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Evaluation of the Ticket to Work Program, Implementation ...

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2<strong>of</strong> disability beneficiaries, and interviews with SSA staff, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Program</strong> Manager, andrepresentatives <strong>of</strong> ENs and SVRAs. It uses this new information <strong>to</strong> examine <strong>the</strong> programfrom <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> TTW-eligible beneficiaries (Chapters II through IV), serviceproviders (Chapters V and VI), and SSA (Chapter VII). Also examined are two broad policyissues that are central <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> design and success <strong>of</strong> TTW: <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>to</strong> which TTW givesproviders a strong financial incentive <strong>to</strong> serve disability beneficiaries (Chapter VIII) and <strong>the</strong>extent <strong>to</strong> which TTW seems <strong>to</strong> be including <strong>the</strong> full range <strong>of</strong> beneficiaries, particularly thosewho may need more intensive supports or assistance <strong>to</strong> succeed in <strong>the</strong> labor market (ChapterIX). Overall conclusions and recommendations are presented in <strong>the</strong> final chapter.A. BACKGROUND ON TICKET TO WORK AND ITS IMPLEMENTATIONThe TTW program, <strong>to</strong>ge<strong>the</strong>r with a few o<strong>the</strong>r initiatives created by <strong>the</strong> same legislation,represents a new approach <strong>to</strong> an old problem. 1 The problem is that while many personswith disabilities work, relatively few who receive disability benefits from SSA ever leave <strong>the</strong>rolls as a result <strong>of</strong> working, and even some who want <strong>to</strong> work may not do so—or may notsucceed in <strong>the</strong> workplace—for a variety <strong>of</strong> reasons.Disability beneficiaries who want substantial employment may face four barriers. First,<strong>the</strong> Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (DI) programs havepolicies that reduce or <strong>of</strong>fset <strong>the</strong> financial gain from employment by reducing benefits asearnings increase. This lowers, in net terms, <strong>the</strong> incentive <strong>to</strong> pursue gainful employment.Second, beneficiaries may have a limited understanding <strong>of</strong> not only <strong>the</strong> provisions designed<strong>to</strong> encourage and reward work, but also <strong>the</strong> services available <strong>to</strong> help <strong>the</strong>m find a job andkeep it. Third, beneficiaries may have nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> skills nor <strong>the</strong> attitudes that would increase<strong>the</strong>ir chances <strong>of</strong> succeeding in <strong>the</strong> workplace; or <strong>the</strong>y may require certain accommodations<strong>to</strong> help <strong>the</strong>m overcome impairments and remain productively employed. Fourth, employersmay misunderstand beneficiaries’ abilities or even discriminate against such individuals.The <strong>Ticket</strong> Act provided a new means <strong>to</strong> help beneficiaries address <strong>the</strong>se barriers andbecome employed and financially self-sufficient. In particular, it introduced a new financingsystem for service providers that added two payment options <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional system thatSSA has used <strong>to</strong> pay state vocational rehabilitation agencies (SVRAs) for rehabilitationservices provided <strong>to</strong> beneficiaries. The traditional system reimburses an agency’s costs, up <strong>to</strong>a limit, if a beneficiary’s earnings reach at least <strong>the</strong> substantial gainful activity level (currentlyset at $830 per month for most beneficiaries) for 9 months in a 12-month period. Both <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> new payment options try <strong>to</strong> give providers a stronger performance incentive ins<strong>of</strong>ar as<strong>the</strong>y require a beneficiary earn enough so that <strong>the</strong>y no longer receive cash benefits for 60months before <strong>the</strong> provider receives full payment. Of <strong>the</strong> two new systems, <strong>the</strong> first option,<strong>the</strong> “outcome-only” system, provides higher payments but only when <strong>the</strong> desired outcome isachieved, i.e., when a beneficiary leaves <strong>the</strong> rolls because <strong>of</strong> work. The o<strong>the</strong>r new option,1 Readers interested in more extensive background information on <strong>the</strong> TTW program or <strong>the</strong> evaluationshould see <strong>the</strong> initial evaluation report (Thorn<strong>to</strong>n et al. 2004) or <strong>the</strong> preliminary process analysis (Livermoreet al. 2003).I: Introduction

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