STRATEGIC

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Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity
The first half of this report explores the character of the challenges
of what former Secretary of State George P. Shultz has called “a
world awash in change.” It reviews America’s changing ideas of itself
and the world beyond as the United States moved from triumph at
the end of the Cold War to the current political stalemate and public
mood of self-doubt, which has itself become a constraint on engagement
abroad. The report also examines the major geopolitical shifts
that have occurred since 9/11 in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East,
and suggests that a flexible approach to diplomacy will be required to
deal with this Rubik’s Cube of shifting international alignments.
Existential and Nonexistential Threats
Whether or not “the world is falling apart,” the United States is in many
ways in an enviable position compared with its rivals. First, the nation
faces no certain existential threat. It does face potential existential threats
from nuclear-armed Russia and China, but without the “we will bury
you” animus that put the fear of hot war into the Cold War confrontation
with the Soviet Union. 2 Today, these rival states are ambiguously both
adversaries and partners—though recently, both appear to be moving
more firmly into the adversary camp. Each has made territorial assertions
that challenge international conventions of state sovereignty and
legal approaches to managing disputes. And each has ramped up spending
and made notable military advances that challenge U.S. deterrence.
Russia has emerged as a revanchist power since Vladimir Putin’s
return to the presidency in 2012 and it now threatens to destabilize
Europe through political pressure and subversion. Russia gains
a degree of immunity for its aggression by reason of its substantial
nuclear arsenal, which it is upgrading. Its “hybrid warfare” tactics, a
combination of political and covert subversion and deniable military
and cyber operations and information warfare, are more difficult to
2 This remark by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 was translated as, “Whether
you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.” Many scholars argue that what
Khrushchev meant was “We will outlast you.” See Philip H. Gordon, Winning the Right War:
The Path to Security for America and the World, New York: Henry Holt, 2007, p. 174.