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SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATION 159Date Targets Suicide bombers Location Victims12 October 2002 Bar, Night Club(Bali Bombing I)Feri (aka Isa) Paddy’s Club, Bali 202 people dead,317 injuredIqbalSari Club, Bali5 August 2003 Hotel Asmar Latin Sani J.W. Marriott Hotel,Jakarta9 September 2004 Embassy Heri Golun Australian Embassy,Jakarta1 October 2005 Café(Bali Bombing II)Misno (aka Wisnuaka Yanto)It is interesting to understand what is driving theseactions. This can be traced from Imam Samudra’sstatement after he received a death sentence. The SydneyMorning Herald reported the case of Imam Samudra:Sentenced to death for his role in the nightclubattack in October 2002 by the Al-Qaeda-linkedJemaah Islamiah terror network that killed 202people, he said he does not fear facing a firingsquad. ‘It’s the key to paradise, everything willbe very, very nice,’ he told Sydney radio station2UE from his prison cell in remarks broadcastyesterday. He believed paradise held the promiseof 72 virgins for single men, but only 23 if a manBenega Café, BaliM. Salik Firdaus Nyoman Café, BaliAyib Hidayat R’Ajas Café, BaliTable 3: Suicide bombers in Indonesia.14 people dead,132 injured11 people dead,tens injured23 people dead,148 woundedhad been married on earth, as he has. ‘We kill toget peace,’ said Samudra, adding that his messageto the United States and Australia—which lost 88citizens in the Bali bombing—was ‘I win.’ (SydneyMorning Herald 2004)The research identified a number of other forces thatdrive JI, ASG and RKK (and some other new generationinsurgents) to carry out terror attacks or terror-relatedactions in Indonesia, the Phlippines and Thailand,respectively, which are summarised in Table 4.The ideology of violence is an important driving force.It has been used to justify the terror attacks or violentJI (Indonesia) ASG (The Philippines) RKK and others (Thailand)Ideology of violenceViolent Jihadism:- Global (primary)- Local (secondary)Takfir (excommunication, enemizingperceived infidels):- America and its allies- Non-believers (particularlyChristians)- The existing (secular)government- Believers (certain Muslims whoare believed to undermine thereligion and its perceived idealpractices)Violent Jihadism:- Local (primary)- Global (secondary)Takfir (excommunication, enemizingperceived infidels):- The existing (secular)government- Non-believers (particularlyCatholics)- America and its allies- Believers (some Muslimswho betray, oppose or donot support the struggle)Violent Jihadism:- LocalTakfir (excommunication, enemizingperceived infidels):- The existing (secular) government- Non-believers (particularlyBuddhists)- Believers (Muslims whocollaborate or work for thegovernment [munafik/hypocrite]and betray, oppose ornot cooperate in the struggle[murtad/apostate])Incentive ExpectationDying as a martyr Dying as a martyr Dying as a syahid (martyr)Going to paradise Dying as a holy warrior Dying as Wira Shuhada (army ofmartyrdom)“Dear my brother and wife, Godwilling, when you see this recordingI’ll already be in heaven.”Getting married or become abridegroom (in heaven)Marrying 72 virgins for a single man(23 for a married man)“Ride on a white horse to heavenwhen […] die”Going to heaven“When martyrs are killed, they arenot dead but alive next to God.”“They [the munafiks] will not bewelcomed in heaven.”Marrying 72 virginsTable 4: The ideology of violence in the researched countries.Asian Transformations in ActionThe Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows
160 SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATIONacts of these organizations. In this ideology, there aretwo interconnected notions used by such groups (i.e.,JI, ASG, RKK), namely violent jihadism and takfir(enemizing perceived infidels, thereby rendering themlegitimate targets). If these groups only used one ofthese notions (i.e., the former), it would not lead toterror attacks, as jihad fi sabillillah (jihad in the pathof God) is allowed only in a declared war against thecombatants. If the latter (takfir) is incorporated into theformer, the target becomes mostly civilians. Moreover,in the views of the militants, the incentives they believethey will receive in the after-life for their actions areinstrumental in providing their motivation.It is interesting to note that Muslims can also becomethe targets of terrorism. This work, however, finds adifferent treatment of them by the groups under study.In the Indonesian case, the groups target Muslimswho are believed to be undermining the religion. JIoperatives, for instance, targeted Ulil Abshar Abdalla(an activist of the Liberal Islam Network, JIL) and evenMegawati Soekarnoputri (before she was President) forassassination, but these plans failed to be realized forvarious reasons. Imam Samudra tried to avoid Muslimcasualties; but if they got killed in the blast it wasconsidered to be their destinies, like collateral damage.He even apologized to the families of Muslim casualtiesin the 2002 Bali bombing (Samudra 2004). However,the ensuing bombings by JI continued to kill manyMuslims.The ASG under Abdurajak Janjalani was known forprotecting and helping Muslims. After his death andwhen Abu Sabaya threatened Christians and urgedMuslims to remove all crosses in Basilan, a formerASG member, Ahmad Sampang, said, “It is not rightanymore… If only Abdurajak was still alive, he would notallow it. Innocent Muslims will be affected” (in TorresJr 2001, 39). The ASG under Khadaffy Janjalani alsoprotected Muslims by, for instance, releasing Muslimswho were kidnapped by mistake (e.g., in the kidnappingof 52 teachers and students in Tumahubong, Basilan,in March 2000). However, they would try to kill thedefectors (perceived traitors) of the ASG; Sampangconfessed that at one time Abu Sabaya’s group went tohis house and tried to kill him, but that “I was able toescape” (in Torres Jr 2001, 42). The ASG also hated theMuslim Congressman Abdulgani “Gerry” Salapudin, aformer MNLF Commander. Sampang said, in the past,“He did not help us. We asked him once to give us atleast a few sacks of rice. But he failed us. We cannot killhim because he has a lot of armed men” (in Torres Jr2001, 39-42).The Thai case is, however, totally different. While JI andthe ASG mostly try to avoid Muslim casualties (if theyoccur, they are considered collateral damage), the newgeneration of insurgents in Thailand has intentionallytargeted many Muslims who work for the government,oppose their deeds and ideology or do not cooperatewith them. This has contributed to the fact that betweenJanuary 2004 and August 2006, more Muslims thanBuddhists were killed in the recent violence and terrorattacks in Thailand. One of the ideological explanationsfor this phenomenon can be found in a captureddocument entitled Berjihad di Pattani (Waging Jihadin Pattani).The majority of Muslims in Thailand, the Philippinesand Indonesia, are, however, moderate. They, includingreligious leaders, do not agree with the deeds and theideology used by JI, the ASG and RKK to justify theirterror attacks or violent acts.The networks: Actual and virtual networksThe networks can be distinguished into actual networksand virtual networks. An actual network can be dividedinto an internal network and an external network.The actual networks of such groups in Indonesia, thePhilippines and Thailand are summarised in Table 5.Another type of network—the virtual network—hasplayed a considerable role in the JI case. Discouragementsto commit terror attacks have been carried out by manyIndonesian religious leaders. Abu Bakar Baa’syir evenreleased a “fatwa”: “Don’t do bombing in Indonesia.”However, according to one security analyst, NoorHuda Ismail, “his ‘fatwa’ discouraging violence inIndonesia has not been well received by fringe youngand impassioned jihadi recruits. Young jihadists haveinstead turned to the Internet to download fatwas frommainly Middle Eastern jihadists, including fatwas fromthe late Jordanian-born Zarqawi and a jailed SaudiArabian cleric, Al Maqdisi” (Ismail 2007).The International Crisis Group (ICG) has notedthat since the 2002 Bali bombing, the terror groupsin Indonesia have reached the third generation andat present are not necessarily under JI’s structuralcommands. Abdullah Sonata, for instance, denied hismembership with JI. He instead declared himself andhis cohort as “mujahid freelance” (freelance mujahidin),meaning their movement is leaderless or under aleaderless organization. One former member of JI fromCentral Java confirmed that Sonata was not a member ofJI. It is also interesting to note that “about 18 ‘mujahidfreelance’ have been under detention” (Tempo 2005).Asian Transformations in ActionThe Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows
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Asian Transformations in ActionThe
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iiiCONTENTSAbout the BookAcknowledg
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V. APPENDICESCultivation of Transfo
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The Regional Project, entitled “C
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ixTHE CONTRIBUTORS(in alphabetical
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MYFEL JOSEPH PALUGA is a faculty me
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xiiiare common to nations around th
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xvsilence maintained by academe on
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xviiIt is reasonable and necessary,
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xixOVERVIEWCzarina Saloma-Akpedonu,
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xxito retain their identity but at
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xxiiiABOUT THE WORKSHOPThe 6 th API
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2CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALANC
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233Day 3, Tuesday, 27 November 2007
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JOSIE M. FERNANDEZExecutive Council
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237MARY RACELISProfessorial Lecture
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239NAPAT TANGAPIWUTInstitute of Asi
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Persistent problems, promising solu
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Blurred borders and social integrat
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the basis of local identity and exa
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a certain Western perspective while
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strategy found their way into a bus
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