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160 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONacts of these organizations. In this ideology, there aretwo interconnected notions used by such groups (i.e.,JI, ASG, RKK), namely violent jihadism and takfir(enemizing perceived infidels, thereby rendering themlegitimate targets). If these groups only used one ofthese notions (i.e., the former), it would not lead toterror attacks, as jihad fi sabillillah (jihad in the pathof God) is allowed only in a declared war against thecombatants. If the latter (takfir) is incorporated into theformer, the target becomes mostly civilians. Moreover,in the views of the militants, the incentives they believethey will receive in the after-life for their actions areinstrumental in providing their motivation.It is interesting to note that Muslims can also becomethe targets of terrorism. This work, however, finds adifferent treatment of them by the groups under study.In the Indonesian case, the groups target Muslimswho are believed to be undermining the religion. JIoperatives, for instance, targeted Ulil Abshar Abdalla(an activist of the Liberal Islam Network, JIL) and evenMegawati Soekarnoputri (before she was President) forassassination, but these plans failed to be realized forvarious reasons. Imam Samudra tried to avoid Muslimcasualties; but if they got killed in the blast it wasconsidered to be their destinies, like collateral damage.He even apologized to the families of Muslim casualtiesin the 2002 Bali bombing (Samudra 2004). However,the ensuing bombings by JI continued to kill manyMuslims.The ASG under Abdurajak Janjalani was known forprotecting and helping Muslims. After his death andwhen Abu Sabaya threatened Christians and urgedMuslims to remove all crosses in Basilan, a formerASG member, Ahmad Sampang, said, “It is not rightanymore… If only Abdurajak was still alive, he would notallow it. Innocent Muslims will be affected” (in TorresJr 2001, 39). The ASG under Khadaffy Janjalani alsoprotected Muslims by, for instance, releasing Muslimswho were kidnapped by mistake (e.g., in the kidnappingof 52 teachers and students in Tumahubong, Basilan,in March 2000). However, they would try to kill thedefectors (perceived traitors) of the ASG; Sampangconfessed that at one time Abu Sabaya’s group went tohis house and tried to kill him, but that “I was able toescape” (in Torres Jr 2001, 42). The ASG also hated theMuslim Congressman Abdulgani “Gerry” Salapudin, aformer MNLF Commander. Sampang said, in the past,“He did not help us. We asked him once to give us atleast a few sacks of rice. But he failed us. We cannot killhim because he has a lot of armed men” (in Torres Jr2001, 39-42).The Thai case is, however, totally different. While JI andthe ASG mostly try to avoid Muslim casualties (if theyoccur, they are considered collateral damage), the newgeneration of insurgents in Thailand has intentionallytargeted many Muslims who work for the government,oppose their deeds and ideology or do not cooperatewith them. This has contributed to the fact that betweenJanuary 2004 and August 2006, more Muslims thanBuddhists were killed in the recent violence and terrorattacks in Thailand. One of the ideological explanationsfor this phenomenon can be found in a captureddocument entitled Berjihad di Pattani (Waging Jihadin Pattani).The majority of Muslims in Thailand, the Philippinesand Indonesia, are, however, moderate. They, includingreligious leaders, do not agree with the deeds and theideology used by JI, the ASG and RKK to justify theirterror attacks or violent acts.The networks: Actual and virtual networksThe networks can be distinguished into actual networksand virtual networks. An actual network can be dividedinto an internal network and an external network.The actual networks of such groups in Indonesia, thePhilippines and Thailand are summarised in Table 5.Another type of network—the virtual network—hasplayed a considerable role in the JI case. Discouragementsto commit terror attacks have been carried out by manyIndonesian religious leaders. Abu Bakar Baa’syir evenreleased a “fatwa”: “Don’t do bombing in Indonesia.”However, according to one security analyst, NoorHuda Ismail, “his ‘fatwa’ discouraging violence inIndonesia has not been well received by fringe youngand impassioned jihadi recruits. Young jihadists haveinstead turned to the Internet to download fatwas frommainly Middle Eastern jihadists, including fatwas fromthe late Jordanian-born Zarqawi and a jailed SaudiArabian cleric, Al Maqdisi” (Ismail 2007).The International Crisis Group (ICG) has notedthat since the 2002 Bali bombing, the terror groupsin Indonesia have reached the third generation andat present are not necessarily under JI’s structuralcommands. Abdullah Sonata, for instance, denied hismembership with JI. He instead declared himself andhis cohort as “mujahid freelance” (freelance mujahidin),meaning their movement is leaderless or under aleaderless organization. One former member of JI fromCentral Java confirmed that Sonata was not a member ofJI. It is also interesting to note that “about 18 ‘mujahidfreelance’ have been under detention” (Tempo 2005).Asian Transformations in ActionThe Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows