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SPECIFICITIES OF GLOBALIZATION 157The driving forcesThe driving forces of such terror attacks or terror-relatedactions in the researched countries could be highlightedfrom two contending perspectives: grievances vs. greed.These contending perspectives, however, insufficientlyexplain such phenomena. Therefore, the papergoes beyond these two contending perspectives byhighlighting perpetrators’ ideology of volence.The grievance issueThe findings reveal that terrorism, terror attacks, or terrorrelated actions in these three countries (Indonesia, thePhilippines and Thailand) were driven by grievances.Table 1 compares the groups’ main grievances.The grievances listed below and the attacks as notedhave a religious dimension in each of these countries.Although in the Indonesian case the current topgrievance is anti-American sentiment, there is stilla strong religious dimension. Such grievances alongwith the origins of the problems (the historical origin)become the root causes of terrorism and terror attacks,consisting of both historical and structural roots. Theexistence of these root causes implies the existence ofgaps between the state and the community and betweentwo different communities.It seems that addressing some of these grievances isbeyond the authority or capability of the respectivegovernments (e.g., the issues of the US and Israel’spolicies and actions in the Indonesian case). Some ofthem are certainly opposed by the existing governments(e.g., the conversion of the secular state to an Islamicstate in Indonesia, the establishment of independentIslamic states in the Philippines and Thailand). Therest could be discussed. As experienced in the past, thegroups may provide concessions if the governments arealso willing to give some. Thus, there is a space to dealwith the existing gaps, at least to improve the situation.Civil society could play an imperative role in bridgingthe gaps.IndonesiaThe PhilippinesMoney funnelled by Al Qaeda to JIMoney funnelled by Al Qaeda to the ASGAl Qaeda to Hambali (I) = USD30,000Jamal Khalifa to ASG = PhP160,000Al Qaeda to Hambali (II) = USD100,000Jamal Khalifa to ASG = PhP6,000,000Al Qaeda to JI (1995) = IDR250 millionAl Qaeda to ASG = Est. USD3,000,000Al Qaeda to JI (1997) = IDR400 millionAl Qaeda to JI (2000) = IDR700 millionIn-country fundraisingOmar al-Faruq to JI = USD200,000a. Main Kidnappings:M Jabarah to JI = USD70,000Sipadan kidnapping = at least USD10,000,000Hambali was captured with USD70,000Ten journalists kidnapping = USD25,000Three journalists kidnapping = Est. USD5,500,000In-country fundraisingPalawan kidnapping = at least USD330,000 (forJewellery shop robbery in Serang (Banten) = IDR6million and 4.5 kg of goldGracia Burnham’s release) + PhP5million (for Kimberly Jao Uy’s release)Lippo bank robbery in Medan = IDR113 millionLocal government’s fund robbery in Poso = IDR490 million b. OthersJewellery shop robbery in Pasar Tua (Palu) = n/aExtortion, blackmail = n/aJewellery shop robbery in Monginsidi (Palu) = n/aTaxing businesspeople, farmers, teachers, among othersMarijuana cultivation & sale of shabu = n/aExpendituresBali bombing I = Est. IDR80 millionExpendituresJW Marriot bombing = Est. IDR80 millionNew teenage recruits in Basilan = PhP5,000/ personAustralian embassy bombing = Est. IDR80 millionNew recruits in Jolo/Sulu = PhP50,000/personOthers = n/aOthers = n/aNotes: (1) n/a = data not available(2) The currency at that time was about Rp 10,000 and PhP42 to the US dollar in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively.Table 2: Terror financing in Indonesia and the Philippines.Asian Transformations in ActionThe Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows