STRATEGIC

Option III: “Agile America”: Adapt and Compete in a Changing World 197
will continue to maintain friendly relations with all of its allies, but
it cannot continue to be a supplicant to deeply flawed, poorly governed
regimes in exchange for counterterrorism cooperation, U.S.
basing rights, and so on. Its relationships with Middle East “frenemies”
should become more transactional. Short-term counterterrorism concerns
must not always trump broader U.S. values and the longer-term
agenda.
At the same time, the United States should not be under any illusion
that it can “promote” democracy in the Middle East. By having
more political distance from its most problematic allies, it may be more
able in the future to anticipate the inevitable next round of uprisings
against malgoverned Middle East regimes, whether these occur a year
or decades from now. Meanwhile, the United States should step up
cultural and economic exchanges with the peoples of the Middle East,
hedging against the uncertain future of their governments.
Defense and Defense Spending
Assumptions
U.S. national security ultimately derives from prosperity and in the
future will depend on access to and stability of the most dynamic
regions of the developing world. Countries that once figured into the
U.S. strategic calculus mainly as Cold War proxies have grown into
economic powerhouses, with large populations, growing militaries,
and regional ambitions. American prosperity will depend on peace and
security in these regions, safe navigation and transport of goods and
people to the important new regions, and thus on U.S. security cooperation
with a range of new partners.
Collaborative security arrangements in Europe—and, potentially,
in Asia—will be increasingly important; Europe, Japan, and South
Korea—the nations that have most benefited from such arrangements
in the past—are more than capable of contributing more to regional
defense. Success in this strategy would require the United States to find
new ways to assist its allies and persuade them to do more. For NATO
members, this means not only achieving the agreed target of spending