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106 Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity<br />

less surprised by recent events—from 9/11 and the Arab Spring to the<br />

rise of ISIS and Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict—than their predecessors<br />

were 30 years ago when the United States failed to anticipate<br />

the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s policymakers find themselves<br />

increasingly frustrated by jobs that involve more crisis management—<br />

suppressing system shocks—than strategic thinking, 5 and by the difficulty<br />

(especially in the current political environment) of mustering the<br />

consensus, trust, and thus the resources necessary to prevent and/or prepare<br />

even for those developments that can be foreseen. 6 The large influx<br />

of resources since 9/11 has helped the intelligence community in one of<br />

its primary missions: intelligence relevant to counterterrorism. However,<br />

it does not appear to have improved the U.S. ability to anticipate other<br />

kinds of developments or prevent surprise. 7 And many things that surprise<br />

us are not actually “intelligence failures”—rather, they result from<br />

a broader inability to pair foresight with action. Yet the more turbulent<br />

the times, the more acute the need for U.S. leaders to look ahead, contemplate<br />

actions that could be taken in the present to improve future<br />

outcomes, and anticipate events rather than respond to them. 8<br />

Contrary to popular belief and the needs of policymakers, intelligence<br />

is not about predicting the future. It is about collecting and<br />

analyzing information that helps explain the physical and political<br />

5 Julianne Smith, “Our Overworked Security Bureaucracy,” Democracy Journal, No. 40,<br />

Spring 2016. She concludes that, “While it is no doubt impossible to predict how and when<br />

the next crisis will unfold, our government must do a better job of assessing risk, testing core<br />

assumptions, and preparing itself for potential contingencies.”<br />

6 The U.S. difficulty in funding a response to the Zika virus is a recent example. Nora Kelly,<br />

“The Senate Goes Home Without Funding Zika,” The Atlantic, April 29, 2016.<br />

7 Known strategies used to reduce surprise include relying on experience, reducing the<br />

number of variables in a problem, adopting a measured response to preserve future options,<br />

and teamwork. Dave Baiocchi and D. Steven Fox, Surprise! From CEOs to Navy Seals: How a<br />

Select Group of Professionals Prepare for and Respond to the Unexpected, Santa Monica, Calif.:<br />

RAND Corporation, RR-341-NRO, 2013.<br />

8 The Project on Forward Engagement has been working on a systems-based approach to<br />

“anticipatory governance” since 2011. Leon Fuerth and Evan M. H. Farber, Anticipatory<br />

Governance, Practical Upgrades: Equipping the Executive Branch to Cope with Increasing Speed<br />

and Complexity of Major Challenges, Washington, D.C.: The Project on Forward Engagement,<br />

October 2012.

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