivation of Transfo
- Page 7 and 8:
The Regional Project, entitled “C
- Page 9 and 10:
ixTHE CONTRIBUTORS(in alphabetical
- Page 11 and 12:
MYFEL JOSEPH PALUGA is a faculty me
- Page 13 and 14:
xiiiare common to nations around th
- Page 15 and 16:
xvsilence maintained by academe on
- Page 17 and 18:
xviiIt is reasonable and necessary,
- Page 19 and 20:
xixOVERVIEWCzarina Saloma-Akpedonu,
- Page 21 and 22:
xxito retain their identity but at
- Page 23 and 24:
xxiiiABOUT THE WORKSHOPThe 6 th API
- Page 25 and 26:
2CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALANC
- Page 27 and 28:
4CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALANC
- Page 29 and 30:
6CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALANC
- Page 31 and 32:
8CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALANC
- Page 33 and 34:
10CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 35 and 36:
12CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 37 and 38:
14CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 39 and 40:
16CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 41 and 42:
18CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 43 and 44:
20CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 45 and 46:
22CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 47 and 48:
24CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 49 and 50:
26 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 51 and 52:
28CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALAN
- Page 53 and 54:
30 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 55 and 56:
32 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 57 and 58:
34 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 59 and 60:
36 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 61 and 62:
38 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 63 and 64:
40 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 65 and 66:
42 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 67 and 68:
44 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 69 and 70:
46 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 71 and 72:
48 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 73 and 74:
50 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 75 and 76:
52 PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, PROMISING S
- Page 77 and 78:
54 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 79 and 80:
56 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 81 and 82:
58 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 83 and 84:
60 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 85 and 86:
62 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 87 and 88:
64 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 89 and 90:
66 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 91 and 92:
68 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 93 and 94:
70 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 95 and 96:
72 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 97 and 98:
74 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 99 and 100:
76 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 101 and 102:
78 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 103 and 104:
80 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 105 and 106:
82 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 107 and 108:
84 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 109 and 110:
86 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 111 and 112:
88 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 113 and 114:
90 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 115 and 116:
92 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 117 and 118:
94 INTERMINGLING OF CONTINUITY AND
- Page 119 and 120:
96 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTEG
- Page 121 and 122:
98 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTEG
- Page 123 and 124:
100 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTE
- Page 125 and 126:
102 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTE
- Page 127 and 128: 104 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTE
- Page 129 and 130: 106 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTE
- Page 131 and 132: 108 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTE
- Page 133 and 134: 110 BLURRED BORDERS AND SOCIAL INTE
- Page 135 and 136: 112 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 137 and 138: 114 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 139 and 140: 116 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 141 and 142: 118 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 143 and 144: 120 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 145 and 146: 122 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 147 and 148: 124 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 149 and 150: 126 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 151 and 152: 128 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 153 and 154: 130 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 155 and 156: 132 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 157 and 158: 134 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 159 and 160: 136 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 161 and 162: 138 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 163 and 164: 140 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 165 and 166: 142 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 167 and 168: 144 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 169 and 170: 146 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONo
- Page 171 and 172: 148 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONa
- Page 173 and 174: 150 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONc
- Page 175 and 176: 152 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONs
- Page 177: 154 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONA
- Page 181 and 182: 158 REFIGURATION OF IDENTITIES AND
- Page 183 and 184: 160 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONa
- Page 185 and 186: 162 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONb
- Page 187 and 188: 164 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONG
- Page 189 and 190: 166 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONh
- Page 191 and 192: 168 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONL
- Page 193 and 194: 170 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONv
- Page 195 and 196: 172 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONT
- Page 197 and 198: 174 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONR
- Page 199 and 200: 176 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONa
- Page 201 and 202: 178 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONp
- Page 203 and 204: 180 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONt
- Page 205 and 206: 182 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONA
- Page 207 and 208: 184 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONN
- Page 209 and 210: 186 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONI
- Page 211 and 212: 188 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTThe repor
- Page 213 and 214: 190 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTregistry
- Page 215 and 216: 192 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTPublic di
- Page 217 and 218: 194 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTConstrain
- Page 219 and 220: 196 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTEmpowerme
- Page 221 and 222: 198 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTshugyou c
- Page 223 and 224: 200 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTSenge and
- Page 225 and 226: 202 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTof an int
- Page 227 and 228: 204 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTWheatley,
- Page 229 and 230:
206 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTtogether
- Page 231 and 232:
208 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTmonitorin
- Page 233 and 234:
210 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTDevelopme
- Page 235 and 236:
212 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTgovernmen
- Page 237 and 238:
214 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTREDEFININ
- Page 239 and 240:
216 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTthe maxim
- Page 241 and 242:
218 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTwork, to
- Page 243 and 244:
220 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTcontinue
- Page 245 and 246:
222 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTspaces, a
- Page 247 and 248:
224 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTACADEMIC
- Page 249 and 250:
226 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTwe consum
- Page 251 and 252:
228 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTI took wi
- Page 253:
230 COLLAGES OF BETTERMENTFourth, t
- Page 256 and 257:
233Day 3, Tuesday, 27 November 2007
- Page 258 and 259:
JOSIE M. FERNANDEZExecutive Council
- Page 260 and 261:
237MARY RACELISProfessorial Lecture
- Page 262 and 263:
239NAPAT TANGAPIWUTInstitute of Asi
- Page 264 and 265:
Persistent problems, promising solu
- Page 266 and 267:
Blurred borders and social integrat
- Page 268 and 269:
the basis of local identity and exa
- Page 270 and 271:
a certain Western perspective while
- Page 272 and 273:
strategy found their way into a bus