CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALANCES 13Actors’ perceptions of and attitudes towards the NECCThe S46 scoffed that OPP II was a plan for bus<strong>in</strong>esspeople, and actors <strong>in</strong> the first quadrant labeled theNECC undemocratic and the OPP II as pay<strong>in</strong>g “lipserviceto politically less sensitive concerns” (Star, June19, 1991; Kua 1990, 3; Jomo 1994, 49-50). On theopposite side, actors that fall <strong>in</strong>to the second quadrantpraised the OPP II because it promoted economicgrowth led by the private sector <strong>in</strong> a liberal environmentand changed the approach to social restructur<strong>in</strong>g (Star,June 18, 19, 20, 1991). These actors believed thatmany of their views and the NECC recommendationshad been <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to the OPP II. UMNOalso supported the OPP II because it set a target fordevelop<strong>in</strong>g Bumiputra entrepreneurs (Star, June 22,1991).The NECC provided the above actors with opportunitiesto have their <strong>in</strong>terests reflected <strong>in</strong> the policy. Thisexpla<strong>in</strong>s their acceptance of the non-liberal political<strong>in</strong>stitution and, hence, the slow<strong>in</strong>g down of oppositionforces.Conclusion: Implication for regime dynamicsThe above f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs are captured <strong>in</strong> Figure 2. There is an<strong>in</strong>teraction with a time lag between the two variables,namely political freedom and the size of oppositionforces, which draws a clockwise trajectory. As thegovernment decided to restrict the political freedomof the people, the size of the opposition <strong>in</strong>creased (theenactment of the first and second OSA bills—trajectoriesrepresented by arrows 1 and 2), until the oppositionmovement successfully forced the government to take aturn towards liberalization, which move was followedby a decrease <strong>in</strong> the size of the opposition to “O” (thethird OSA bill—arrows 3 and 4). The size of theopposition has rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> stasis at “O,” because thelevel of restriction has not varied <strong>in</strong> the course of theimplementation.The enactment of the Freedom of Information Act(FOI) can be achieved only when the trajectory shiftsto the upper right (the ideal trajectory). However, aslong as deliberative <strong>in</strong>stitutions, such as the NECC, areperceived to be effective channels of <strong>in</strong>terest articulationby many actors (e.g., the BN parties, bus<strong>in</strong>esscommunities), such a shift is not likely to occur.Contrary to expectations, middle and capitalist classesare not as conservative as are alleged, and neither iscivil society so divided. In fact, their cooperation, orthe synchronization of the movements by respectiveactors, actually resulted <strong>in</strong> the amendments to theOSA. However, the above picture also dismissesthe assumption of the <strong>in</strong>cremental tendency of theopposition forces. Rather, the size of the oppositionforces, which determ<strong>in</strong>es the prospect for <strong>in</strong>stitutionalreform and regime change, is <strong>in</strong> dynamic <strong>in</strong>teractionwith people’s perceptions of and attitudes towardsthe political <strong>in</strong>stitution and the nature of the political<strong>in</strong>stitution.A scenario for liberalization, based on the above model,is as follows. A serious abuse of the OSA gives rise toan opposition movement (arrow 1), while many actorsf<strong>in</strong>d the deliberative <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>in</strong>effective, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gabout a shift <strong>in</strong> the trajectory to the ideal one, result<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> endurable opposition (arrow 5), which eventuallySize of opposition forces25301Actual dynamics of opposition forcesIdeal dynamics of opposition forcesFigure 3: Dynamics of opposition forces and political freedom.4OSA 1 & 2 OSA3 FOIPolitical freedom<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Transformations</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Action</strong>The Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows
14CIRCLES OF POWER AND COUNTERBALANCESleads to the enactment of the Freedom of InformationAct. In other words, pro-liberal movements succeedwhen more people face authoritative control and an<strong>in</strong>effective deliberative framework.We may be able to th<strong>in</strong>k of another way than astraightforward liberalization, which may follow sucha gloomy development. For example, broaden<strong>in</strong>gand deepen<strong>in</strong>g the deliberation processes and gradual<strong>in</strong>stitutional reform through deliberation amongvarious actors may be realistic, as is exemplified by theBar Council’s successful effort for legal reform throughdeliberation with the government, which resulted <strong>in</strong> anamendment to the Legal Profession Act <strong>in</strong> 2003.NOTES1The orig<strong>in</strong>al OSA was enacted <strong>in</strong> 1972.REFERENCESBooks and articlesAbdul Rahman Embong. State-led Modernization and the NewMiddle Class <strong>in</strong> Malaysia. New York: Palgrave, 2002.Case, William. “Semi-Democracy <strong>in</strong> Malaysia: Withstand<strong>in</strong>gthe Pressures for Regime Change.” Pacific Affairs 66.2 (1993):183-205.Crouch, Harold. Government and Society <strong>in</strong> Malaysia. Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1996.Jomo, K.S. Beyond 1990: Considerations for a New NationalDevelopment Strategy. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of AdvancedStudies, University of Malaya, 1989.________. U-Turn? Malaysian Economic Development Policyafter 1990. Townsville: James Cook University of NorthQueensland, 1994.Kok Wee Kiat, L<strong>in</strong>g Liong Sik, Fong Chan Onn, Chua JuiMeng, and Michael Yeoh. The Malaysian Challenges <strong>in</strong> the1990s—Strategies for Growth and Development, Selangor:Pelanduk Publications, MCA, 1990.Kua Kia Soong. Ed. Framework for an Alternative MalaysianEconomic Policy. Kuala Lumpur: The Resource and ResearchCentre, Selangor Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Assembly Hall, 1990.Means, Gordon. “Soft Authoritarianism <strong>in</strong> Malaysia andS<strong>in</strong>gapore.” Journal of Democracy 7.1 (1996): 103-17.Ottaway, Mar<strong>in</strong>a. Democracy Challenged. Wash<strong>in</strong>gton:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM). NEP Selepas 1990?The National Economic Policy-1990 and Beyond. Pulau P<strong>in</strong>ang:Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, 1984.Weiss, Meredith. Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society andCoalitions for Political Change <strong>in</strong> Malaysia. Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2006.Government publicationsPenyata Rasmi Parlimen Dewan Rakyat (PRPDR). December5, 1986.National Economic Consultative Council (NECC). LaporanMajlis Perund<strong>in</strong>gan Ekonomi Negara, 1991.Malaysia, The Second Outl<strong>in</strong>e Perspective Plan 1991-2000,1991 (OPP II).Conference speeches and papersFong Chan Onn. “NECC Report and the NDP: Reflectionsof Multi-Ethnic Understand<strong>in</strong>g?” MCA National Sem<strong>in</strong>ar onNECC & NDAP. 25 August 1991, Kuala Lumpur.Yeoh Poh Seng. Ed. “A Review of the Third BumiputeraEconomic Congress Resolutions and Their Implications onFuture Policy Formulation.” Report of Malaysian Ch<strong>in</strong>eseEconomic Congress. 18-19 August 1992 , Kuala Lumpur.Mahathir Mohamad. “The Way Forward.” February 28,1991. Malaysian Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Council.Mohd. Ramli Kushairi. “New Directions for the Post-1990Economic Policy.” National Chamber of Commerce &Industry of Malaysia and Malaysian Institute of EconomicResearch. National Conference on Post-1990 EconomicPolicy: New Directions for Post-1990 Economic Policy. 31 stJuly - 1 st August, 1989, Kuala Lumpur.Newspapers and magaz<strong>in</strong>esNanyang Siang Pau: 26 November 1986; 16 December 1986;12 September 1988; 26 November 1988New Straits Times: 8, 10, 17, 18, 23, 25, 28, 29 March 1986;28, 29, 31 October 1986; 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22,23, 25, 26 November 1986; 4, 8, 10, 12, 22 December 1986;2, 3, 4, 5 April 1986; 22, 23 April 1987; 29 October 1988;27 July 1989; 5 February 1990; 27 August 1992; 4 October1992; 15 January 2000<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Transformations</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Action</strong>The Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows
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